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
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THE GREAT PEACE



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THE GREAT PEACE

BY

H. H. POWERS

Author of "The Things Men Fight For," "America
Among the Nations," "America
and Britain," etc.

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1918

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PREFACE

WHEN I was asked last August to prepare a book on the terms of peace, I consented to have it ready by March, 1919. My publishers thought that it should be ready by February first if it was to anticipate the march of events. The writing was completed in October, but even so, events have gotten ahead. It is some consolation to know that the whole world shares in this miscalculation. Neither the peoples nor their governments, the knowing ones who had all the inside information, were prepared for this headlong precipitancy. A letter from one of the staff of the Department of State at Washington expresses the surprise, not to say the consternation, of the government at this sudden development for which we were so eager and yet so utterly unprepared. It was in anticipation of this unpreparedness that the book was written, and yet I too am caught among the unprepared.

Naturally I have considered carefully whether any change should be made in the text as the proofs pass through my hands, but save for a few footnotes and minor changes, I have left it as it was written. The difficulty in the phraseology,—all of it appropriate to the situation of last September,—is pervasive. Adaptation to the situation of today would mean re-writing. But it is only the phraseology that the armistice has rendered out of date. The problems remain,—not one of them settled despite confident and contradictory newspaper assertion. Even the signing of the treaty of peace, an event for which we must perhaps long wait in patience, will bring to most of them no immediate solution. If the great truth be borne in mind that we are dealing with the slow forces of race evolution rather than with political fiats of in-

stant effectiveness, we shall be little disturbed by these sudden eddies in the slow current of events. Momentous as these November days have been, they do not seem to me to have greatly altered the problem. As I read in these days of victory what I wrote in the days of struggle, it is only words that I would change.

No doubt the reader will be impatient,—as I was,—to get over the generalities of Part I and get to the concrete problems of Part II. We have been surfeited with generalities and abstract propositions. We are eager to know where the new frontiers are to be drawn and how much Germany is going to pay to Belgium, and what is going to become of the Kaiser. But I have found, as I believe the reader will find, that there is no getting away from these general principles. We must either master them or they will master us. If we do not hold them as reasoned propositions, we hold them as prepossessions and unconscious assumptions. Thus, there is a universal assumption that people of one speech ought to live under one government, and from that we hastily conclude that there should be an independent Poland. We do not stop to consider that by the same token we ought to be British, Alsace should be German, and Switzerland should be divided among Germany, Italy, and France. Again we assert the right of all peoples to decide their own allegiance. That would have justified the Southern Confederacy and would insure the crumbling of half Europe into helpless fragments. Or again we assert the claim of the past and plead for the restoration of historic arrangements. That would make New England British and Florida Spanish while reuniting the Poles and freeing the Bohemians. In popular discussion these and other principles are confidently assumed as political axioms,—not conjointly of course, for this would neutralize them, but singly and for the most part arbitrarily, the particular assumption being requisitioned which proves

momentarily convenient. The writer like the reader is subject to this lawless tyranny of arbitrary assumption unless he sternly guards himself against it. It is for this reason that I have ventured to consider with some care the scope and the limitations of these principles which are so confidently and so carelessly assumed in current discussion. I hope the reader will have the patience to do the same.

Those who have done me the honor to read my earlier books on these subjects will see in the present book a larger recognition of the psychological factor and something less of insistence upon physical environment and cosmic forces than in the earlier works. They will perhaps assume that I have changed my views as to the relative importance of these factors. I should not feel humiliated to plead guilty to the honorable indictment. Strange indeed must be the individual or the nation that has passed through these four years without seeing things in somewhat different proportion. The very hope of the world lies in such changes as the result of its travail.

But the change is after all more in my theme than in my attitude. Hitherto I have dealt with permanent relations and with influences extending over centuries. Seen thus in longer perspective, history seems primarily the product of the cosmic forces. The fume and fret of men seems but froth on the surface. Altogether different is the problem here considered, the problem of effecting a working arrangement for the years immediately before us. In this problem of the hour and of the near tomorrow, human forces are everything. The hate of Bulgar and Greek, the prejudice of Moslem and Orthodox and Catholic among the Jugo-Slavs, the resentment against German barbarities,— what are mountains and seas against these fierce energies of the human soul? To treat these as at once almighty and ephemeral, this is the difficult art of the statesman.

I make no apology for my rather pitiless insistence upon the difficulties of the problem and the necessarily imperfect, even provisional, character of the adjustments which peace will effect. The air is full of that irrepressible optimism which is at once the hope and the despair of humanity. If I have trudged along on the ground while others have aeroplaned in the clouds, unmindful of the obstacles that beset the pathway of plodding men, I have none the less trudged cheerfully, confident that the obstacles are being overcome and that we shall sometime attain our goal.

H. H. POWERS.

Newton, Mass.,
November 19, 1918.

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE Great War is passing and the Great Peace approaches. The conflict, prolonged and widened beyond our utmost fears, is entering upon its fifth year as these lines are written. The end is not yet, but the indications are getting clearer that the end is approaching and that the end is to be as we wish. Beyond doubt an extremely stubborn conflict is still before us, with losses that will stagger humanity and with possible vicissitudes of fortune which may at times obscure the issue, but a calm survey of the situation from a point withdrawn from the smoke of battle permits but one conclusion. The initial advantage of German preparedness has disappeared, and the superior resources of the Allies in men and materials are unmistakably apparent. The crude and hesitant allied strategy of the early months of the war has been succeeded by clear vision and fixed purpose. The almost insuperable difficulties in the way of unified command have been overcome. Leadership, if not of Napoleonic genius, yet forged in the heat of the great conflict and of demonstrated competency, has been assured. Above all the incoherence of thought and confusion of purpose, always the supreme danger in democratic governments, have been eliminated. The onslaught of the highly organized Central Powers, which so nearly overwhelmed us at the outset, has transformed our unbridled, wanton energy into disciplined power. The more the struggle is prolonged, the more complete that transformation will be and the more assured our triumph. Such is the outlook at this hour. It may deceive us, for nothing is sure before the event, but if the outcome is not

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assured, the obligation of preparedness for the next step is clear. It may be presumptuous to assume victory at this stage of the conflict, but it is simple prudence to prepare betimes for an event which we have willed with all the power of our being and which seems increasingly assured.

And for this event we are not prepared. As far as Berlin our pathway lies straight before us,—difficult beyond compare, but unmistakable. But from there it is lost in a maze of infinite intricacy. If Germany were beaten tomorrow, we should be in sore perplexity to know what to do next. Preparation for war has left us no time to prepare for peace,—nay, more, it has been a bar to any such preparation. One of the difficult lessons we have had to learn is that we must cease discussing the issues of the war until victory was assured. The paramount need was for agreement. To disagree while we were fighting Germany meant ruin. Hence Germany's oft repeated seductive invitation: "Come, now, let us reason together." Germany knew that if she could start a discussion of peace terms, she could start a disagreement with all its disastrous consequences. Fortunately we knew it too, and have had the self-control to adjourn till the hour of victory those questions upon which agreement will be sure to be difficult and attended with many heart burnings. We were agreed with certainty upon only one thing, the necessity of defeating Germany. For this every nation, every class, every school of opinion, had its own reasons. Latin and Saxon, capital and labor, imperialist and anti-imperialist, all were in sharpest disagreement on some of the issues involved. Fortunately they were agreed that the defeat of Germany was more than the issues upon which they disagreed. The Latin wished to defeat her because she held provinces rightfully his; the Briton because she menaced his necessary sea communications. The laborite recognized Germany as unfriendly to the political ascendancy of

labor, while the manufacturer feared the ruthless aggression of German "big business." The imperialist saw in imperialist Germany a redoubtable competitor; the anti-imperialist saw in her the chief protagonist of a hated principle. It was thumbs down all round, but for the most varied and even opposite reasons. The one condition of successful coöperation under such circumstances is that individual aims shall be subordinated. This has been perhaps our hardest lesson as allies, but we have learned it. A few remain who will not be silenced, who are so intent upon their particular purpose that they are willing to risk defeat rather than that victory should fail to realize their hopes. Thus a recent champion of ultra democratic reforms declares that if these reforms are not realized in the forthcoming peace, the war will have been fought in vain. Our allies "must not be permitted to determine our purposes" in the war, but we must constrain them to make these purposes their own, knowing that this will be "for their ultimate good." To this end he urges that President Wilson should force their hand by the threat of withdrawing from the alliance. Our aid being indispensable, our terms would necessarily be accepted. This enthusiast does not raise the question of what would happen if Britain should threaten to withdraw unless we acquiesced in a program of annexation. He sees no disturbing analogy between his proposal and the action of Bulgaria who demanded her price and sold out to the highest bidder, or that of Italy who conditioned her support upon the doubtful acquisition of territories across the Adriatic. To sanction these purposes is farthest from his thoughts, for they are purposes which he does not approve. But "our" (?) purposes are different, and since they have as yet not commended themselves to our allies, and these allies show no inclination voluntarily to adopt them, it is obvious strategy to bargain with those who oppose these purposes when they are in a tight place.

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It needs no very profound insight to see that this is introducing the principle of belligerency into the Allied camp. Strategy is a principle of war, and its use against allies means war against allies. If every people, class, or party should choose this time to push its advantage under penalty of refusing to coöperate, it is obvious that coöperation would at once cease. For while the radical declares that if peace does not assure radical democracy, the war will have been fought in vain, a conservative is simultaneously declaring that if ultra democracy prevails, "then we have lost the war." To the insinuating demand that we should state our case against Germany, there has been one consistent answer. We have no single case against Germany. We have individual cases against her, but as yet no common case. Each belligerent has purposes peculiar to itself, purposes in which its allies have little interest, purposes which are even mutually antagonistic. Italy wants the Trentino and Trieste, but has no direct interest in the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. France wants Alsace-Lorraine, but is little interested in,—perhaps is secretly jealous of,—Britain's control of the sea. And so on indefinitely. The discussion of these aims may produce,—almost certainly will produce,—antagonisms and estrangements, not only between allies, but also between classes and special interests within each individual country. No successful war of modern times has failed to have its aftermath of disappointment and recrimination. England's clemency to the Boers alienated large sections of British political opinion. The Treaty of Frankfort left divided counsels in Germany, and the Treaty of Portsmouth well nigh produced a revolution in Japan. This war will be no exception to the rule. It will rather be an exceptional case in point. Hence the just characterization of all Germany's peace offensives as traps. If these inherent conflicts of interest and opinion could be lifted

up into consciousness while Germany is still redoubtable, a judicious concession to war-weary Italy or some other approachable unit might disclose another Caporetto and breach the line. Failing this, it would at least lessen the cohesion and weaken the morale upon which victory depends. It is all but certain that if the belligerents were to agree to an armistice and meet in council, conditions would develop, as the result of their discussions, which would make the resumption of hostilities impossible, no matter how unsatisfactory the results obtained.

All such proposals have fallen flat, save in the deplorable case of Russia, whose fate has not been without its lessons for the Allies. These proposals have found their supporters, but they have everywhere been a dwindling minority. Not without difficulty has a people habituated to free speech and political discussion, seen the reasonableness of refusing to reason. Yet in nothing have they so justified the claim of democracy to be the arbiter of these difficult questions. It is democracy's supreme achievement to have perceived that the will to victory must exclude all else until victory makes it possible to disagree and not perish. For disagree we shall and must.

It is thus that preparation for war has postponed preparation for peace, by excluding from negotiation, from public discussion, even from individual thought, the grave questions incident to peace. With all the pronouncements that have appeared, there is as yet scarce a beginning of formulated terms. These pronouncements have been, for the most part, literary or rhetorical generalizations valuable for rallying purposes but not of a nature to enter into a treaty of peace. To destroy militarism, to make the world safe for democracy, to secure the right of self-determination for all peoples, these are legitimate formulas for ideals, but it is clear that if these ends are to be furthered by treaty, these propositions must

be translated into concrete terms, territorial, economic, and commercial. This is the task of peace making, the task which we have adjourned.

Yet in another sense the adjournment has furthered the formulation of peace terms in a way which no discussion or negotiation could have done. The concrete task has waited, but the psychology of the peoples who are to perform the task, has undergone constant and far-reaching change. We have ceased to be citizens of a country or a state and have all unconsciously become citizens of the world. Undreamed possibilities of coöperation among nations have been realized as incidents to the great struggle. Equally, the marauder has disclosed a power and a will to injure which nothing but the experience could have made credible. In particular, our own nation has forever discarded the myth of isolation. It long ago ceased to be a fact, but the tradition lingered, and along with it, not a little of the ignorance, the arrogance, and the indifference of which it was the fertile source. If there are those who still think we might have avoided this war, they must at least recognize that we have not avoided it, and being what we are, we should not be likely to avoid it under like circumstances again. If the physical conditions permit isolation, the psychic conditions do not. Whatever reluctance we may have felt to accept this conclusion, the constant necessities of international concert and the fellowship of prolonged suffering and achievement have tended rapidly to dissipate it. We are reconciled to being a part of the world, an indispensable pre-requisite of intelligent participation in the great world task. If, therefore, we still know little of the complicated problems with which the peace conference must deal, we have been getting ready to know. We have been developing the "international mind."

This was peculiarly necessary for the Allies who represent,—partly by chance, to be sure, but not the less really,—

the cause of democracy. Democracy, despite its ancient lineage, is a comparatively modern thing. Its ancient applications were to units so small as to have no modern significance, and its modern applications have been partial at best. Broadly speaking, its success has been in inverse ratio to the size of its domain. The town meeting has been a success; the state has been less successful. In the broadest field of international relations democracy has yet to demonstrate its capacity. The great democracy of Britain has had a wonderful diplomacy, but not a very democratic one. Nowhere does democracy defer so willingly to expert wisdom as in the matter of foreign relations. Our own experience is also unconvincing. Our diplomacy has been neither wholly democratic nor wholly successful, and withal its tasks have been much simpler than those of other nations, largely because we have deliberately minimized our relations with other states.

But throughout the domain of democracy there is a clear announcement that democracy is to assume the responsibilities of diplomacy. There is to be no more secret diplomacy. International relations like domestic relations are to be determined by the popular will. Doubtless the change will be less sweeping than these demands would suggest, but there can be little doubt that there will be a change and that it will be in the direction indicated. The people may not know how to rule, but they are plainly determined to try. The forthcoming settlement is sure to feel a democratic pressure never known before. That settlement will not only involve concrete problems affecting every nation on the planet, but it will probably establish new principles and lay the foundations of a most radical reconstruction of the world order. It is not simple tasks but supreme incentives that call democracy into action. Such an incentive the present conflict has furnished. The settlement will be a people's peace as has been no other. No matter who the people's representative may be, he will

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listen to the people's voice for the constant renewal of his mandate. Not once but a thousand times in the course of the long negotiations, will be heard the words: "Our people demand this." "Our people will not accept that." If used at times as a screen for personal insistence, it will owe its serviceableness in this connection to its substantial truth. The people will dictate, vaguely, fitfully, ambiguously, but not the less imperiously. We have invoked democracy, and democracy has come at our bidding, unskilled and unknowing, but not the less unafraid.

Not to the diplomats, whose skill I respect but do not emulate, but to the people, their masters, these pages are dedicated. What shall be the terms of the people's peace, the Great Peace? What are the principles of that better statecraft which has been slowly and half unconsciously taking shape in the minds of those who through the will to victory have slowly won the right to will the world's peace? And what do these principles require in the way of concrete adjustments and arrangements among the mountains and the rivers and the seas where men have chanced to be born and have snugly nested themselves in the traditions, the prejudices, the loves and the hates of a hundred generations?

On one point let there be no misunderstanding. Not until victory crowns our arms do these questions become the order of the day. With the enemy in arms there can be no parley, none even among ourselves until we can be sure of our own uncompromising and inflexible purpose. Our enemy will not spare, and we must not spare. The most criminal of all wars is the one begun for a righteous purpose and stopped short of a possible triumph. Such a war exacts its toll of misery and devastation, yet relinquishes the prize which alone can justify the sacrifice. War is the negation of reason, the confession that moral forces have failed to safeguard essential human interests. A beaten enemy or one who knows that to go far-

ther is to fare worse, will grasp at the ruse of negotiation. The nation that is fooled thereby has not learned the lesson of war. Negotiation to the uttermost before war begins; war to the uttermost when negotiation has failed. There is no half way ground in the law of war. This is not spite. These lines are written in no vindictive or implacable spirit. It is the plainest statement of inexorable law that they who draw the sword must accept its arbitrament. These pages are not written for the enemy, but for his conquerors against the day of victory. If they are written somewhat in advance of that day, it is in the firm conviction that the will to victory is assured. If victory is still to tarry long in its coming, it is not too early to prepare for its arrival. When it comes there can be no waiting. The misery of the world will brook no long and hesitant negotiations.

It is hardly necessary to add that the writer is not attempting to draft a treaty of peace. Such an instrument, of necessity a task for experts, is but an incident in the larger problem of settlement and reconstruction which will require many minds and many agencies for its accomplishment. Our attempt will be simply to answer the question: What should the Allies demand? This question takes no account of the detailed problem of ways and means, nor yet of the probable ability of the Allies to impose their will. The question is perhaps best discussed as an academic question. It is well to be clear as to what we seek, whether or not the fate of arms puts the prize within our reach. Not by way of prophecy, however legitimate, but by way of working hypothesis, we assume the defeat of Germany as the basis of our inquiry. If Germany threw up her hands and cried "Kamerad," what would we do with her? What with her wretched partners? What of the powers now our allies, and of the great world in general and possible better guaranties for its peace and order? We will be as concrete and practical as possible in our an-

swers. It avails little to say that frontiers should follow ethnic lines. Where are those lines, and what sort of a Europe would we have if we followed them? A little map drawing will throw much light upon a difficult principle which, in the untested abstract, seems so attractively simple. Similarly, such principles as self-determination and independence. Who or what is the "self" involved and what is the scope of the desired "determination." Accepting without question the principle of making the world safe for democracy, what measures is it desirable or practicable for the nations in council to adopt looking to that end? In a word, the purpose will be to concrete the problem, not to technicalize it.

It is hardly necessary to add that inquiries of this kind are peculiarly necessary for the American people. We no doubt have a very considerable aptitude for practical affairs, but in the present struggle we are, by our very location, ignorant of the practical issues involved. Not one in a thousand of us knows that the fate of the world may be determined by the possession of a great iron mine in Lorraine, or a pass across the Taurus Mountains, or a harbor in the Adriatic. We are tolerably good judges of iron mines and passes and harbors when once we discover their existence, but we do not live in Europe, and have not thought it worth our while as a nation to take note of its outworn equipment. So our unencumbered minds find in this field, thus artificially denuded of all its concrete realities, a rare opportunity for that aerial political philosophy which we as a people affect. It is appalling with what confidence we generalize from our own highly exceptional experience regarding situations in Europe which we totally misconceive. We invoke democracy as the cure for all the ills which the Central Powers are inflicting upon the world, quite overlooking the fact that both the German Reichstag and the Austrian Reichsrat are almost ideally

democratic bodies. A man can vote for deputy in either Austria or Germany who could not vote for Congressman in Massachusetts. These bodies have no real power, we are told. True, because they do not take it. They have all the power that the British House of Commons ever had to curb autocracy, if they and the people back of them had the will to do so. But these peoples do not wish to curb autocracy which they believe necessary to give them the unity which popular government would destroy. The most superficial knowledge of these countries, and especially of Austria, reveals conditions with which our democracy has never shown itself able to cope. A knowledge of these facts of physical environment and political condition should be valuable, if for nothing else, to moderate the excessive confidence of our political generalizations.

Finally, let it be insisted with all possible emphasis, that the terms of peace to be agreed upon should be based upon the fullest recognition of the special problems and wishes of the associated nations. There is a disposition in some quarters to recall the fact that we entered the war as a free lance, not bound by any pledge to make peace in common with those who had so long borne the burden before us. This fancied liberty gives us a freedom of action, so we are told, which enables us to dictate terms. Conceivably, to those who see no obligation that is not "so nominated in the bond." But no possible course of action could be more unworthy or unreasonable. The nearness of the Allies to the scene of conflict and their immediate dependence upon the result gives them a right to speak which we can scarcely claim. Were our detachment entirely a matter of disinterestedness instead of being chiefly a matter of ignorance, our ambition to act as arbiter might have some justification. As it is, any such pretension on our part is quite unwarranted and its enforcement by coercion, direct or indirect, altogether intolerable. We are not more

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disinterested than the Allies. We are simply more ignorant of our interests. Above all we are ignorant of their interests. It is therefore earnestly to be hoped that our study of the problem of peace will be conducted throughout in a spirit of profoundest deference for the views and the wishes of those who are associated with us in the struggle and who are so immediately and vitally dependent upon the outcome.

It is needless to say that the technical task of treaty drafting, frontier delimitation, and financial adjustment which must complete the agreement reached, is a task for experts and one quite beyond the scope of the present work.

PART 1

NATIONALITY

CHAPTER II

NATIONALISM

As we approach the problem of peace, the first question is, who is at war? This question may seem superfluous in view of common knowledge on the subject, but a moment's reflection will convince us that here at the outset of our inquiry there exists a serious confusion of thought. The surface fact that we are at war with Germany is held by many to conceal a deeper fact of very different purport. On the one hand we are assured that our quarrel is not with the German people but with the German government, the latter being conceived primarily as a principle of rule represented by a limited clique of persons who are at present its exponents. Making due allowance for the diplomacy associated with this assertion and recognizing its apparent conflict with the logic of events, it can not be doubted that this doctrine has a strong hold upon the popular mind. The fact that the powers allied against Germany have been from the first predominantly democratic and that the fortunes of war have eliminated the most conspicuous exception,—autocratic, German-modeled Japan being easily overlooked,—has tended to confirm this impression that this is a war, not between nations as such, but between principles of political and social organization. That it is so in fact admits of no reasonable doubt. Popular government is a reality in the western peoples and is not yet realized in the Central Powers. If the western nations win, their ideas will win with them, while a German victory would undoubtedly give a long lease of life and a possible extension of domain to autocracy. No doubt autocracy and democracy stand to win or lose with their present cham-

pions, at least for long years to come. But whether these nations have gone to war primarily as champions of democracy or autocracy is not so clear. Had this been the issue in 1914, Japan and Russia would certainly have taken the other side. On the outskirts of the two great camps are others whose status is not clear. As regards democracy, there is at present little to choose between China and Turkey, between Bulgaria and Serbia, yet they are in opposite camps. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that other considerations have influenced these nations,— all of them considerably, some of them overwhelmingly. Democracy and autocracy will share the fate of other characteristics, language, religion, etc. A German victory would enormously extend the domain of the German language, as an allied victory will extend or confirm that of English and French. Yet no one claims that this is a war of languages. Incidentally it is so, for the victor's language will triumph with him, nor would it be safe to assume that peoples are unconscious of this fact or uninfluenced by it. Consciously, and still more unconsciously, they are committed in heart to their own familiar speech and will sacrifice much for its sake. But this is but one of many things to which they are committed and for which they will suffer and die.

Quite comparable to the view that this is a war between principles, is the widely held theory that it is a war of classes, a capitalists' war, as popular phrase puts it. The argument is that wars are brought on by financial interests in the hope of gain. This gain may be in the shape of direct profits from industries created or stimulated by the war, or the more subtle gain of tactical advantage in the class struggle always in progress. The argument is often forced and obviously convinces less by its cogency than by its congeniality. That there are facts which lend themselves to this interpretation is clear. War contracts of immense extent are let on easy terms and

result in enormous profits. Currency inflation, always a concomitant of war, even when best financed, sends up prices, scales down debts and creates fictitious values. Every war has left its legacy of great fortunes, often persisting through many generations. Sentiment, too, throws its weight into the scale. Labor is adjured in the name of patriotism not to press its advantage, and its response may at times enable capital to improve its tactical position.

It would be strange if these possibilities did not appeal to certain individuals. That "high finance" or "big business" should avail itself in a measure of the opportunities thus offered is to be expected. That it has at times done so on a considerable scale and with far-reaching results is probable. The action of the National Liberal party,—the party of "big business"—in Germany in the present war apparently furnishes an example. Nor is the influence exerted by so mighty an organization as Krupps on minor nations through well conducted propaganda a negligible factor in determining their decisions for war or peace.

But when all is said, the facts are hopelessly against this theory as an explanation of war. War is destruction, and wealth prospers only by production. The disturbance of values brings wealth to a few but takes wealth from many. The fortunes that war creates are as nothing to the fortunes which it destroys. If individuals in hope of gain are moved to favor war, even to promote it by organized effort, immensely greater numbers are moved by identical interests to preserve peace, and there is no reason to suppose them less alert or capable than their opponents. Similarly, if war gives the employer an advantage over patriotic labor, it gives labor a far greater advantage over capital when industry, feverishly stimulated and penalized for failure, can suffer no interruption. If the rise of wages does not always outstrip the rise in prices, the thoughtful laborer will realize that he

scores an enormous gain if he maintains his standard of living at a time when society as a whole is put on short rations. War comes to no class as a boon, but upon none does its hand rest more lightly than upon labor.

All of these considerations are greatly enhanced as war passes from the local to the general. It is possible to imagine big business in America or England deriving advantage from a war in the Balkans in which we were non-participants and our profits as purveyors were undiminished by war taxes. Even so, a close analysis would disclose offsets for these advantages, though hardly sufficient to neutralize their temptations. But when the conflagration becomes general, these advantages disappear. The farmer whose crop is good in a season of partial crop failure, may prosper and even come to associate prosperity with crop failure. But let the blight extend to his own crop and the truer relation reveals itself. Even without this immediate loss, it must slowly become clear that prosperity is sadly limited under conditions of widespread indigence.

No, the "interests" find their opportunity in a condition of general prosperity and maximum production of wealth. Nothing is more certain than that the great capital interests in modern states are overwhelmingly committed to peace. The destroyer of wealth is their enemy, no matter where he operates, for he destroys the medium in which they operate, the sole possible source of their gains. So clear is this fact that sanguine experts before our present war were found to declare that organized industry and finance had made war impossible. The holders of the purse strings held the dogs of war in leash. This was an exaggeration of the power of organized finance, as others then contended and as the result has shown, but there was never a question then,— there can be no question now,— as to where the interests of capital and

finance really lie and on which side their representatives are to be found.

But while this is not fundamentally a class war, it is so to a degree incidentally. No one of the present belligerents entered this war to emancipate labor or to subject it to the tyranny of capital. Yet it will not escape any fair-minded observer that the status of labor is far different on the one side from what it is on the other. Despite their enormous accumulations of capital, no countries have so restricted the power of capital by legislative and social action as have Britain and the United States. In none is the influence of labor so powerful. Not only in the great Anglo-Saxon centers but still more in the self-governing dominions of Australia and New Zealand, labor sits in the seat of the mighty as nowhere else in the world. Neither the equity nor the adequacy of these conditions is here in question. We are concerned only to note the fact that the Anglo-Saxon countries stand as the supreme representatives of the principle of labor emancipation. Nothing approximating these conditions can be found in Germany and Austria. On the other hand, in Germany especially, organizations of capital, instead of being checked by anti-trust laws as with us, have been favored, even forced, in the interest of national efficiency. Again we will waive the question of desirability or undesirability of these policies. It is sufficient to note the facts.

Once more, it behooves us to recognize that this antithesis does not hold throughout. Industrial conditions in China, Japan, Serbia, or Greece, bear little resemblance to those above described. Least of all did Russia, at the time of her entering the conflict, rank with the emancipated powers, nor has her orgy of liberty contributed certainly to the emancipation of labor, however effectually it has destroyed capitalist tyranny. It is perfectly certain that the line-up was not on

this issue, yet it is equally certain that the line chances to be drawn between the forces of industrial freedom and reaction. A German victory will mean the perpetuation of the all-powerful *Cartels* of German industrial organization and the extension of their sway over new territories together with the subjection of labor. A victory for the Allies must as certainly extend their industrial system with its attendant emancipation of labor.

Other popular theories of war might be considered, but always with the same result. The contestants in the great struggle are not fighting in the first instance for an abstract principle or for a virtue, or for a private or class interest, but for a great concrete human thing which embodies these principles and interests only incidentally and imperfectly, and that along with many others. *For this is a war between nations.* And we find our place in the ranks, not because we approve the principles or interests there represented, but for the very much humbler reason that we were born there and have, for the most part, no option but to stay. This does not mean that we do not care for these principles, virtues, or interests, but that we recognize the impracticability of working for them otherwise than as embodied in the nation. We try to make our nation represent the principles and the special interests that we believe in, always with but partial success, but we accept the result and make the best of it. For after all the nation is the only place where these things have any real existence. The only virtue there is in the world is the virtue that is in virtuous men, and they are only partially virtuous at best. So with nations. None of them have ideal class relations or perfect democracy, but they have the only democracy and the only class relations that there are in the world. Outside of them there is only imagination, a valuable thing, but not at all to be mistaken for the reality. It is only out of the democracy of the pres-

ent and the imperfect class relations of the present that the better democracy and the more perfect class relation can grow. Thus the nation is the repository of all that the race has achieved in the way of democracy and all related interests, a very imperfect repository, no doubt, but the only one. The treasure is in earthen vessels, but there are no other vessels, and without them there would be no treasure.

It is therefore the deepest of all social instincts, an instinct more imperious than that of our own self-protection, which impels us to defend the nation. Within the home circle we may criticise, attack, and modify to any extent, but we must not sacrifice the nation or carry our criticism to the point of weakening it in the great competition of the nations. When the existence of the nation is ever so remotely at stake, criticism and party struggle must cease. Thus the two great parties in the British government are usually in sharpest antagonism, but when a foreign crisis menaces the British nation, it is the unfailing practice that the leader of the opposition in Parliament rises at the first opportunity and pledges the support of his party to the government. There must be no opposition within, no criticism, no discussion of principles, while there is danger from without. These lines are written not by way of advocacy, but simply in explanation of the fundamental political principle of our age. Men have everywhere judged that the nations are essential as repositories of the great social forces and that they must be defended from all attacks, violent or insidious. There are a few who seem to think this policy a mistake. They see in the nation not so much a repository of social forces as an interference with their larger play. They would quite disparage nationalism or abolish it altogether. Perhaps the future may have such things in store, but certainly not the present. To eliminate the nation in the interest of humanity would be like tearing down our house that we might see the sky.

THE GREAT PEACE

It is hardly necessary to add that in this cult of the nation we have usually very little choice as to which nation we shall support. The nations are not all alike, and it is often possible for the intelligent citizen to see that some other meets his ideas of justice and political wisdom far better than his own. But he can not usually change his allegiance on that account, nor would it be well if he could. The free lance may espouse the cause of a nation with which he is in sympathy, as Lord Byron espoused the cause of Greek independence, but few are so situated that they can play this part, and it is a very ineffectual part. Changes of allegiance are difficult and are seldom made for political reasons. The allegiance of adoption is always an imperfect allegiance. But quite aside from this question of feasibility is the deeper question of right. The crude and imperfect nation may have quite as good reason to exist as the more advanced nation. It is all the nation that somebody has. It may hold little as yet in the way of finished achievements, but it holds unknown possibilities, possibilities that no other nation may be able to hold, and that are somebody's all. Hence the instinct of national support is unquestioning. Stand for principle, virtue, party, class, within the nation, but never as between nations. Stand for your nation. Such is the instinct and law of being in the twentieth century. Perhaps no people has ever shown more devotion to abstract principles or contended more earnestly for them than the French, and never were they more engrossed in their several advocacies than in 1914. But ask a French soldier what he is fighting for, and what will he reply? For liberty, equality, fraternity? for democracy? for socialism? Not one of these. The answer will not vary among a thousand. "*Pour la France.*"

Perhaps the most disturbing thought about this blind instinct of nationalism is that it so often tenaciously maintains barriers and divisions that are clearly superfluous. It has

the vices as well as the virtues of conservatism. We could all mention manifestations of nationalism today that are an unqualified nuisance, though there might be disagreement as to the examples chosen. Indeed there are no more serious obstacles in the way of the settlement that we seek than certain perfectly gratuitous and obstructive assertions of nationalism. Virtues like individuals have the defects of their qualities. It is friction that makes it so hard to move the railway train, but it is friction that makes it possible to move it at all, for without friction the wheels would not grip the rails. Nationalism must therefore be dealt with in its dual capacity of conserving and obstructing force. Few will question the wisdom of the French soldier who fights for France, but we did question,— and as the world judges, justly — the wisdom of those who fought to make a separate nation out of our southern states. There are other cases. The mere shout of nationalism for any chance unit without consideration of size, location, or suitability, is not a claim to our endorsement.

For in one important particular nations are not like men. They are after all only devices for human convenience, without assignable limit as to size or character. Hence it is that they are able to devour and absorb one another, either wholly or in part, becoming thereby proportionally larger. Men have fixed frontiers, and though they may greatly interfere with one another's privilege and convenience, this frontier of personal identity is never passed. Not so with nations. They may not only annex one another's territories, but may quite assimilate one another's people, displacing the sentiments and habits which constituted their former nationality by others suitable to the new allegiance. This latter process, to be sure, is often slow and difficult, and seemingly becomes more difficult as the national organization becomes more elaborate. But if we take a long glance backward over history we shall not only discover cases in which it has been com-

pletely successful, but we shall perceive that this process of merger and assimilation, often violent and painful, has been the regular method of national growth in its earlier stages. Indeed, it is not clear how else great nations could have come into being in a world which was all parceled out among little ones. It is pretty clear that nations ultimately reach a stage of development where such merger and assimilation is no longer possible,— indeed it seems to be one of the mistakes of our great adversary not to have fully appreciated this fact, but up to a certain point, while nations are still plastic, such mergers, even though temporarily unwelcome, are a normal method of uniting men. The principle of self-determination,— a principle vital to nations as to individuals,— presupposes in each case a certain maturity. Applied rashly it means disintegration.

Since nations are but conveniences and, as it were, way-stations on the road toward unity, why, it may be asked, should we not at once effect the inevitable union, thus ending once for all, these conflicts which threaten to engulf humanity? Easier said than done. Nations serve the purpose of social convenience, but it is not therefore to be assumed that they are mechanical contrivances which can be used or junked at pleasure. The nation is not contrived; it grows. Its essence is not an agreement but a sentiment, or rather, a complex maze of sentiments, associations and attachments, the product of incredibly slow growth. Have we any idea of the painful experiences through which man has come to his present estate? Slowly, with countless misgivings and misadventures, he has stumbled out of the isolation of his early cave, living down old suspicions, laying the ghosts of strange terrors, accustoming himself to new restrictions, and learning new arts, new wants, and new loves. For millenniums each he has conned the lesson of the family, the clan, the tribe, the petty state, the nation, learning their passwords, their sym-

bols, and their mystic rites, ever revolting and as often scoured back to his arduous task. With every widening of his frontier he has faced new terrors and met new foes, ever constrained to enter upon new pathways where his progress has been marked by his blood. Ever and anon the frontier has claimed him as its victim, yielding him a sullen obedience only at the price of the amenities and the attachments which were the glory of the narrower circle, and making him the outlaw of progress. The structure of civilization is cemented with the blood of humanity, and not with that of the soldier alone.

And now comes our heedless enthusiast and asks: "To what purpose all this clamor of the nations? Why love the one more than the other? How are you better off to live under this government than under that?" Forsooth! How am I better off to live in my own skin?

It is the A B C of our inquiry to recognize the fundamental character of nationality. It is beside the mark to descant upon the weakness of nationality and the advantages of internationalism. We have the one and we have not the other. That the larger circle, the wider horizon, to the limit of a unified humanity, is preferable to our present national units we may readily admit. The unification of humanity is the obvious goal of human progress, the unavoidable hypothesis of all constructive thought. But the question is not as to the merits of human unity. The question is how to get it. We shall not get it by the disparagement of nationality or by the reversal of the process by which organization has thus far been attained. Nations have their unlovely traits. They are selfish, suspicious, and prone to resort to force in the assertion of their claims. Scrupulosity, candor, and deference have not been the rule in international relations. That is unbeautiful, seemingly bad, though an exact appraisal of results is difficult. But nations have their beautiful side.

Sheltered behind their barriers of prejudice and suspicion are discipline and forbearance, coöperation, protection, and love. There the ritual of life works its marvel of harmony in feeling, thought, and action. These things are good, just the kind of things that the great human nation of the future will require in larger measure. To decry nationality, to belittle its services, to emphasize its limitations and picture it as the antithesis of human unity instead of its partial realization, this is not to advance the cause of unity but to retard it. Nationality is human unity half grown. If we ever get full unity, it will be by the further development of nationality. Even now that further development is visibly taking place before our eyes. It is seemingly to be the crowning glory of our own race to develop the super-nation, the unforced merger of independent nations committed to pacific coöperation in the field of the largest human interests.

It is not irrelevant to note in this connection that the critics of nationality, though ever reprehending its divisive influence, seem to have little real sympathy with unity as hitherto realized in human experience. The emphasis is always upon liberty, with a visible sense of the irksomeness of cogent organization. Their ideal seems rather to be that of an easy-going fellowship in which friction is reduced by reducing the points of contact, an organization that is less exacting, more Bohemian in spirit, and free from the irksome constraints of the more strenuous nationalism. It is significant that internationalism, rather than supernationalism or pan-nationalism, is the term chosen to express this ideal. The assumption is that present nations are to persist, but with their teeth drawn, this concession to the rejected principle of nationality being made as a matter of expediency. But nationality as thus tolerated, is to lose its old time significance as the unifier of humanity.

Concurrently with this emasculation of nationality, the

utmost emphasis is laid upon local independence or self-determination. It is easy to see what all this comes to. Divisive tendencies now held in check by the demands of nationalism would be released and half completed assimilations interrupted. The painfully widening mental horizon would again narrow. Localism, provincialism, with an unsubstantial fiction of human unity, these are the inevitable,— perhaps the desired,— result. The internationalist is conspicuously the advocate of local and internal reforms. Fortunately for our instruction, this philosophy is being applied by Russia, with what results, those most concerned may soon be expected to judge.

These conclusions will evoke protest. The internationalist disclaims any intention of disparaging nationality. A prominent socialist has recently declared: "Internationalism is not anti-nationalism. Internationalism presupposes nationalism. It is the inter-relation of nations. The maintenance of national integrity and independence is one essential condition of internationalism." No doubt these declarations are sincere and represent the attitude of internationalists as a class. They have no intention of destroying nationalism. But we are less concerned with intentions than with tendencies. The internationalist recognizes in nationalism an "essential condition of internationalism," but does he recognize the essential conditions of nationalism? Internationalism may not purpose the destruction of nationalism, but the disparagement of nationalism has always been its concomitant, its pervasive spirit. The animating spirit of internationalism has ever been,— not national solidarity, but *class* solidarity,— and it is national solidarity which is the "essential condition" of nationalism.

It is to be noted finally that nationalism is the striking characteristic of recent political development. This means that the present age is preëminently the age of nations and

that sentiment and doctrine have followed in the wake of fact. The definiteness and coherence acquired by the modern nations in the last two or three centuries and above all the immense increase in the daily services rendered by the nation in our time, all this has developed a corresponding group consciousness out of all proportion to anything known in earlier times. When the individual knew the nation only as the tax gatherer or through the summons to the corvee or the army, his enthusiasm for the nation was not very ardent. Indeed, had the call to service not come through his local liege lord to whom he sustained a closer and more human relation, it is doubtful whether the state could have commanded his allegiance. But when he meets the state daily in the postman, when the railway, the highway, and all the complex machinery of modern national life reveal the state as the great doer of needful things, the national consciousness becomes an abiding, all-overshadowing fact. Hence the tendency,—seemingly somewhat counter to the spirit of the age,—toward separation under the lead of nationalism. The languid nationalism of an earlier day permitted the pseudo-union of Norway and Sweden, presaged a like union of Spain and Portugal, and permitted the drastic germanizing policy of Maria Theresa and her son with but feeble opposition. The nationalism of today, tenfold intensified by the larger service-ableness of the state and reinforced by the literary revival which has restored the consciousness of past achievement, has made short work of these unions based on indifference. Norway and Sweden have separated, Portugal repudiates the idea of merger with vehemence, and the strangely consorted nationalities of the dual empire are obsessed with a spirit of virulent nationalism. Beyond question this is but a cross current. The dominant tendency of the age is toward the formation of larger nations, a tendency which necessarily implies merger and the disappearance of nationalism in some

of its narrower and more obstructive manifestations. But this tendency toward merger is offset by the tendency toward the intensification of nationality. The units to be merged become more resistant, less assimilable. If the American colonies had not united when they did, they could not now be made into a nation.

It is with this paramount fact of nationality, a fact legitimate in its essence, however extravagant and troublesome in its occasional manifestations, that we have to deal. The task of the peace conference is essentially a task in nation making. Prepossessions against this fundamental fact of nationalism will make that task impossible. Equally, such prepossessions will make it impossible for us to anticipate and contribute to that task.

It is a corollary of nationalism that nations have rights which are exclusive as regards one another. If nations have a right to exist, they have a right to rule within their own domain. That is the meaning of nationality, the meaning of democracy, the basic principle of our western civilization. Never is that principle likely to be so sorely tested as in the moment of its triumph. What a temptation to our emancipated labor to compel the emancipation of labor in the Central Powers! What more generous than to reach a helping hand to an oppressed fellow worker! What more prudent than thus to eliminate the danger of his underpaid competition! How eagerly certain elements in Germany itself would welcome such intervention! The clamor of appeal is already raised. Similarly the cause of temperance, of suffrage, of democracy, see here their opportunity to follow in the wake of the ponderous war tank into fastnesses otherwise so difficult of assault. It is no disparagement of any of these interests to sternly resist their plea. Triumphs thus won would be specious, premature, and in the long run, disastrous. "Liberty is not a gift; liberty is an achievement." For liberty

conferred but unachieved is not liberty but only indulgent autocracy.

In particular should democracy be on its guard lest, in a moment when its triumph necessitates the wholesale reconstruction of alien systems, it forget its own nature in its eagerness to prevail. Make the world safe for democracy,— yes, by all means, at any sacrifice of blood and treasure. But the safety of democracy is infinitely more dependent upon forbearance than upon aggression. The people that wills, even passively, to have an autocratic government, is more nearly exercising a democratic prerogative than the people who would force a democratic government upon them. The utmost that can be justified,— and this only with the extremest circumspection,— is to demand for subject or component peoples the right of self-expression. Even so we rob them of the stimulating privilege of self-achievement. If it be argued that the very existence of an autocratic Germany with its militarist traditions and purposes, threatens the liberties of neighboring peoples, the reply must be that Germany will be autocratic until she elects to be otherwise. Have we not learned the futility of baptizing the unregenerate? To compel Germany to desist from her attack on our liberties,— that is our plain duty. To compel her to adopt free institutions is to misjudge both our rights and our powers. Germany thus veneered would not be less hostile, nor should we profit by a deceptive reliance upon her democratic mask. It would be a grave abuse of the happiest of rallying cries if we should try to make the world safe for democracy by forcing an un-sought freedom upon an unprepared people.

CHAPTER III

NATIONALITY AND RACE

SINCE nationality holds thus the supreme place in the human scheme of things, the problem of peace becomes a problem in constructive nationality. The war has put existing nations to a terrible test, and in addition to the damage it has wrought, it has disclosed every sort of defect and pathological condition. There seems to be no likelihood that this peace conference, like that of a hundred years ago, will try to restore the status quo ante. A radical reconstruction seems inevitable. It therefore becomes highly important to understand the essential conditions of national life.

In seeking the basis of nationality the first thought is that it rests on the foundation of race. Words used in this connection seem everywhere to imply such a dependence. But if by race is meant blood relationship, no existing nation can lay much claim to race unity. If we carry our inquiry back to the earliest social group, the primitive family, we shall find nothing that can be called race purity. The mixing process is already at work. Marriage, especially in the days of wife purchase, is the reverse of exclusive, and slavery is even more indulgent. Even the Hebrews had their Gibeonites.

But such race purity as the family represents quickly vanishes in the turmoil of early nation building. Migration, conquest, and wholesale deportation with the ruthless disregard of all prejudices and race barriers, mingles the most alien elements. With the advent of more settled conditions, these violent agencies are less active, but their place is taken

by individual migration, that silent infiltration of alien elements which permeates the entire population, and that the more as civilization advances and the facilities for movement increase. What we see going on in America is what goes on everywhere and always in the growing parts of the world. The notion of a pure bred race is a fiction.

It is perhaps worth noting that within wide limits this mingling of the races encounters no protest of reason or instinct. The union of Caucasian and Mongolian, of black and white, is repugnant to civilized instincts, but aside from purely prudential considerations as affecting problems of language, religion, life habit or social status, unions between our closely related western races occasion no repugnance. It seems to be, as indeed it is, the natural thing. Blood relationship is a negligible factor in our problem.

But though the fact of kinship is negligible, the name is still a name to conjure with. The consciousness of race,—the latter vaguely conceived as connoting kinship,—is one of the most stubborn with which we have to deal. Though a people may be mingled of every race and may know themselves to be so, yet there is no cry to which they will rally as they will to that of kinship. The most mongrel of nations will sacrifice its most substantial interests and risk its very existence in the service of its assumed kin. This is the animus of pan-slavism, irridentism, and the like. The appeal, to be sure, has often had its ulterior motive. The Pan-slavist Russian, so much in evidence in earlier discussions, was much more concerned about the Dardanelles than about his Polish or Balkan relatives, while the Pan-German, with characteristic effrontery, uses the race catchword in behalf of the annexation of territories never inhabited by the German people. But these very abuses are suggestive of the strength of race sentiment. The German expansionist would not call his program Pan-German if there were not something

in that covert suggestion of race unity, even in the most inappropriate connections. How much more when, as in the case of Italy, the assumption has an outward semblance of justification? If blood unity is gone forever, the consciousness of it is not, and no factor in our problem requires to be handled with more deference and tact.

The truth is that while kinship is a fiction, *race* is a fact. We are united by blood only in the most casual way, but we are united by other bonds which are far more tangible and significant, and which are almost as closely associated with birth as kinship itself. We may be born of the bondwoman in the house, but we are none the less born in the house. The brotherhood that really counts in the world as such doesn't come from being born of the same parents, but from growing up in the same family. Members of the same race are therefore those that have grown up in the same race family, that have joined in the same concert exercises and have learned the same ritual of life. Included in this ritual are all the most fruitful activities of our lives. Our much vaunted individuality is and must be only a trifling interest in an essentially ritualized existence. More than this becomes social weakness; much more becomes insanity. Every people is constantly busy in developing its ritual, in reducing all the activities of life to uniformity, and correlating them with one another, all in the interest of efficiency and economy. The way chosen is often arbitrary. It matters little what tune we sing, but we must sing together. Correlation is the very essence of society.

The supreme example of this correlation is language. To be able easily and with precision to communicate our ideas and feelings to those with whom we must coöperate is an obvious necessity, yet one hardly appreciated till once we are deprived of it. A few hours' isolation among a people whose language he did not speak has more than once made the

writer appreciate the embarrassments of the builders of the Tower of Babel. As language develops, it becomes the intellectual counterpart of our entire life, establishing relations of incredible finesse, and in turn, stimulating and enticing life into activities of unlimited subtlety and complexity. Inasmuch as language is the counterpart of all else and the condition of all else, it is often assumed to be the effective basis of race.

But there is much else than language. Indeed pretty much all else that there is falls under this same great law of correlation. The food that we eat is determined originally by the spontaneous resources of our habitat, but this option of nature rapidly disappears. Time was when Peru grew potatoes and our own country maize, but now both are grown over the world. We are learning to make nature very subservient. If the choice of our food was once with her, it is now with us. If France, Germany, and America, drink three different kinds of coffee, it is not because they produce different kinds, for none of them produce any, and all of them get the ingredients on essentially the same terms. The choice of articles of food and still more of the methods of preparation and service, are not nature's choices but social choices. This is still more true as regards costume, household organization, business and social procedure. Every department of life, every possible human interest, comes under the sway of this same great law of correlation and concert. The result is an all-embracing social ritual, a ritual with antiphonal responses, a ritual with parts for the few and parts for the many and parts for all, but a ritual without which we are nothing. The individual voice, to be sure, is heard, but to no purpose unless it in turn becomes ritual. Failing that, it is only discord.

All this is truism, but truism too often forgotten at the moment when recognition is vital. More truisms must be noted if we are to proceed with hope of profit.

The obvious function of all this correlation is convenience,—convenience of so cogent a character as to be virtual necessity. Suppose we decide to eat different food from that usually eaten about us, food quite as wholesome and equally congenial to climate and soil, but not the social choice. Suppose even less, that we merely decide to have it prepared or served by other than the usual method. The result is at the least, a vast inconvenience and an expenditure of time and effort out of all proportion to the advantage gained, which last is almost invariably nil. The writer has had rather unusual opportunity to notice the application of this principle to his fellow countrymen in travel,—laborious and time consuming effort repeated day after day and meal after meal, to effect trivial changes in the ritual of foreign cookery or service, when a tithe the effort devoted to self adaptation would have removed the annoying friction by conformity of the traveler to the ritual of the land of which he is the guest. Equally and more true is this principle in other parts of social procedure. Imagine, if it be possible, that no social standards afford guidance in the matter of dress,—that each must devise and in some way secure the necessary costume. Conceive the labor involved in devising, in securing the necessary materials, in making or guiding the making, to say nothing of the weird and soul estranging result. Intelligent women are sometimes criticised for subserviency to "senseless" fashion. The sufficient answer is that they can not afford the time and effort to do anything else. The purpose of social ritual is to lighten the burden of life, to bring producer, purveyor, and user into frictionless correlation, and to make the myriad perplexities of social choice forgettable things.

But social ritual, though originating in convenience, is not therefore a mere utilitarian calculus of advantage. It quickly develops a counterpart of unreasoning, passionate

attachment which finds its only equal in maternal affection. Customs the most arbitrary and the most irksome in the learning, ultimately intrench themselves behind this barrier of feeling and resist all encroachment. We may recognize that our way is no better than another, that in a given situation it is a handicap and that we can come to the mountain far easier than the mountain can come to us,— the suggestion of change is none the less intensely repugnant to us. More often we quite lose the power to recognize the true relation, and our ritual becomes to us the very constitution of nature. The Englishman who thought the French word for bread, *pain*, very peculiar "because it *is* bread, you know," is a classic illustration. When the ritual of social procedure is thus completely assimilated to the fundamentals of nature and the normal attachments have been developed, innovation becomes sacrilege.

This, then, is our definition of race, a body of men united by a social ritual. Born into this ritual, no matter from what stock, they grow up in almost abject dependence upon it. The adaptation once effected, any second adaptation becomes immensely difficult and is perhaps never complete. The mere learning of a foreign language is but the most trifling beginning. Said an American who lived for years in Germany and had brought back with him a beautiful German wife: "I thought I had become German in sympathy and in habit, but if I had known how many trifling differences of instinctive judgment and procedure existed between us, recurring day by day and creating friction in the most unexpected relations, I would never have married her."

The essence of the social ritual is thus twofold. Objectively it is convenience. Subjectively it is congeniality.

We now have to notice certain facts in this connection which are vital to our problem. The first is the arbitrary character of this ritual. All important as it is, the impor-

tance is in the ritualization, not in the thing ritualized. When an army receives the order, "march," it might conceivably start with either foot, but it is imperative that all start with the same foot. Judged by inherent fitness, many social forms are absurd. What more arbitrary than that an obsolete riding coat with skirts split to go over the horse's back and cut away in front to accommodate the rider's bended legs, should have become the exacting model for full dress of men who never mount a horse. It is the pitfall of the inexperienced to judge these social prescriptions by intrinsic fitness. But intrinsic fitness is as nothing to social uniformity, especially in connections where forms are primarily of symbolical value. Any one could devise a coat more suitable, but probably no society in the world could secure its adoption and emotional consecration, as inscrutable influences have secured it for the coat in question. As society progresses, this arbitrariness of social choice tends to increase. As our mastery over nature increases, the range of theoretic choice widens. But the range of actual choice does not widen in proportion. Social considerations of propriety take the place of nature's vanishing barriers and again, straight is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life. For the multiplication of options means confusion, and ritual and convention are the only escape from chaos. Not that the new options bring no advantage, but they are available only with social sanction. They must be ritualized to be really available and legitimate.

It is therefore illegitimate to assume that race character, resting as it does essentially upon arbitrary choices, is inherently sacred. Some other word for bread would do quite as well if once adopted. Language, custom, even religion and government, are largely arbitrary as regards their inherent character. Their only advantage,—a very great one, to be sure,—is that they have acquired social and emotional sanc-

tion. There is much talk today of reuniting religious denominations which are no longer separated by differences in the "essentials." In fact they are separated by something far more essential than articles of creed,—by unconsciously developed rituals of form and expression in a multitude of insignificant things which are an obstacle to that congeniality which is the condition of helpful association. This is no disparagement of the project of union, a policy often dictated by the weightiest considerations of economy and efficiency. It is merely a suggestion of where the true obstacle to union is to be found. The tenacity of social ritual and the difficulty of changing it can scarcely be exaggerated, but broadly speaking, other forms would do as well. The practical man will urge changes only with extreme circumspection, but he is not dealing with the sacro-sanct.

One final and all important consideration remains. What determines that a given people shall develop a ritual? There are numberless observations to be made in this connection, but only one that is of vital importance. One fact overshadows and embraces all others. They develop a ritual because they live together. They can not develop it unless they live together; they must develop it if they do. This means that *race is a product of association*, a result of living together.

But this important truth is always at variance with the facts of the moment. There are at all times people living in a unit territory who are not of one race, and people of one race who are not living in one territory. Thus, it would seem that the Transylvanians and the Hungarians or the Poles and the Germans, separated by no natural barriers, ought to be united in race, but they are sharply opposed. Conversely, the ancient Phœnicians and Greeks and the modern Anglo-Saxons are conspicuous examples of race unity, though occupying widely scattered territories. The obvious

explanation is that these races have changed their habitat. They lived together long enough to develop their language and race character, and then migrated to another territory where the diverse race characters have as yet resisted the unifying influence of habitat. Sometimes, however, a more subtle change has taken place in the territory itself, barriers have been virtually eliminated and habitats once distinct thus merged into a unit. This little noticed tendency is peculiarly characteristic of recent years. Time was when very moderate barriers kept peoples pretty effectually apart. The Apennines almost prevented communication between Venice and Florence, giving to the two peoples a markedly different character through the distinctive period of their history. Today the barrier is scarcely noticeable, and Italy is a unit habitat. The very considerable diversity which had grown up between the different parts of Italy has perceptibly diminished since railways and other modern facilities have lowered the dividing barriers, the process of unification being aided, of course, by the substantial unity bequeathed to all by Rome. In the great plains of eastern Europe, mere extent and sparseness of population long prevented unification. With extreme simplicity of life and the feeblest incentive for intercourse and exchange, mere expanse and other trivial obstacles sufficed to keep peoples apart and slowly to diversify them. Witness the separatism of the Ukraine unmotivated by barriers of mountain and sea. Against such separatism the quickened life of the present with its freer communication and its more varied regional demands operates as a powerful unifying influence. The result, however, is to unify the habitat much more than the people. Hence the irritating incongruity between race and habitat, the seeming refutation of the truth that the one is the product of the other. The tendency is in consequence to attribute to race an absolute character and to accord to it a deference to which it is not entitled. Race character is

derivative in origin and arbitrary in essence. The forces making for unification are undoubtedly gaining at the expense of the divisive forces. While recognizing the tenacity with which races hold to their language and customs, political prevision can not wholly ignore the fact that they are a waning power. When a conflict presents itself between race integrity and the most obvious requirements of territorial convenience, the former may not unreasonably be asked to make concessions. Race interests are not always paramount.

It will be noted that this conclusion is somewhat in contrast with that reached in the preceding chapter regarding nationality. Nationality must not be confounded with race. Race is merely one of the bases of nationality, ordinarily the most important one, but never the only one, and in exceptional cases quite subordinate to other factors. It is a great advantage to a nation to be based on race unity, but it is not a necessity. Switzerland is a nation, and withal a very successful one, but the Swiss are not of one race. Physical conditions of habitat are here so much more important than race unity that they not only effect the union of diverse races, but that without appreciable tendency toward assimilation. Great Britain, again, is a nation, but the diverse races united under its sway, English, Scotch, Welsh, and Cornish, being less separated by physical barriers, are visibly undergoing assimilation. The Cornish have lost their separate language, the Scotch nearly so, and the Welsh in part, and complete assimilation seems plainly foreshadowed, but as yet British unity is a unity of nationality with but an incomplete unity of race.

More striking and difficult examples are found in the great imperial combinations of Britain and of Rome. Roman unity made no pretense to being a unity of race. Indeed, for a long time nothing more was attempted than the barest recognition of Rome's paramount authority. Rome had long

been mistress of the world before she even attempted unity of administration. With the ultimate unification of administration, however, there inevitably came a steadily increasing measure of cultural and even of racial unity. Roman architecture, with wide variation of forms, but always Roman, became universal. Even the Roman language displaced the less developed of the subject tongues, thus completing the unity of what we now instinctively call the "Latin races," a unity developed from the most pronounced diversity within historic times. More significant still is the consciousness of unity which persisted in Roman Europe for many centuries after the decay of the Roman power, a feeling that the world unity which that power represented must somewhere still exist, however much in abeyance. This was neither a unity of race, for none such existed, nor a unity of state, for political authority had long since passed away, but a unity essentially national, although on so vast a scale that usage hesitates to apply the term. The more recent and less developed case of the British Empire presents similar phenomena.

We waste our time here in attempts at exact classification. The cases are few and so highly individual that classification helps us little. But it is clear that the group solidarity which has received such accentuation in our day, is something else than race unity. Race consciousness should unite the Dutch and Flemish, the Germans and Austrians, the Americans and Canadians, and divide the Swiss. If given full sway, it would recast very extensively the political map of the world. But race is a waning rather than a growing power. The awkward recrudescence of race separatism in our day attests rather than disproves the assertion. It is the protest of an alarmed race consciousness which foresees its doom.

Nationality is again to be distinguished from mere political authority resting upon no foundation but physical coercion. The authority of the Austrian monarchy has not

succeeded in uniting the diverse elements of that perplexing population into a nation, though they unquestionably constitute a state. It is difficult to speak of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland as a nation, though it is undoubtedly a state. But while the state is not the nation, it tends to become one. German Alsace became completely merged in the French nation (though not in the French race). Cornwall, Wales, and Scotland have become merged in the British nation, and are apparently in process of a further merger into the British race. There is a clear dependence of state upon nation, and of nation upon race, but each depends upon other things as well. Moreover the dependence works the other way. The state requires national feeling as the condition of its stability, but let the state be once established and judiciously maintained, and national feeling will result. Prussia was built upon the resentful incorporation of Frankfort and Hanover, but both are now safely Prussian. Bavaria and Saxony were hardly more favorable to the Empire, but their loyalty in 1914 was unquestioned. Nor can the general desirability of these mergers be questioned, whatever their present embarrassments.

To summarize, race unity based on language and custom, has lost ground in our day, and nationality, a unity based on other considerations, chiefly economic, territorial, and political, has acquired the ascendancy. Nationalism stands, on the whole, for the larger, though not for the complete union of mankind.

CHAPTER IV

NATIONALITY AND TERRITORY

We have seen that nationality is the key to our problem and that nationality is closely connected with race. Indeed some would have it that the two should be identical, that a race should always be a nation and a nation always a race. The trouble, it is contended, lies just here, that nations have been formed which are not based on unity of race and so are inharmonious, one race tyrannizing over the other as the Austrians do over the Bohemians, the Magyars over the Croats, and the like. Let each of these races be a nation by itself and all will be well. This is an enticing theory in the abstract, but when we begin to apply it, we at once discover that something besides race is necessary to make a satisfactory nation. It is absolutely necessary that the race that is to form a nation should be satisfactorily situated. For instance, if a race is divided and scattered, some here and some there, with alien populations in between, it is usually recognized as impracticable to form them into a single ethnic nation. Either they must form a number of smaller nations alike in race but unable to unite because they lack the necessary territorial unity, or they must be formed into a single nation with incorporation of the alien elements. In either case race unity is plainly not enough. Territorial unity is also necessary to the forming of a satisfactory nation. Even the sea,—which is quite as much a bond as a barrier,—usually makes national union difficult. It has made it impossible for the Anglo-Saxon race to form a single nation, despite its pronounced unity and its control of sea communications.

But the territorial requirement is for something more than unity. There are certain elemental conveniences which are quite as necessary as unity itself to successful national life. To start nations without these is to run so large a risk of failure that no prudent people will attempt it. First among these requirements is defense. A nation's territory and the wealth which it accumulates upon it in the shape of houses, roads, factories and the like, constitute its capital. The nation that can not put its possessions under lock and key, as it were, simply invites aggression. Undoubtedly we may hope for greater respect for national rights and something of collective enforcement of them as time goes on, but recent events have not tended to reassure us as regards the present. Nor can we hope that the time will ever come when the nation like the householder will not need to take reasonable precautions. In any case it is a present necessity of nations to protect themselves, and therefore a prime requisite that the national domain should be reasonably capable of defense. In particular it becomes important that nations should be delimited on reasonably equitable terms. A national boundary may be an arbitrary line through a plain,— not an ideal frontier, surely, nor easily capable of defense, but still an equitable one, as the two neighbors face each other on essentially equal terms. But when a natural barrier exists between two peoples with fastnesses of immense strength, and the line is so drawn as to give these all to one party, making his domain impregnable and leaving that of the neighbor completely indefensible, the inequity is such as virtually to destroy the latter's independence and create a relation of vassalage. Very few are aware of the number of strategic frontiers which are now of that character and the part they have played in the present conflict. Thus, Italy has lived all her national life under the sword of Damocles, her frontier towards Austria running, not along the mountain crests,

but far down the Italian slope. This has made Austria perfectly safe, while Italy was always exposed to Austrian aggression. A nation so situated could not disagree with so dangerous a neighbor. It was this helplessness which drove Italy into the Triple Alliance, a most unnatural combination, and this again that induced her to join the Allies, hoping thus to remove the hated menace and secure an equitable and defensible frontier. It so happens that the territory needed to rectify this frontier is all Italian so that racial and territorial considerations unite in demanding the change, but it is easy to understand that if the population were alien,—as in certain like situations it is,—the strategic consideration might be of so great importance as to overbear the claims of race. It would in any case be a factor that could not be ignored.

But territorial demands do not stop here. War, though a possibility which a prudent people can never leave out of account, is after all the exception. Provision for peace is even more necessary. There are territorial requirements of peace as well as of war, and these have rapidly become more exacting with the development of civilization. Here, perhaps, more than anywhere else, popular notions are inadequate, particularly in countries whose perceptions have not been sharpened by need. A country so completely equipped as is our own, with all the facilities for modern civilized existence, easily overlooks its debt to an exceptionally favorable situation. That which it owes to accident or good fortune, it easily assumes to be the common lot of nations. It is safe to say that there is not a single nation in existence that does not lack some important element of our wonderful endowment. If we had more experience of their needs, we should have more sympathy with their strivings.

It is important to note in this connection that the development of civilization in the last two or three centuries has

materially modified what we may call the minimum territorial requirements of nationality. The exceedingly simple life of an earlier age was essentially local and self-sufficing. Every community, almost every household, raised its own food, built its own dwellings, made its own tools, and wove its own garments. Things brought from distant localities,—mostly articles of personal adornment and luxuries of limited use,—demanded little in the way of transportation facilities. The pack horse and mountain trail were sufficient. Access to foreign lands was a convenience, but not a necessity, the more so as life, thus compelled to be local and self-sufficient, developed local possibilities that are now undreamed of. For a woman of the Middle Ages to be denied the privileges of the cloth mart was small privation. She might still be decently, perhaps sumptuously clad. For the woman of today the cloth mart is absolutely necessary.

This all-roundness of community life had its political consequences. It made little nations possible and that in comparatively indifferent situations. Bohemia might be not only happy and prosperous but highly civilized without having harbors or extensive commercial facilities. Even in the interior of Russia such independent political units could and did flourish.

But something has changed all that. Perhaps the steam engine was chiefly responsible. But whatever it was, the result was that industry of every kind became specialized, communities ceased to be self-sufficing and became dependent upon one another, sending great distances and in many directions, not for a few things of exceptional use, but for everything. Probably the modern American brings his food an average of a hundred miles and other things much farther. Hardly a home is so humble that its equipment does not lay under tribute every grand division of the globe.

It is a peculiarity of the new industrial order that it was

compelled from its very nature to be virulently competitive. The new way of making goods, by great mechanisms driven by nature energies, was cheaper, vastly cheaper, than the old way, but on one condition, namely, that they should be made in very great quantities. But if made in great quantities, there would obviously be more than single communities or small districts could use. It was therefore necessary to get the largest possible markets. Hence the belligerent imperialism of the new industry. It could not remain contentedly at home and allow other countries to go on in their old way. It simply had to have world markets or it could not work at all. It broke into these old countries with their hand artisanship and local self-sufficiency, as a desolating revolutionary force. Some of them like China tried to stem the tide but to no avail. Had the new system been capable of local application, the innovators might possibly have been more considerate. As it was, they developed, as men always do, a philosophy of society consonant with their needs and sword in hand demanded its recognition. The intrinsic legitimacy of honest trade had become an axiom of western thought and was maintained by force of arms.

The all important characteristic of this new order was the increase of transportation. For every one of us, every day, four tons of goods are moved a mile by the railroads alone. Other agencies probably move as much more. Transportation has probably increased a hundred-fold as compared with the days of Elizabeth. Such an increase has been made possible only by a complete change in transportation methods. The development of transportation facilities has become a prime concern with modern nations. They are in that respect somewhat like private concerns. When one firm employs auto trucks, its competitor can not get along with pack mules or carts. The securing of favorable sites for railroads (one accession to the territory of the United States

was made exclusively for that purpose), for industrial plants, and above all for the great harbors which modern shipping requires, is of capital importance and is indeed a chief preoccupation of modern statecraft.

It will readily be understood how completely such a revolution invalidates the territorial standards of earlier national life. It is important to notice this because nationality is being continually advocated on the strength of former national possession and achievement. Bohemia, Poland, Serbia, and other nations of the past are applicants for readmission to the family of nations on old territorial lines. The argument is simple and at first sight plausible. "We once were independent, prosperous, and civilized. Why can we not, with the same territories, be so again?" The answer should be easy in the light of the foregoing. "Prosperity and civilization now rest on a different basis from what they did in your day." The modern nation can no more get along with the old outfit than the modern housewife can get along with the spinning wheel and the distaff. This is not to prejudice the case of these or other candidates for nationhood, but they must meet the new requirements if they are to win the privilege anew. No greater folly could be committed than to set up new nations without the basic requisites of present-day national life.

The consciousness that new things can not be as the old is curiously betrayed in certain of the extreme nationalist proposals recently offered for our consideration. Thus an ardent protagonist of Bohemian independence urges the reconstruction of Bohemia as an independent nation, but can not forget the fact that Bohemian territory has no access to the sea. This, he sees, will never do. He therefore proposes that Bohemia be accorded a narrow strip of territory which should serve as a runway to the sea. This pipestem appendage would, of course, be alien in population and would work havoc

with other nationalities quite as much entitled to unity and perhaps to independence as Bohemia herself. It would be a standing provocation to hostilities and yet entirely indefensible, a positive marvel of misadjustment. But what would you? An independent Bohemia must have access to the sea. Assuredly, but the historic Bohemia in whose name the new Bohemia is invoked, had no harbors and needed none. Thus she has bequeathed no raw material out of which the necessities of a modern Bohemia can be constructed. Similar difficulties present themselves in connection with the reconstitution of Poland, and perhaps in other cases as well.

The meaning of it all is clear. The past has bequeathed to us a lot of little nations with their little patrimonies, once ample for nationhood. They ask to be continued under new conditions which permit none but nations more ample and more liberally endowed. Professing themselves willing to be little, they demand,—the conditions demand,—an equipment which is possible only for the big. We will not attempt, for the moment, to reconcile this conflict of interests. We are concerned to note, first, that such a conflict exists, that race unity is at war with the requirements of modern equipment, and second, that race unity is an old fact, the product of existence under conditions that have now passed away, and the other is a new fact, the requirements which new conditions have inexorably forced upon the modern world. It requires little insight to predict the ultimate outcome of such a struggle. The Bohemians will have a seaport, whether or no, and they will pay for it by such concessions from race unity as are necessary.

With all possible insistence let it be repeated that these words are written in no unsympathetic spirit. It is not the intention to disparage these products of the patient discipline of past ages. The legacy of race ideals, race sympathies, and race inspiration which the past has left us must

be accounted among our most precious possessions. To treat them lightly as things to be brushed aside at convenience, to note only the barriers which they interpose in the way of progress, this is the opposite of wisdom and of statesmanship. But there is not one of these precious inheritances that has not itself been purchased at the expense of lesser but like sentiments which have died that it might live. With what agonies of heartache the Scottish clans yielded to the strong hand that welded them into the weapon of Robert the Bruce! How many memories of Bannockburn have had to be forgotten or remembered with kindlier thoughts ere the kilties could find their glory in Waterloo and the Marne! That the one must increase and the other decrease is the lesson of all history. The process will not be hastened by contumely and reproach. The existing horizon is the possible horizon for the moment, and the enthusiasms of today are the only possible parents of the larger enthusiasms of tomorrow. We must reckon,—not grudgingly but sympathetically,—with the products of historic nationality. But we must not sacrifice to them,—we are powerless to sacrifice to them,—the vital requirements of modern life. These new requirements, these larger physical conditions, have the same power to create their spiritual counterpart of sentiment and congeniality, their new race unity, that former conditions have had. Prudence requires respect for the nationality of the past, but progress requires respect for the nationality of the future.

It will long ago have occurred to the impatient reader that an easy way of removing this conflict is to be found in co-operation. An independent Bohemia must indeed have access to the sea, but why a monopolized Bohemian access? Why can not some neighboring seaboard nation permit the use of its facilities by arrangement? It can. This is not a matter of speculation but of fact. Such arrangements

exist. Germany ships via Antwerp, Switzerland via Genoa, and the like. But while experience attests the possibility of such arrangements, it also witnesses beyond question that they are never satisfactory. They are impeded, partial, and precarious. They are better than nothing, better, it may be, than any available alternative, but they remain irksome at the best. It may seem very unreasonable of Germany to want Antwerp for her very own, but what would we say to an alien-owned New York which we were permitted to use by arrangement? It is safe to say that such a New York would never have attained a quarter of its present size and that the diverted traffic would have followed more expensive routes to less convenient harbors.

Here, quite naturally, the internationalist sees in his proposal a cure for the evils of jarring national interests. Let the precarious arrangements referred to be guaranteed by the associated nations and the uncertainty is removed. Yes, if something can guarantee the associated nations. The proposal to neutralize or internationalize important ports or traffic ways which are necessarily used by different nations, is an elaboration of the same principle. Such an arrangement, it is urged, would make it possible to have an independent Bohemia, and in short, any number of little nations without territorial distortions.

It may seem ungracious to suggest that this is one of the very objections to internationalism. It summons men to the larger brotherhood by promising them a larger freedom to indulge their narrower prejudices. The world feels uncomfortable just now because of an unusual amount of readjustment which it is called upon to make. The little unities that stand for nothing but the past, that correspond to nothing in the life conditions of the present, are feeling the pitiless pressure of these new conditions. We are constrained to enter into larger relationships, to adjust ourselves to larger

groups and get acquainted with strange people. It is all so uncongenial, so irksome. We are homesick for the little home circle out of which we have been driven into this great cheerless, uncongenial world.

And just as we are feeling the irksomeness of this larger relationship, and uneasiness is passing into resentment and revolt, along comes the internationalist and launches his anathema against this thing that irks us. He tells us that polyglot empires and unions not based on congeniality ought not to be. How welcome such doctrine! In exchange for this odious reality which chafes us, he summons us to a supreme unity, to the world fellowship, a fellowship that seems to demand no concrete sacrifices, to entail no immediate and irksome relations. And withal and above all it permits and even enjoins the return to the earlier congenial relation with its local exclusiveness and prejudices. The appeal is enticing.

It may be conceded that this response to the appeal of internationalism is quite illogical. If internationalism ever becomes a fact among men, it will be no painless union. It will require such a shedding of prejudices and such a readjustment of mental habit as no nationalism ever yet imposed, and the serious internationalist doubtless realizes this and is willing to pay the price. Nor need we question for a moment the sincerity of its prophets or the elevation of their motives. But all unconsciously the gospel of internationalism owes its glamour in large part to its indulgent attitude toward provincialism. Its immediate tendency is disintegrating, whatever its promise. So pronounced is this relation that disintegration is usually the first plank in the internationalist platform, the one upon which present effort is chiefly concentrated. Russia is not altogether a fair example, but her case is none the less relevant. She has proclaimed the larger human unity and denounced the irksome unity of the nation

under the name of self-determination. The resulting disintegration is apparent, but hardly the resulting unity.

Conceding all that may be claimed for internationalism as the goal of human endeavor, it is impossible to avoid the query whether the disintegration of the present larger aggregates is the way to get it. These have been painfully formed by the slow removal of obstructive sentiments, the formation of larger cohesions, and the successive widening of men's horizons. The little has grown into the large. May not the large grow into the universal?

In summary, nationality is based upon race and upon physical conditions. But race is itself the product of earlier and long standing physical conditions. Conflicts between the two are due to changes in physical conditions, changes due in part to migration, but in greater part to the development of larger relations of co-operation and interdependence. In its present high stage of development race sentiment is exceedingly tenacious and imperious, often arrogating to itself an absolute and permanent character and yielding reluctantly to changed physical conditions. Changes in physical condition have of late been rapid and far-reaching, the newer demands for successful national life requiring larger areas and better facilities than were formerly necessary. Present race feeling, therefore, does not fit present national requirements, which latter are too recent to have developed the larger race sentiments except imperfectly in certain favored localities like Great Britain. It is a transition age, an age of narrow sentiments and broad requirements. Working arrangements must be based on compromise. Yet it is well to remember that race sentiment is itself a product of physical conditions and that new conditions inevitably produce new sentiments. Historic nationalism is a stubborn but a waning force; specialized industrial civilization a permanent and growing power. This must increase and that must decrease. The working adjust-

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ments which we are called upon to effect will call for very large concessions to these great spiritual inheritances from the past, but these concessions should be made in full recognition of this fundamental fact. The Great Peace must be based on a larger justice, a deeper sympathy, and a fuller deference than we have hitherto known, but it would indeed be pitiful if that deference and sympathy were construed in the interest of provincialism and the perpetuation of petty prejudice among men. Not so would it become the Great Peace.

CHAPTER V

NATIONALITY AND NATURAL RESOURCE

At the basis of national life there is always an economic problem. An essential condition of the nation as of the family is an assured livelihood. Briefly and by exception, a nation may live upon its endowment as a family may live by consuming its patrimony, but such an existence is precarious and demoralizing. Nations can not long escape the wholesome necessity of providing for their own necessities. Exemption from this requirement, even for a brief period, results in a degeneration of tissue which is speedily followed by national decay. Spain and Portugal are classic examples of nations ruined by being privileged for a time to live on the fruits of other men's labors.

It is therefore pertinent to inquire at the founding of the nation as at the founding of the new household,—is economic support assured? If not, then nationality will be handicapped and stunted. Such a result has its dangers, not only for the nation in question, but for the general community of nations. The indigent nation is apt to be the tool of the unscrupulous, like the indigent individual. Relations of extreme dependence involve responsibilities which may well be the subject of the closest public scrutiny.

First in importance in the inventory of a nation's economic resources must be reckoned its soil. This, with its correlate of climate, is the natural source of its food, clothing, and much of its shelter and permanent equipment. It is true that all these things may be, and commonly are, secured in part from outside the national limits, but to the extent that

this is necessary, the nation becomes obviously dependent in its most fundamental interests. In war, importation is difficult if not impossible, and dependence upon it quickly becomes onerous. But not alone in war is the relation irksome. The purveyor is always in some sense a master, and national independence, under such conditions of dependence, is to a degree a contradiction in terms.

The present war has served to emphasize what all the world knew but had not previously appreciated. That something like universal famine was a possibility as a result of interruption of world commerce, had hardly occurred to us. Yet we have seen the food producing countries themselves put on short rations, while millions of bushels of the coveted wheat spoiled for lack of transport. Equally, we have seen local production stimulated beyond precedent or supposed possibility by distress. It may be doubted whether nations will ever again accept complacently the extreme dependence which has characterized England and Belgium in recent years. Possibly the accumulation of a surplus may help to insure against possible lean years; but for the most part, these nations must resort to the unwelcome expedient of costly artificial stimulation, if their limited agriculture is to meet the increasing demand.

Be this as it may, in our task of nation building, we can hardly overlook the importance of these fundamental requisites of successful nationality. Europe has not always remembered this need in her nation making. When Greece in 1830 was constituted an independent nation, by the European powers, the very able prince who was called to guide the destinies of the little state, declined the invitation on the ground that Thessaly, the natural granary of Greece, was not included. But the powers were timid and were guided as usual by a great variety of considerations which made it seemingly impracticable to provide adequately for the wants

of the fledgling nation. Their decision held, and an imprudent and incompetent prince rashly assumed the responsibilities which the other had declined. The result was complete failure. The powers were obliged to do their work over again, to include the necessary grainland, and to secure a more competent leader.

Capacity to produce food staples is of prime importance, but by no means the only desideratum. Ability to provide a "balanced ration" is most desirable. Agricultural variety with its larger guaranty against the vicissitudes of nature, stock and their products, fruit and the numberless delicacies of the civilized table, these all count. Nor does the requirement stop with food. The impending shortage of wool and the disappointing cotton crop of the present year are reminders of our dependence for other essentials upon the soil. A narrow and highly specialized productivity, even though ample in amount, again necessitates exchange and involves dependence, and this again incites to effort to better the nation's economic position, it may be by those violent efforts which it is our problem to prevent.

The needs above noted are fundamental to all nations and to all civilizations. The Indian who disputed the possession of hunting grounds with a rival tribe was actuated by the same motives that today impel Germany to annex the grain fields of Courland. But there has slowly developed in the western nations a need which in its magnitude has not characterized earlier civilizations and is not now felt by certain great peoples. The distinctive characteristic of our western civilization is its dependence upon minerals. In this it differs from the great civilizations of the east. Their equipment is essentially of vegetable origin. Nothing so impresses the traveler in China as the number of things made of bamboo which with us are made of metal. If to vegetable products we add earthenware of one sort or another, the product

of minerals whose supply is universal and unlimited, we have the essential basis of these great civilizations.

In contrast, our civilization has learned to avail itself,—and that at a rapidly increasing rate,—of minerals and more particularly of metals the annual production of which already mounts into the hundreds of millions of tons. Scarceley a year passes that does not witness the transfer of some important article from the vegetable to the mineral category, apparently never to return. The recent general adoption of metal bedsteads and the introduction of metal office fixtures now in progress, are cases in point.

The advantage of this metal civilization is obvious. Nothing else could make possible the mighty enginery of modern industry or war. We perhaps do not often enough reflect that it has the great defect of ultimate exhaustion. Great as is the wealth of certain metals like iron still reposing in the bowels of the earth, the supply is not unlimited, and local scarcity is already acutely felt. Furthermore, continued exploitation must be under less favorable conditions, with the possibility that we may experience economic exhaustion even if physical exhaustion is still remote. The time may yet come when men will hunt iron as men hunted it in the Middle Ages, reserving the costly stuff for necessary implements and invoking for vulgar uses again the unfailing timber or bamboo.

Be the future what it will, wealth of iron and coal is today the much sought dower of favored nations. A reasonable supply of both is, if not indispensable, at least of such extreme importance to modern nations that they will go to almost any lengths to secure them. Doubtless a people may live happily without these resources, but they cannot form a nation of great wealth and power without them. The nations that have developed great population, great wealth, and great political power, have all been industrial nations, at

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least in modern times. Agriculture creates no such accumulations of capital, no such enginery of power, no such huge masses of population, as does industry, which, in the western nations, is directly or indirectly based on the exploitation of mineral resources. Doubtless such a development brings its grave problems and perplexities. The philosopher might perhaps counsel a people to resist these dangerous advantages, but peoples in their onward groping find little opportunity to heed philosophic counsel. In our war with man or nature, the all-compelling demand is power. That, the exploitation of metal industries assures beyond the wildest imaginings of a soil tilling people.

Again this war has emphasized the great lesson. The nations that are winning are those that can forge the heavier sword. Here, everywhere, the cry is for more, and ever more, millions of tons of coal and steel. It takes steel to make cannon, and steel to make shells, and steel to make ships. And the while we are straining every nerve to provide these things, we are reminded on every side of the myriad demands of peace which passed unnoticed until denied. Contrast the pitiful weakness of Italy that, without coal or iron of her own, waits a suppliant for the supplies that are needed to stem the tide of invasion. There is warrant for the belief that with coal and iron mines of her own, Italy, even the weaker Italy of today, might have been knocking at the gates of Vienna. But Italy with coal and iron of her own would not have been the Italy of today. An immensely larger population, a vastly larger accumulation of capital and industrial appliances capable of conversion to war's emergency uses would have changed the problem *in toto*. Is it any wonder that the nations want coal and iron?

It will of course be urged that economic provision is not necessarily dependent on political control. This is true, as present conditions prove. Italy and other nations have se-

cured their coal and iron, like many other commodities, by importation, and must apparently continue to do so. It is not to be supposed, however, that such provision is satisfactory, even if assured. Districts having coal and iron, commodities that are difficult of transport, have an immense advantage in the development of the basic industries over districts not thus provided. The mere mining of coal and ore employs a large population, and this necessarily belongs to the district in question. When it is remembered that it takes four tons of coal and several tons of ore and stone to make a single ton of steel, it will readily be seen that the basic industries tend strongly to gravitate likewise to the locality where nature has located their heavy materials. Thus a farther increment of industrial population tends to develop in such centers.

To those to whom nationality is nothing but an inconsequential prejudice, it may seem of no moment whether such a population own the allegiance of a particular nation or not. But men do not so judge. These men pay taxes and their wealth,—often very large,—is an asset of the state. They are available to recruit the armies of their state. They are in all respects of the stuff that states are made of. If the members of a nation are of importance, by the same token, these possible additions are important.

But we may perhaps add another reason for desiring the incorporation of such districts into the territory of the nation. It is important, not only to get population, but to assimilate it to the race which is nationally paramount. The assimilation of agricultural populations is very slow. Infrequent contact with assimilative elements, and perhaps a mental habit less susceptible to these influences, makes such a population tenacious of alien speech or ways. But such industrial centers as above described, especially if developed by the alien annexing power, draw their population from

other sources and predominantly from the dominant nationality, if it is suitable. It is comparatively easy to implant the new language and race sentiments in such a mobile population during the period of its fluidity. Such additions, therefore, not only strengthen the nation, but strengthen the race, results obviously to be desired if race and nationality are conceived to be important. Whatever the reasons,—and it is safe to say that aggressive nationalism is but secondarily concerned with the reasons,—there is nothing that the nations want more than deposits of coal and iron. Campaigns are conducted and treaties framed with very large regard for these prime essentials of national life. Some of the most sensitive frontier problems in Europe turn on these stores of mineral wealth. On debatable ground, with a population already hybrid, they are the most tempting of all opportunities to shift by slight changes of boundary or effort, the whole political and racial equilibrium of the family of nations. The enormous industrial development of central Europe in the last fifty years has inured to the benefit of Germany because she acquired the mineral basis of that development from France in 1871. By that transaction Germany acquired more than the fields of Alsace-Lorraine, more than their iron and coal, more than their two million people. Quite beyond the limits of these provinces, in the region of the belching furnaces and the busy workshops, some millions of men today speak German and loyally support the German cause who would never have existed had the trains carried their coal and their ore the other way and fed them to the furnaces of France, to call into being there the other millions that have not been. For the mines bring forth men, and men after the nation's kind. Small difference in the end, will some one be found to suggest? Perhaps so to those who view the whole with an outsider's indifference, but to France with her thinning line of

defenders, and to Germany with her plans of world dominion, these millions one way or the other may be the difference between success and failure.

It is hardly necessary to add that other minerals enter largely into the list of national requisites, especially copper for which, in its rapidly widening uses, there is no known substitute. Manganese, tungsten, and other metals, some of them but yesterday unknown, have speedily become indispensable as ingredients in that ever changing marvel of products which still goes by the old name of steel. Other minerals of chemical importance extend the list. Many of these, though of highest importance, are used in small quantities and derived from limited and local sources, where they are easily controlled by individuals, with possible exclusive advantage to single powers. In this field of obscure but vital interests, unpracticed statesmanship and diplomatic tradition are easily misled and popular judgment is hopelessly incompetent. It is nevertheless in the realm of these subtle forces that the destiny of nations may henceforth be decided.

No attempt is here made to enumerate the necessary industrial requirements of the nation. A complete inventory is the work of the industrial expert, a functionary too little employed in most national counsels. Nor has it been the attempt to show that nations ought to insist upon these resources as conditions of their existence. The purpose has been rather to indicate that nations do seek these things, and that their presence or absence reacts strongly upon the wealth, population, and power of the states in question. And since wealth, population, and power have much to do with the survival of nations, the builders of nations must have large regard for these things.

So far we have dealt exclusively with natural resources. There are, however, other and derivative factors which determine the economic life of a nation quite as much, perhaps,

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as these gifts of nature. The possession of mines determines whether a nation shall have a mining industry or not. But it does not determine quite absolutely whether the nation shall have a smelting industry or not. If the materials are all there, the tendency is strong to develop such an industry, but still these materials may be shipped elsewhere and the smelting done by another nation, as in fact happens. Conversely, as this case indicates, it is possible for a nation without such resources to develop the industry appropriate to them. The derivative industry is not quite controlled by the primary industry.

As we go farther from the primary industry toward industries more and more elaborate, the dependence becomes ever less. Watch springs need not be made near coal and iron mines. They may be made anywhere where other conditions are favorable. Thus a very large option is opened in the broad field of industry. Not that the choice ever becomes a matter of indifference. There are always potent if not compelling economic reasons. It pays to make watch springs in some places and not in others, but no longer because of the location of the mines. And since large scale industry and the grouping of kindred industries is always advantageous, it follows that there is everywhere a tendency toward specialization and far reaching dependence. This specialization is at bottom quite as natural as that which rests on the presence or absence of natural resources, but it is far more flexible. Left to themselves, industries will mass themselves as stated, but it is quite possible for nations to prevent this massing and to develop, by judicious stimulation, industries of a varied character. Economically this does not pay. Nations do not get rich by bribing themselves to maintain unprofitable industries. No matter how many complexities and side issues are brought into the argument, nothing can change this fundamental economic relation. Nor do

high wages and full dinner pails result from this maintenance of non-paying industries, unless temporarily, by averting the collapse of an artificial order which the system itself has created.

But while such a policy does not make us rich it may make us independent. The reasons that impel nations to seek varied natural resources may justly impel them to develop varied national industries. Complete national self-sufficiency, either in resources or in developed industries, is a chimera, but relative self-sufficiency is an attainable and a desirable goal.

But it will be objected that this is a national rather than an international problem. It has already been urged in an earlier chapter that the peace conference can not better show its wisdom than by resolutely refraining from interference in matters of purely national concern. It is much to be wished that the rule might be observed in this connection. Unfortunately it is all but certain that certain powers with which we have to deal will recognize no such limitation. The German industrial development, so much admired and in some ways so admirable, has been as ruthless and as aggressive as German militarism itself. For the widespread German practice of selling goods below cost in invaded markets and making up the loss in protected home markets, there is probably no remedy, especially as against a nation that has no respect for its promises. But certain industries so fostered are of a character which perhaps entitles them to international consideration. A German manufacturer of dyestuffs is said to have declared, anent a proposal to develop that industry in Italy, that he would do business there without profit for ten years,— would if necessary sacrifice the profits of ten years past,— to defeat that project. This seems harmless until we learn that the reason for this German specialty is that the dyestuff industry can be converted with-

out change of materials or appliances, into the manufacture of high explosives. Such specialization has a significance in connection with the problem of national defense that makes it a legitimate interest to alliances formed for that purpose. Whether effective measures can be devised is not so clear.

More imperative and more practicable, however, is it to see that nations disorganized by the war do not resume their national life under conditions that destroy their economic freedom. If we may not dictate the economic policy of other nations, by the same token we must see that others do not do so. We may be perfectly certain that every effort will be made by certain powers to prevent the development of economic independence, with its concomitants of wealth and power, by certain other nations whose subserviency and helplessness are desired. The attempt will be to accomplish by an industrial offensive that which the military offensive has failed to achieve. Prudence forbids us to interpose a veto, but it requires us to insure the square deal.

No rule can be laid down as to the economic requisites of national existence, but it is clear that such requisites exist and that they are among the weightiest considerations in the nation builders' problem. Ample and varied resources are a condition of national strength and independence. Such provision our own country enjoys in a high degree. Probably no other nation is so nearly self-sufficing as the United States, nor is it probable that its like is possible without extensive mergers of states now separate.

For nations not blessed with this all-round provision, the possession in abundance of some material or product which is vitally necessary to other nations, is the nearest equivalent. Germany's potash makes her a strong bargainer for our cotton. If little Greece had been known to have iron in her mountains, she might have gotten on without Thessaly. Those who have iron can always buy wheat.

But they cannot buy the capital which their industry is not of a nature to create, or the thousands of their own kind which their industry is not competent to support. Above all they can not buy the varied human types that the raising of the wheat and the forging of the iron produce. Their building must be done with less differentiated human material. The result must be a simpler organism and one perhaps less fitted to survive under modern conditions.

In conclusion, a single fact calls for emphasis. Economic resource, like territorial convenience or defensibility, is an independent requisite of national existence. The economic demands of today are totally unlike those of earlier times and stand in no necessary relation to historic sentiments or historic frontiers. Where race sentiment or historic boundaries conflict with economic requirements, concession is inevitable. In particular must purely local sentiment be subordinated to the interests of the larger populations affected. How inadequate the proposal that the disposition of Alsace-Lorraine should be determined by a plebiscite! The industrial, political, and cultural future of two great nations is dependent upon the decision in a way of which the humble Alsatian peasant is utterly unconscious. There could be no greater travesty of justice than to settle these far-reaching questions of human destiny by reference to the transient sentiment of a single generation of distracted border peasantry. To invoke the principle of self-determination in connections where its exercise would give to the unknowing few the power to determine the fate and even the existence of millions who have no voice in the settlement, can have no other result than to bring discredit upon a vital principle.

CHAPTER VI

NATIONALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP

THE present peoples of the world are clearly very unequal in their capacity for the duties of nationality. These inequalities, again, are of the most varied character. There are differences of location, of climate, of education, and of historical inheritance. The English have been peculiarly favored by their location, enjoying at once exceptional opportunity for contact with the world and at the same time a rare immunity from attack. They have consequently developed a remarkable aptitude for affairs and for political and social organization. The French have profited greatly from their Roman inheritance which laid the foundation of their extraordinary political unity. The Germans, enjoying neither of these advantages, have been but recently and imperfectly unified and have been unable to develop the capacity for self government which the inherent capabilities of the people should lead us to expect. Here location and inheritance account for differences of the most far reaching character, but differences which seemingly do not inhere in race character. The Germans are socially akin to the English and were joint originators of their political institutions. Very large Teutonic elements have continually recruited the Anglo-Saxon stock, and at an earlier date, the French stock as well, with no sign of inferiority or misadaptation after a generation or two of assimilation. Differences are here purely a matter of situation and circumstance, though not necessarily slight or transient on that account. In more extreme cases, like that of the Russians and the Poles, where access to the world is still more limited and natural defenses almost wholly

lacking, political development has been effectively checked, though again, we have no reason to doubt the capacity of the race.

But there are other cases where the difference is more fundamental and significant. Where climatic conditions are essentially a bar to energy, a type of character develops which is undoubtedly less capable of political development. Whether the inhabitants of the tropics, when transferred to temperate climates, are capable of developing the qualities of the northern races is a disputed question, but one of little moment. There is little opportunity for such transfer, and whatever the result to those thus circumstanced, those that are left behind remain unmodified and determine the character of the race. It is this character that concerns us. What are the possibilities of political development in the less favored climates, more particularly in the broad zone between thirty degrees north and south of the Equator, the tropics as defined by the ethnologist?

The writer has elsewhere¹ given at length his reasons for believing that the political inferiority of the tropics is inherent and permanent. It was in the tropics that civilization first developed, but that civilization was based on slavery, sure sign of the irksomeness of exertion. Even this slave organization seems to have been effected by members of more energetic races. With the passing of slavery and the introduction of a more efficient principle of organization, civilization transferred its headquarters to the energy zone and the tropics ceased to progress, even retrograded, separated from the developing northern peoples by an ever widening gulf, until the northerner himself chose to bridge it. It has been justly said that no tropical people has ever yet developed a civilization that would pass muster according to the most tolerant of modern standards. Such governments have ex-

¹ "America Among the Nations," Chapter XII.

isted within the tropics, and in particular exist there today, but they are established and maintained by peoples from the temperate zones. Such participation in these governments as the native peoples have acquired, has been under the tutelage of the suzerain peoples. The actual choice of human agents,— always the test of self government,— has never rested with the native. Possibly this too will come, but even so it will not prove or constitute equality. It will mean at most that they are capable of development,— not that they are capable of *self*-development.

The question of ultimate capacity, however, concerns us very little. It is at best a question whether these peoples will never develop political capacity, or will develop it very, very slowly. Any suggestion that tropical races as a whole are the equals of the northern peoples in political capacity is a palpable absurdity. Making allowance for certain favored localities in the tropics where elevation or dryness counteract in a measure the enervating effects of climate, the general condition of the tropics speaks for itself. They are not young peoples, novices at their task. The tropical peoples are among the oldest on the globe. They are not few or scattered. The tropics in Africa, India and South America bulk large among the world's inhabited areas, and India alone has a population nearly equal to that of all Europe, with natural defenses unrivaled in the world. They are not lacking in resources, for nowhere has nature been more lavish. Yet India passed, almost without a struggle, under the control of a power one tenth her size and ten thousand miles away. Tropical Africa was partitioned with scarce a protest, and tropical America appropriated as though it were an empty land. We can explain these facts only on the assumption of the inferior political capacity of tropical peoples.

It is sometimes urged that this is not inferiority but only

adaptation to tropical conditions. True, but not an adaptation to world conditions, and it is with world conditions that modern civilization and modern political conditions have to deal. All the tendencies of modern life,—the harnessing of nature forces, quantity production, world markets, universal transportation and communication,—tend to make all parts of the world dependent upon one another. The tropical peoples may themselves be quite satisfied to be indolent, unorganized, and inefficient, but the organized and energetic northern people need the products of the tropics in a measure which only organization and industry can supply. Diseases due to carelessness and sloth may be a small matter to the native,¹ but when foreign ships carry the infection to distant ports, it requires intervention. Finally, and most of all, tropical peoples require protection from the cupidity and ruthless energy of the powerful peoples who are tempted or compelled to seek their products. Thus, the discovery of rich tin deposits in the Malay Peninsula at a time when other known deposits of this indispensable metal were beginning to be exhausted, put a pressure upon these feebly organized folk which they were entirely unable to bear. Imagine the conditions that would have followed such a discovery if no strong government had intervened to protect native interests. A few vigorous and unscrupulous adventurers such as are found among all strong peoples,—men like Cortez or Pizarro or Drake, or Hawkins,—would seize the territory, coerce the natives into working the mines, subject them to unspeakable cruelties, and virtually exterminate the race in the pursuit of private gain, as was done in the West Indies. It is useless to say,—wrong to say,—that the

¹ The inhabitants of Guayaquil are said to have protested against the eradication of yellow fever on the ground that they, being semi-immune, survived its attacks, while the more susceptible foreigner succumbed. It constituted thus a natural protection against dreaded commercial competition.

foreigner should keep out. He will not and he should not keep out. It would be a breach of trust toward civilization to leave unutilized a necessary instrument of progress because an inefficient people have accidentally located on the spot. Anyway it will not be done. There is no power in the world that can keep out the lawless adventurer under such circumstances. The prize is too great, the place too remote, and foreign prohibition too ineffectual.

The tin mines of Malaysia offer an easy illustration of the problem of tropical exploitation, but it is only one case among many. All natural products of the tropics, products demanded by western civilization with ever increasing importunity, present similar temptations and dangers. The frightful cruelties of rubber gathering in the Putumayo illustrate the danger of letting the strong race go as exploiter without carrying his own strong restraints and protections with him. Similar conditions obtained in the Congo while under the control of an irresponsible commercial combination, conditions which even the assumption of responsibility by Belgium did not at once remove.

When the demand for tropical products exceeds nature's spontaneous supply, new reasons for tutelage present themselves. The Malay can collect wild rubber, but when it becomes necessary to establish a rubber plantation, neither coercion nor inducements will make him equal to the task. Larger power of organization, more sustained purpose, and fuller knowledge than tropical man possesses are required for the purpose. Yet the purpose is perfectly legitimate. It is as reasonable that the soil of the tropics should be tilled as that the tin should be mined in the service of civilization. Yet this mobilization of world resources which is at once the necessity and the glory of our civilization, requires the organizing abilities and the effective restraints which only the most advanced nations can furnish. The strong races

must help the weak and yet must protect them from the impact of their own strength.

The tropics perhaps furnish the clearest case of obvious dependence, but not by any means the only one. Peoples of undoubted capacity may be quite as dependent by reason of limited area and peculiar situation. Denmark is an example. No expansion of Danish territory is practicable, and consequently, no considerable expansion of the race. Denmark is surrounded by powerful nations who would find her territories a most convenient addition to their domain. Obviously the integrity of Denmark must depend on something else than her own strength. Lack of coal, of access to the sea, or of other vital needs of national life create further conditions of helplessness, a helplessness very different from that of the tropical peoples, but not the less real. What they can not do for themselves, stronger nations must do for them.

Hence the relation which we may call trusteeship, a relation not to be confounded with mere control. There has been plenty of control in the world, but little trusteeship. The higher relation has slowly developed from the lower. The early conquerors were merely marauders. They took everything they could turn to account and destroyed the rest. It was an advance when the great Pharaoh of the eighteenth dynasty hit upon the idea of making annual raids, plundering with moderation, and leaving enough food and seed so there might be something for him next year. Then came the system of tribute in which the helpless bought immunity from the annual raid by an advance payment. It is the principle accepted by early empire builders and dominant still in the days of more enlightened Rome, that helpless, appropriated peoples are the property of their suzerain, to be farmed for his benefit like a private estate, and with such regard for native interests as a prudent farmer shows to-

ward his horses or cattle, the source of his profits. Even Cicero pleads for good government in the provinces, not at all in the interest of the provincials, but on the ground that it will increase the revenue that can be derived from them. In justice to Rome it must be recognized that she became better than her theories and that much of the spirit of trusteeship animated her best officials. But their higher temper never had the support of a recognized social principle.

In the awful collapse of civilization which followed the decay of Rome, the fugitive principle was quite lost sight of. With the rise of modern nations and the world discoveries which established dependencies of unprecedented extent, the unschooled nations began again at the first lessons. The plundering of Peru and the depopulation of the West Indian Islands were eighteenth dynasty performances or worse. Drake and Hawkins hardly represented a higher principle. The policy of the British East India Company in the early period of its unexpected imperial responsibilities, reflect but little of the later British temper. The attempt to tax the American Colonies, though moderate in amount and reasonable in its alleged purpose, was suggestive of the earlier idea of ownership. And so still is the terminology handed down from an earlier time and an earlier set of political ideas. We still hear of "British Possessions," and the realities of the modern relation are still concealed under the symbols of ownership.

Slowly the principle of trusteeship has emerged from the brutal relation of force. The incontinent marauder slowly learns prudence and gives his victims the benefit of a closed season, as did the great Pharaoh. Then he protects, multiplies, and organizes them, the better to harness them for his purpose. Such was the policy of Rome in the great days, a wise and humane exploiter, but still not a trustee. But at last, in accordance with a principle of universal application,

he becomes interested in the objects of his care. Like the horse fancier, whose passion for horses leads him to spend his money freely upon them, so the care-taker of the peoples becomes engrossed in his task, proud of his constructive achievement, eager to give rather than to get, and the ulterior purpose of his effort at the beginning is slowly subordinated and then forgotten. He is no longer an owner, an exploiter, but a trustee. The relation here indicated is not at all one of self-denying devotion or religious self-abnegation. It is one that results naturally from honest and competent devotion to a constructive task. We learn to enjoy the task. Once we have learned the delight of building, we would rather build than occupy. The typical trust administrator is a practical, business man, largely competent, and capable of a large satisfaction in his own competency. No self-denying altruism need supplement,— still less can it ever replace,— his sturdy respect for professional honor, his repugnance for the cheap betrayal of the implicit trust placed in him, and his satisfaction at seeing his city of brick become a city of marble. The man who has once known these recompenses cares little for any other. Especially if he continues a long line of those who have so wrought and so judged, any other judgment or attitude becomes impossible.

The same holds of nations, possibly in an even greater degree. They are slower to move, slower to become imbued with a principle, but correspondingly slow to abandon it, especially if it is backed by a long tradition. It is cheap tirade to denounce the great order-creating powers as land grabbers, bandits, and brigands. There have been nations that were selfish and short-sighted, without inspired vision or constructive wisdom. And there have been others that have built greatly and enduringly, asking little by way of recompense save the privilege of building, because their pleasure was in that. The world has nothing more valuable to show

as the result of its age-long travail than such men and such nations as these.

It is needless to say that the spirit of trusteeship has been very differently developed in modern nations. It is not always possible to account for these differences which seem to stand in no uniform relation to experience or national temperament. The beginners seem to have fared worst. Spain and Portugal had the unfortunate privilege of plundering the treasure houses of the newly discovered world. Possibly other peoples would have plundered as ruthlessly at that time and would have paid as heavy a penalty. That penalty came in the form of a demoralizing tradition of unearned wealth which no later experience or enlightenment could overcome. Contrary to popular opinion, Spain's colonial legislation was for the most part well conceived and unselfish. But nothing could secure its administration in that spirit. The habit of "milking" the colonies dominated the official and the national consciousness. This administrative plunder did not find its worst effect in the constant drain upon colonial resources, but in the destruction of the constructive tradition. The habit of thinking of the colonies in terms of revenue made it impossible to think of them in terms of constructive opportunity. It isn't the collector of rents in slum tenements who dreams dreams of architectural reconstruction. This depressing temper was not that of individuals; it was the temper of the nation. With imperial decline and the growing need of earning her own living, the reluctant nation responded with increasing shift and evasion. It was the loss of her last colony that started Spain on the wholesome path of self-support. To her had been committed one of the world's greatest trusts, but she had never learned the secret of trusteeship.

Spain is a conspicuous example of failure in the trusteeship of dependent peoples, but she is neither the only failure nor

the worst one. The failure of Portugal has been more abject and pitiful. Her mighty power in the East has dwindled to the merest speck, a fossil reminder of things extinct, while her African colonies, the only considerable remains of her vast empire, are the blackest spots on the dark continent. Even more than Spain, too, she has suffered the demoralizing home reaction of unearned existence. Her chief monument is African slavery, her invention. The world owes to her infamous trusteeship the most insoluble of all social and race problems.

But distinctly worse than either is the case of Turkey. She hardly surpasses them in cruelty or destructiveness, but against her trusteeship lies this damning indictment, that it has been the subjection of the higher to the lower. The Turkish Empire has included the most civilized peoples of the ancient world and of all the later times down to the Renaissance. It has scarcely included at any time a people,—Arab, Jew, Greek, Armenian, or other,—which was not superior to the Turk himself. Upon these subject races the Turk has never conferred any gift of organization. He has never even learned their own higher secret. He has simply allowed their organization to continue, using at times the conquered as agents of administration, and through them farming his estate for his own benefit. Thus the Rumanian principalities were always ruled by Christians. Before the conquest Christians ruled them in the interest of Christians; afterward, Christians ruled them in the interest of Turks. The governorship was sold in Constantinople to the highest bidder, and the purchaser, always a Greek, recouped himself from the revenues that should have gone to the development of the provinces. Meanwhile the Turk sat at home, good-natured, tolerant, unimaginative, amid the decaying splendors of an empire that he did not create and could not preserve. It is not an uncommon thing that a crude people has

conquered a more highly developed one, but it would be difficult to find a case in which the conqueror has learned so little from the conquered. If there is any power among men to rectify the demonstrated misfits of history, the Turk may well be asked to give an account of his stewardship.

If we turn from these deplorable examples in almost any direction, the contrast is striking. In trusteeship of the high-handed imperial sort, the Russian has given us much to admire. Doubtless Russian provincial development has been for the sake of the empire rather than for the sake of the provinces, but there has at least been provincial development, and that of a sort that would have done honor to Trajan. To one who compares the squalid quarters of old Tiflis with the magnificently appointed city which Russia has built beside it, or who looks out upon the superb avenues and quays of Dalny which displace the Chinese fisher huts of a few years before, it is plain that with all her faults, Russia was no mere parasite, no wearer of the cast-off purple of older empires. Nor was her constructive power confined to the building of cities. Under a dynasty which despite its recent fiasco has been characterized for a century and a half by a remarkable degree of ability and public spirit, Russia was one of the great constructive powers in the world. It was her misfortune that the democratic preoccupations of the western powers should make us primarily conscious of Russia's unlearned lessons, her rudimentary development of popular government and safeguards for individual right. We neither realized the impossibility of achieving these things first, nor yet the fact that they were being rapidly achieved. The Duma and the Zemstvos, despite their limited prerogatives, were rapidly building popular government on the soundest of foundations when the avalanche of fanaticism and treason swept their work away. The writer holds no brief for Russia. Her efforts will be needed at home for a long time to come. Even

were she with us still in her coherent power, her trusteeship for the wards of the nations was more to be dreaded than sought. But now that she has left the stage we may freely recognize her as one of the great players.

A mixed record, but on the whole an honorable one is that of France. The problem presented by North America, a problem of colonization more than of trusteeship of the native races, was little suited to the France of the *ancien régime*. Religious bigotry hindered settlement, and state aid proved a demoralizing inducement. International conflicts prevented any rational policy toward the natives, even had the insight of the time made such a policy possible. It is rare that a historic decision has been better justified than was that on the Heights of Abraham in 1759.

But the free France of a later day has had a very different history. No wars with European rivals have been fought within the limits of her great modern dependencies. No attempt has been made to displace their native populations. From the first the policy has been one of development, and so far from exploiting these possessions for tribute, they have uniformly entailed a charge upon the home government for their maintenance and development. It is just here that France has been oftenest criticised. She has not been predatory or parasitic,—despite a certain tendency to officialism on the part of French residents,—but she has not always seemed to be practical. Perhaps the difficulty lies with the home people. They are less disposed to grasp colonial opportunities for business and less inclined to let foreigners do so. Hence the development of the dependencies is slower and the day of self-support is postponed.

Possibly it should be added that French devotion to the principles of free government has at times hindered her work. In her effort to do for her dependents she has gone so far as

to incorporate Algeria into the body of France, giving it representation in the French Parliament and at one time extending the entire body of French law to this province. The result only demonstrated the futility of arrangements not based on nature. Algeria is not France, and her representatives show a dangerous provincialism and detachment from general interests. Above all, Mohammedans are not Frenchmen, and the well meant privileges of French law were for them a hardship and an irritation.

But despite these excesses of zeal and other limitations of a less excusable kind, French rule has shown in a high degree the spirit of trusteeship, and an increasing mastery of its problems. It is a matter of regret, to those who chiefly desire the expansion of the French race, that the Frenchman is so little disposed to emigrate and challenge the native possession of Algeria and Tunis, but as the trustee of dependent peoples France is certainly not to be criticised for showing so little disposition to displace them. That she is creating in these lands the material conditions of civilization in a degree that they have never known, and that she is sincerely devoted to their development rather than to a policy of exhausting exploitation is hardly to be questioned. France is one of the great trustees.

The case of Britain is too well known and recognized as a model to require lengthy discussion. The most striking fact is the immensity of her trust. About one-fourth of the population as of the area of the globe is in her keeping, and of these more than three-fourths are essentially wards. Indeed if we take account of the scanty population of the self-governing dominions, a population quite unable to protect itself unaided against possible aggressors, then all outside the United Kingdom, or more than nine-tenths of the vast aggregate, must be classed as dependent. Trusteeship, however,

as regards the self-governing dominions can be nothing more than protection from foreign aggression. Beyond this they are self-sufficing.

Toward the dependent peoples the policy of Britain, though persistently misrepresented, is not open to doubt. Its first requisite is order, as is that of every true government. But this assured, all effort is bent toward the care and development of the people held in trust. Burke's declaration that England was not powerful enough to oppress the humblest dweller on the banks of the Ganges and protect the proudest lord on the banks of the Thames, may fairly be taken as the guiding principle of British trusteeship, a principle whose strength lies not so much in its acceptance by the British people as in the slowly developed tradition of the British administrator. This tradition which is not the creation of any single individual or the result of any legislative act, has slowly come to envelop the whole service like an atmosphere. It is not the sentimental devotion of the altruist, but the self-respect of a superior race. From his first day in the service the future administrator breathes this atmosphere of matter-of-course recognition of native rights and suzerain obligations. The petty tricks, the lies, the nameless exasperations of his wards must not exhaust his patience. That would be to show weakness. His word must be inviolable, the more so because theirs is not. To take advantage of them is contemptible, unsportsmanlike. Not saintliness but sportsmanship is the key to this finest service ever rendered by race to race.

But the great thing about British trusteeship is not merely its justice, competency, and professional honor. It is rather to be found in its democracy. To the limit of the possible it is Britain's policy to place responsibility in native hands. This policy, so well exemplified and advocated by Lord Cromer in his administration of Egypt, means in the first

place the use of native agents so far as possible in administrative service, a general practice in all trusteeships, for only the most bungling incompetent seeks posts for "deserving" partisans in such a service. But British policy goes farther,—and in this finds its distinctive characteristic,—placing the actual direction of affairs little by little in native hands. In this Britain never dogmatizes about the inalienable right of men to govern themselves. She feels her way. She is chiefly concerned with their ability to govern themselves, and justly concludes that, failing the ability, the right has no present application. Withal, she has shown herself inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt. In recent years especially, she has taken long chances in her extension of the principle of native control. Unlike France, she cares not a whit for logical consistency. Her procedure is empirical. But she is sincerely devoted to the principle that men should be permitted the use of their powers and encouraged to develop them. The discontent among her educated colonials is an indication of success in the attainment of both these aims.

The striking outward fact is the material success of British trusteeship. Her colonies prosper, prosper beyond the imagination of those unfamiliar with them. Not one of them pays a penny of tribute or contributes perforce even to imperial defense. Yet not one of them entails a charge upon the imperial budget. Their increase in wealth has been enormous, an increase which has accrued primarily,—especially in Egypt,—to the poorest classes of the population. And the English have prospered,—justly prospered,—in trade with the people that England has made rich. That wealth and intelligence have not brought submissiveness and content is quite in accordance with their nature. It is a unique record. Britain is the great trustee.

Our own experiments in this unwonted relationship call for brief notice. Our experience has been but recent and

has been complicated from the first by prepossessions and divided counsels. We had no thought of assuming trust obligations. We had little sympathy with them or appreciation of their necessity. In particular we felt that they were inconsistent with our own political institutions. In consequence our policy has been characterized by not a little of half-heartedness and vacillation, the more so as our first great acquisition,—that of the Philippines,—was of a peculiarly unpremeditated and unnecessary character. Our hesitancy has naturally reacted powerfully upon the Filipino mind, arousing aspirations of the vaguest and most troublesome character. Said an American who had listened to a Filipino's glowing words on independence: "What could you do, if you were independent, that you cannot do now?" "I could build my house there in the middle of the street, if I wanted to." "But suppose your neighbor objected and interfered." "I would get him." "But suppose he got you." A shrug of the shoulders was the only answer.

Yet despite these handicaps, American administration in the Philippines is an undeniable success. Material prosperity, enormous improvement in physical and sanitary conditions, well nigh universal education, and the establishment of order and safety such as the islands have never known, are its indisputable results. Objections on the ground of imperialism and the strategy of national defense simply lose all hold upon the mind, when once we are in the actual presence of this great undertaking. We are doing the white man's work and doing it worthily. We have learned much from Britain, but possibly have a thing or two that we might teach her. In the extension of self-government to the people, we have vied with Britain in the audacity of our faith.

One fact is worthy of especial notice. In the mountainous interior of the islands have dwelt from time immemorial the head hunters whose strange rites are so inimicable to civiliza-

tion. They are also found in Formosa, Borneo, and other localities where they are the wards of the Japanese and the Dutch, expert trustees in their way. Both these powers have been compelled to adopt a policy of extermination toward these untamable savages. The Japanese have surrounded their habitat with a barrier of barbed wire which is advanced from time to time as parts of the area are cleared, and in this narrowing circle the savages are trapped and destroyed. In the Philippines, Americans have risked their lives to learn the secret of these strange peoples and to reconcile them to civilized ways, an effort that has been crowned with success. They are today among the most promising of our Filipino wards.

But American trusteeship has not stopped with the Philippines. The building of the Panama Canal, and the slowly dawning consciousness of its vital place in our developing commerce and our national defense, have awakened us to the necessity of order and business-like administration in the Caribbean region. Faced with the possibility of foreign complications of the most dangerous character, we have shed our prepossessions and accepted our inevitable task. We stand guard over Cuba, protecting her alike from foreign aggressors and from herself. We have annexed Porto Rico and the Virgin Isles. We have a protectorate over Hayti and Panama. We are unofficially in control of the Dominican Republic. Our marines occupy the Nicaraguan capital. The Canal Zone is ours by a perpetually renewable lease. Not one of these trusts was sought; not one of them could be avoided; and the end is not yet. The inexorable logic of events has brushed aside our theories and our prepossessions. Not with exultation but with a grave sense of responsibility we may accept our place among the world's trustees.

The coming settlement is primarily a problem of trusteeship. What is to become of the German colonies, the Portu-

guese colonies, the Turkish subject territories? Who are to be sponsors for Belgium, for Denmark, for Switzerland, for Holland, for the Balkan and near-Balkan states? Who will maintain the free passage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles? The answer will depend largely on our conception of the relation involved.

On the one hand is heard the claim of ownership. Give us back "our colonies," our share of the plums. Colonies are property to be farmed like an estate. Their people are our servants to be used subject only to such limitations as self-interest and public conscience with its feeble instruments for the prevention of cruelty may dictate. This was the answer of Spain to all charges of cruelty and incompetency in Cuba. "Cuba is ours." It was the plea of ownership, pure and simple. To this claim we instinctively opposed the principle of trusteeship. The opposition was not one of argument or theory. It was the instinct of a free people. Spain's historic title was unquestioned. The great trust was indubitably hers. But she had been guilty of breach of trust, and through incompetency and maladministration her title was forfeit. There was no other possible attitude for a free nation committed to the cause of human freedom. There is no other possible attitude today.

But if trusteeship, then who is to be the trustee? Again the internationalist is heard. For the common interest there should be a common trust. An international trusteeship is proposed for the administration of the Dardanelles, the great canals, the little nations, the tropical colonies and the like. The proposal is logically plausible. But the opinion may safely be hazarded that the trusteeship which is to give the world a stable peace will depend much less on logic than on competency. Beyond a doubt the spirit of trusteeship must be maintained. Territories and interests which are incapable of self-administration, must be administered in the inter-

est of their own people and the community of nations. But whether such administration can better be secured by an untried international agency than by experts in the work who, all uncoerced, have developed compelling traditions of sound trusteeship, may well be doubted. Possibly an administration could be devised for Egypt which would better satisfy the equities of international theory than that now established there, but hardly one that would better conserve the interests of the Egyptians, or the legitimate interests of other powers. The case is not unrepresentative. The possibilities of internationalism will be considered in another chapter. Meanwhile it behooves us to note to how great an extent the greater nations of the world have acquired not only international functions but the international spirit. A recent writer has aptly described the British Empire as "a great and sacred international trust with responsibilities of vital importance for all mankind." These words are no figure of speech. The British Empire is not an empire but a group of free nations holding numerous wards in trust. That trust is administered with strictest impartiality not only as regards the associated nations, but as regards nations in general. The prudent will think twice before they relinquish such tried instruments as this for untried theoretical creations.

But whatever the ultimate choice, the great national trusts must long continue. We may propose internationalization of the Dardanelles and the like, but no man in his senses expects Britain to surrender India or France Madagascar. Whether these trusts are to be permanent or are ultimately to give way to international agencies, the chief wards of humanity are still to be long in their keeping. There can be no more urgent duty in this terrible hour than to emphasize their character as trusts. Discriminating tariffs, administrative partiality, parasitism, and official intimidation such as have marred and still mar certain otherwise fair records,

are one and all incompatible with the spirit of the trust. Such excellent administrators as Holland and France may hesitate to grant to all nations the advantages which they enjoy in the farming of their rich, tropical possessions, but any other policy is sure to jeopardize both their title and the peace of the world. No more vital interest is involved in the forthcoming settlement than to establish on the firmest foundations the principle of trusteeship, the principle that the control of helpless peoples is to be in their interest and in the common interest of all nations. The trustee must find his reward in the mere privilege of doing, not in any monopoly of trade or exploitation. We may with perfect legitimacy consider the removal of Germany from her trusteeship. Whether we can justly or safely exclude her from traffic with these colonies or with any colonies is a very different question. To so exclude her would be to deny her a place in the family of the nations.

CHAPTER VII

NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

WAR is in part an effort to hold nations accountable for their acts, an effort usually culminating in the imposition of a penalty by the victor. We have here to consider the efficacy and practicability of certain conventional penalties as a means of holding offending nations to account. In particular the popular penalty of indemnity calls for careful consideration.

There is nothing that a belligerent does to an enemy in war that he may not do to the same enemy after surrender if he chooses. The collapse of all resistance leaves the victor sole arbiter. In earlier warfare the worst horrors were often reserved for the hour of victory. The story of Samuel who cursed Saul and deposed him from the kingship because he had spared the king of the Amalekites and the best of the flocks condemned by the implacable Samuel is familiar. From that time down to Tilly's capture of Magdeburg in the Thirty Years' War, the harsh old rule has been of intermittent if not regular application. Even among the most civilized ancient races the selling of prisoners of war into slavery and the beheading of enemy generals on the battlefield was the high watermark of leniency. Confiscation of estates and looting of personal property was a matter of course.

Self-interest mitigated the rule in case of conquest. What was the use of conquered provinces if nobody remained to till them for the benefit of the conquerors? The notion that these lands were necessary for the expansion of the conqueror's people did not at first suggest itself. Race lines were trivial in a day when language was rudimentary and slavery obliterated all distinctions. With primitive sense of thrift,

therefore, a conquered population might be conserved, the while personal effects as before were ruthlessly confiscated. This was the easier because of the fact that such effects were almost exclusively articles of personal gratification rather than productive capital. When the Egyptian Pharaoh proudly records the thousands of pounds of gold that he carried off as the result of a marauding campaign, we must beware of attaching to the transaction a modern significance. No doubt the feelings of the conquered suffered severely from the loss of their earrings and bracelets, and the vanity of the conqueror was correspondingly flattered, but the economic functions of society were little disturbed. Gold was not a circulating medium or a measure of values, and the transfer of gold from one locality or owner to another was a matter of no serious consequence.

To a very large degree these conditions continued down to comparatively modern times. The precious metals, to be sure, became money in Greek and Roman days, and the industrial fabric became somewhat sensitive to disturbances from this source. But even in the great days industry remained simple, credit relations were few, productive instruments were but tools of small value, and accumulations of industrial capital were comparatively small. During the Middle Ages again the world lapsed into a far more primitive condition, and simplicity again brought the immunity which is characteristic of all simple organisms.

But with the development of power industry came the enormous accumulations of industrial capital and with them the all-embracing credit relations and the sensitiveness to monetary values which are the characteristic of our time. It is not necessary or fitting that we here go into detail. It is sufficient to remind ourselves of the perfectly recognized fact that the industrial fabric of the world is now a unit, that its parts are all interdependent, and that an extreme sensitive-

ness pervades the whole. Violent transfers of the precious metals or of industrial capital are attended with disastrous results which are apt to outweigh their benefits. Without attempting to go into this subject fully, we may give a few illustrations.

Let us take the subject of indemnity in its crudest form as popularly conceived, the payment of a large sum of gold by a country whose currency is gold or on a gold basis. It is a well known fact that prices are determined by the ratio between the amount of money in circulation and the amount of business done. Suppose we could violently take from Germany a billion dollars and add it,—as we should do in this money age,—to our circulation. There would be a general rise in prices everywhere, that is, a cheapening of money. All creditors, including holders of insurance policies, owners of liberty bonds, receivers of fixed salaries, and the like, would lose in proportion to the cheapening of money. Other classes would reap correspondingly unexpected profits. Hardship and extravagance inevitably follow such changes. But this is only the beginning. Every country depends somewhat,—usually a great deal,—on foreign commerce. When prices rise, manufacturers are compelled to charge more for their goods. If, for instance, they wished to sell goods in South America, their prices would be very high. Meanwhile Germany, having reduced her money supply by a billion dollars, would have experienced a general fall in prices, and her manufacturers would be able to offer their wares in South America at a very low price. The first result of our seizure of Germany's gold would be to shut ourselves completely out of the South American market.

But the matter would not stop here. There are always some industries in which there is close competition even for our home market. Let us take the cotton industry as an illustration. We have a tariff on imported cotton goods to pro-

tect our home producers. Even so there are usually some kinds of cotton goods which can be bought so cheaply abroad that even after payment of the duty they will undersell American goods. Now let us suppose that prices rise violently in America and fall correspondingly in Germany. That, of course, would include the price of manufactured cottons along with the rest. Immediately the German manufacturer could undersell the American manufacturer and we should all soon be wearing goods "made in Germany." Sentiment, of course, might prevent this for a time and to some extent, but no boycott based on sentiment ever long restrains economic forces. The second result of our billion dollar indemnity would therefore be to close our own factories, turn our people out of employment, and boom the industries of Germany. So certain are these results that it is now recognized as economically impossible to transfer large quantities of the money metals,—that which is the nation's normal quota,—from one nation to another. So extreme is this sensitiveness that even peace transactions on a large scale have to be managed with the greatest care. When the United States acquired the Panama Canal from France for the sum of forty millions, special experts were called in to devise means of transferring this sum,—now so seemingly insignificant,—without creating serious disturbances of the kind above mentioned.

It is characteristic of the ruthlessness of German militarism that they planned on huge indemnities in case of victory. At the close of the war of 1870-71 Germany exacted from France an indemnity of a billion dollars,—a huge sum for those days,—and took it *in gold*. She is said to have locked up this sum as a war chest in preparation for "the next war" for which she is always preparing. This prevented the flooding of her own currency and the consequent rise in prices, but it did not prevent the reverse effect in France. The result, though mitigated, was distinctly unfavorable to Ger-

man industry which did not begin to forge ahead until the effect of this was lived down. Conversely, France surprised the world by the rapidity of her economic recovery. Germany is now repeating this blunder. In her peace with Russia she has exacted an enormous indemnity which is now being paid by installments and in gold. Her economists have not failed to warn her of the danger of this course, but the nation has not yet mastered its crude passion of cupidity. Among the numerous extravagant peace demands heard in Germany during the last four years, none is heard so often as the demand for indemnities.

But there are subtler ways of securing indemnities than this. One is to take over productive property in some form. Thus the railways of Germany, now state owned, might conceivably be made over to foreign governments to be run for their benefit or sold to foreign or German syndicates. This would in itself be an immense indemnity. The surrender of German ships is also proposed, a proposal which has the more pertinence because of the destruction of Allied shipping by submarine warfare. Still another proposal,—this time from German sources,—is that colonies be transferred as an indemnity. Finally, a transfer of national credits or obligations is proposed. Thus, Germany, when considering an indemnity from France, proposed that Russia's huge debt to France should be paid to Germany. Again a would-be German conciliator proposed that Belgium be indemnified for her losses by England against the surrender to the latter of the German colonies. A proposal closely akin to the above is that the indemnity exacted should be paid in installments as is now being done by Russia. This was urged by German chauvinists at a time when Germany, still suffering from the effects of the French indemnity, was urged to again despoil the too rapidly recovering France. Such an indemnity, though expressed in terms of money, would not be really paid

in money, but by transfers of goods in the ordinary course of international trade.

These proposals all have the merit that they do not disorder the delicate credit system of the world in the way above described. Each has its individual merits and objections which deserve brief notice before we turn to the general principle underlying them all.

The railroads are the largest industrial asset of the German states. They have the merit of tangibility. But if operated in the interest of foreign states or their citizens, they would inevitably become the target for unfriendly legislation and regulation at which the Germans are past masters, and for which there is no limit and no remedy. It may be naïvely objected that Germany would be bound by treaty pledges on these points. Doubtless, but conceding that these difficulties could all be anticipated,—an extreme concession,—what is to compel Germany to respect these pledges? Foreign owned railroads would be a most irritating constant reminder of Germany's humiliation. Cheating the railroad would become a point of honor, and German law, administered by utterly unfriendly officials, would give no redress. If the foreign powers protested, Germany would in effect reply: "What are you going to do about it? Will you make another world war to redress your grievances?" The net result would be that Germany would submit to any hardship to ruin these hated foreign properties. Bankruptcy would follow, and with little or no payment the properties would pass into German hands again. Hence, the only thing would be to dispose of them at once to German owners. This would mean merely an ordinary indemnity with the railroads as a cumbersome intermediate term for determining the amount.

The transfer of ships is not open to these objections, and is of all these proposals the most appropriate. It presents only such objections as hold against all indemnities, objections

which we reserve for later consideration. Even more innocuous, unless in this most general way, is the proposed transfer of international obligations. The principal question is as to the value of the obligations available for transfer. If Germany were victor, France might be compelled to surrender her claims against Russia as formerly proposed, but their value is now doubtful. Our own country would be the chief loser. We now hold obligations against governments for the most part solvent, amounting to over seven billions of dollars. To transfer these obligations to Germany would not only largely offset her own vast debt, but what is even more important, it would give her absolute financial control of some or all of these countries during the long period of indebtedness. Such a country as Italy, for instance, would become absolutely a tributary state, unable to make a single important decision without Germany's consent. The establishment of this relation of financial control over countries not available for annexation, was indeed a prominent feature of Germany's plan of world conquest which contemplated indemnities from France which, as one noted writer urged, "can scarcely be made too heavy."

But with the Allies as victors, what can be gotten in this way? Immense sums are due from Russia to Germany, but one purpose of the Allies is to liberate Russia from this German tyranny. We can not collect further installments from Russia. We must if possible compel Germany to return what she has taken. We shall be fortunate if our financial relations with Russia do not involve much heavier burdens.

Turkey, Bulgaria, and presumably Austria owe vast sums to Germany. But we have seemingly decided to dismember at least two of these countries. The value of their obligations under these circumstances is problematical. If the Turks lose Constantinople, Armenia, Palestine, Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, two thirds of which is an accomplished fact

and the rest an almost inevitable sequence of victory, how will they pay the huge war debt they have contracted? Bulgaria, too, is likely to issue from the war with diminished wealth and credit if not with diminished territories. The case of Austria is more obscure but not more hopeful.

It will be plain from the foregoing that such transfers promise small relief for the war burdened Allies. Nevertheless this is the one form of indemnity which it is most imperative to exact. These obligations carry with them of necessity a large measure of political dependence, and the Allies will leave their work half done if they leave the component parts of the menacing *Mittel Europa* in financial bondage to Germany. Turkish bonds may be below par, but they at least command Turkish allegiance and that must not be to Germany. Such a transfer would come much more under the head of guaranty than of indemnity, but it is not the less important for that reason.

The possibility that Germany may hold pre-war obligations against foreign states such as Brazil which may have good value is worth considering, but these obligations are doubtless in private hands and are hardly to be distinguished from the manifold assets of that character which make so large a part of a nation's financial capital. There is little to be gained by singling out these securities in indemnity calculations.

There remains to be considered the proposed transfer of colonies. Aside from the fact that these colonies are already in Allied possession and their assimilation into their several colonial administrations already far advanced, it can not be too emphatically asserted that colonies can not be considered as indemnity. Nations want them, as men want wives, but they should not be gotten by purchase in the one case or the other. To count colonies as financial assets inevitably implies the idea of exploitation for profit. This is the bane of

all colonial relations, the vicious principle that wrecked the colonial empires of Spain and Portugal and made their names a byword and a hissing. It is a vicious theory which only the Anglo-Saxon seems completely to have outgrown. He makes money, to be sure, from colonial trade, but only as he makes money from trade with Germany, or as a German makes money by trade with these same Anglo-Saxon colonies. The sole meaning of possession in such cases should be,— and very nearly is,— the artificial maintenance of conditions of world commerce which more developed peoples can maintain for themselves. No nation that assumes the burden of maintaining these conditions with fair equity toward the civilized world should be asked to pay for the privilege. The sale of colonies is on a par with the Turkish system of selling governorships. It is significant that Germany should think such a sale quite a business proposition. It gives us the measure of German trusteeship.

The difficulty of finding available assets for the collection of indemnities is plainly considerable. Nevertheless it may safely be assumed that the collection of an indemnity in the form of capital, if discreetly managed and especially if distributed over a long period, is not economically impossible. Germany has vast powers of recuperation and if skillfully farmed for indemnity purposes, would prove productive.

There remain, therefore, the general questions, what do we wish to accomplish by means of indemnity and how far are our ends attainable?

The first idea is that of punishment, to hurt Germany because she has hurt us. This again may be simply from anger, a desire to inflict injury without much thought of consequences, or it may be a more reasoned attempt to make Germany think twice before she tries it again. The first we will not discuss, though sentiments of resentment will perhaps bulk large at times during the long struggle. It is much to

be hoped, however, that we shall keep a cool head and see where we are going. If so, our desire to make Germany smart as a deterrent to future aggression will probably resolve itself into the more tangible and reasonable demand of recompense for injuries suffered. We will not for the moment dwell on the fact that the injury is incalculable and utterly beyond Germany's power to recompense. It may well be that certain particular injuries will be deemed to have prior claim and that they will not be open to this objection. Wherever the line is drawn, we may concede the possibility of formulating a practicable demand and of enforcing it at the peace settlement.

There is still another criterion for the determination of an indemnity, namely, the weakening of the rival. This has been the avowed purpose of Germany both in the historic case of 1871 and in the proposals made later with regard to indemnities to be exacted from Britain, France, and America. This is of course an entirely different thing from the compensating of injuries, but in practice it works out much the same. The losses are always so colossal that no indemnity can cover them, and whether the indemnity be demanded for this purpose or for the weakening of the enemy, it may very well be the limit of what the conquered can pay. Our problem, therefore, simplifies itself to this. What will be the result to us of exacting an indemnity from Germany?

First of all, we must continue our military occupation of the country until the indemnity is paid. This has been the rule in such cases. If the indemnity is collected at once, the occupation will be brief, but in that case the amount can not be considerable. It can not be too strongly insisted that the means for paying a large indemnity do not exist in Germany at present. Possibly Germany could raise the amount by foreign loans as France did in 1871, but the odds are much against her, and if she succeeded, it would amount to our

lending her the money to pay our indemnity with all the risk of later repudiation which would be involved in taking her promise to start with. In all probability such an indemnity would have to be paid in installments, and if we did not continue military occupation of the country, the installments simply would not be paid. Germany would have no conscience about repudiating a debt which she believed unrighteous, and she would know perfectly that her enemies would not undertake another world war to collect a debt that would not cover a tenth their expenses. The cost of such a military occupation would in itself be prohibitive, though it would be the least of the objections to such a course. It would not be peace but war.

It has been urged that the Allies possess an easy alternative to this expensive and dangerous expedient of armed occupation. They hold and presumably will retain the tropical world and many of the raw materials necessary to German industry. Any failure on Germany's part, it is argued, can be met by a refusal to furnish the raw materials which Germany needs. But a moment's reflection will make it clear that the Allies possess no such power. It is not the nations that buy and sell rubber and cotton, but individuals who act quite independently and ask only protection in their operations. Doubtless the Allied nations will, in their national capacity, control the supply of necessary raw materials to prevent cornering in a scarcity market, but to continue to do so would mean the abandonment of the fundamental principle of our economy. It is conceivable that that principle may be abandoned, but certainly not suddenly, nor in the interest of collecting an indemnity. So long as the régime of individual liberty continues, Germany will find purveyors for her wants. If the Allies should abandon the policy of the open door as regards the territories they hold in trust, and should forbid the sale of their products to Germany, it would not

only invalidate their title to trusteeship but would raise a storm of protest from their own citizens. There may well be opportunities for wise, concerted, economic action on the part of the Allied governments, but they will hardly find it in abrogating their long standing rule of industrial liberty. As compared with the havoc which such a step would work, the gain of an indemnity, even the largest, would be as dust in the balance. Moreover the Allies do not altogether monopolize these supplies, and any attempt so to do would stimulate competitive production elsewhere with disastrous results.

But we will not allow even this difficulty to keep us from the deeper issue. Possibly ingenuity and statesmanship of a high order could overcome these obstacles and could secure from Germany the regular payments of a deferred indemnity of large amount. What would be the result? The immediate result would of course be to enrich the Allies and impoverish Germany. In the same way a gift to charity relieves suffering. But it is the rarest thing in the world that the forces set in motion stop with the first happy result. Habits are formed and character adjustments effected which are often the opposite of what is intended. As the world emerges from the colossal contest, the supreme fact will be the impoverishment of the world. For this there is but one possible cure, the devotion anew of human energy to the conquest of nature, the practice of thrift and self-denial. The nation that learns these habits soonest and best, will inherit the future. Any trifling handicap in the way of initial allotment will rapidly disappear in the face of this all potent factor. We are awed by the immensity of the world's momentary stock of wealth. That is as nothing to the great stream which is ever emerging from the void and disappearing in the channels of human service. Give to a favored nation any advantage you please in the way of initial supply, and if its rival has an advantage, say, of ten per cent. in habits of pro-

ductivity and thrift, it will pass its favored competitor in a single generation. Bismarck thought he had disabled France for fifty years by his crushing indemnity. Within a decade he confessed his miscalculation and showed undisguised alarm at the recovery of his humbled enemy. Impoverishment only stimulated thrift, such thrift as no other nation in Europe knows, and reversed the great Chancellor's calculation.

Despite all her losses, Germany is going to emerge from this war tremendously strong for the ensuing industrial struggle. Her colossal debt is not a liability against the German people, but against Germans in behalf of other Germans. Every cent paid by the taxpayer will be wrung from him by enforced economy which will become a law of his being. But every cent so paid will be paid to a person who is for the most part an investor, an accumulator. It would be impossible to devise a better method for coercive thrift. It will mean enormous privation, the loss for whole generations of much that makes life worth living, but it will mean the rebuilding of the industrial machine of Germany in the shortest possible time.

If we impose farther burdens we shall possibly postpone that recovery (though even that is not sure, as the experience of France would seem to show), but we should assure only the more certainly the ultimate result. Meanwhile we should just as surely experience a disastrous reaction ourselves. Nothing so bodes ill to us in our future competition with Germany as the certainty that we shall not be willing to pay the price for success that she will offer. We shall demand shorter hours, lighter tasks, more favorable and expensive conditions of labor. Above all we shall demand higher wages which means that we shall refuse to set aside as large a part of the national income as Germany will do, to restore and enlarge the great industrial plant of society. This may be the wise decision. Certainly the ampler living is one of the

things, nay, the very thing, for which industry exists. But the eternal obstacle to the attainment of these ends is the competition of lower paid and less exacting labor. It is an economic truism that slave labor makes free labor impossible. In precisely the same way the prolonged enslavement of German labor would be an insuperable obstacle to the emancipation of our own.

In the face of these considerations, it is scarcely worth our while to urge or refute the so-called ethical arguments for indemnity. Germany's guilt for the great war is incalculable, but it is a guilt for which the feeble means at the disposal of the victor offer no atonement. Perhaps, too, in our moments of calmer thought, we may realize that it is guilt of a somewhat different order from that with which our puny tribunals are accustomed to deal. In the surging torrents of race assertion and the conflict of race ideals individuals count for so little and their freedom of choice is so narrowed that our human codes and tribunals seem to have no competent jurisdiction. This is no attempt to minimize the guilt of Germany. The writer can not see it otherwise than as a monstrous, immeasurable thing. Not because it is so little but because it is so great, he feels the hopelessness of any attempt to assess a penalty. The great case takes us back through a chain of causes which we shall not soon follow to the end. We may as well wait for the judgment day.

Our conclusion is, therefore, that as a general measure of reprisal, or restitution, or deterrent, or economic repression, indemnities are not available. Above all in a war of such magnitude as this, the defeated can not pay and the victors can not collect an indemnity at all commensurate with either injury or guilt. Could they do so, the indemnity would ultimately defeat its own end by its reactions upon the habits of the peoples involved. Indemnity is no remedy for war.

But it is possible that in a limited way indemnity may be

a remedy for the abuses of war. There is a distinction, possibly artificial, but not the less important, between things sanctioned and things forbidden in war by the consensus of civilized nations. The sinking of the *Queen Mary* is in a different class from the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The invasion of France, the recognized rival of Germany, unprovoked as it was, is different from the invasion of Belgium, whose neutrality Germany had promised to protect. The execution of Captain Fryatt was not war, but plain official murder of a civilian. These acts, appalling as is their aggregate, are after all just the things which our governments and our tribunals have been established to deal with. Indemnities for the victims of the *Lusitania* and for at least certain of the injuries suffered by Belgium,¹ if kept within limits not too disturbing to the economic order, may have a wholesome effect in establishing the limits of warfare. Even here, however, only the most conspicuous cases can be dealt with. Any attempt to cover the field of Germany's violations of international law would at once encounter the obstacles already noted.

The writer ventures, with much hesitation, to raise the question of other possible penalties in certain cases. There were things done in Belgium as elsewhere which have no relation to war and which no nation condones. Many of these are on record and their perpetrators perfectly known. The suggestion is reasonable and perhaps practicable, that certain of these monsters, men often high in authority, should be handed over to civil tribunals and punished in accordance with civil law. A few public trials and legal executions would have results of possibly permanent value. Care should be taken to choose such cases as even the German conscience would condemn. Yet here again the suggestion appalls by its vast scope. Only the most limited application of the principle of peace reprisals can have other than disastrous reactions.

¹ This subject is considered at length in the chapter on Belgium.

If the peace for which we are striving is to be worthy of our struggles, it must be a peace that will bring prosperity to the world, and ultimately reconciliation to men. The notion that the crippling or impoverishment of a competing nation can permanently enrich our own is a fallacy condemned by all human experience and unworthy of thoughtful men. Let us not be guilty of following Germany in the grossest of her blunders. Germany is at present a colossal example of misdirected energy, but destruction is not her only art. German proficiency is as marked in constructive as in destructive lines. The problem of the world is not to destroy this energy but to subdue it to its service. Let us not forget, in the just indignation of the moment, the immense potential serviceableness of this misguided people. The Germans are after all a people that the world can not spare. Even from the low standpoint of commerce the repression of Germany would have disastrous consequences. Germany is not only England's redoubtable competitor. She is also England's best customer. If, therefore, the suppression of Germany brought profit to certain industries it would bring ruin to other and greater industries. The full benefits of affluence are impossible except in an affluent world. It is indicative of Germany's abuse and degradation of the function of war that she should see in it an opportunity for wholesale plunder.

Above all it is fitting that a nation which never exacted an indemnity, but which has established the precedent of payment for the territories annexed, a nation that entered this war in pursuit of no material interests and that rejects with scorn the imputation of sordid aims,—it is fitting that such a nation should refuse to compound its ideals for money payment. And may reparation, where necessary, be so made as to carry with it no taint, no clouding of the ideal which is the glory of Belgium and France.

CHAPTER VIII

NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM

INTERNATIONALISM, in its necessity and its crude reality, is the outstanding fact in the present world situation. Nations can do nothing alone,—will never again do anything alone. There are no more local problems, no exclusively national interests. Alliances are the supreme problem of war, as coöperation is the supreme fact in peace. With the passing of the old local civilization and of the self-sufficient community, independent nationality in any complete sense of the word becomes a fiction. International dependence is the ever increasing fact as civilization develops. The problem of the hour is to match this growing independence with both the mood and the mechanism of effective coöperation. The dependence is inevitable, and that in itself means weakness. Effective coöperation is indispensable. Only that means power.

A time like this tends to emphasize and at the same time to pervert the problem of internationalism. Our thought turns too exclusively to the prevention of war. The problem seems to be a judicial one, and the supreme need a tribunal for the settlement of disputes. The great international interests, on the contrary, are peace interests, and the problem is administrative far more than judicial. It is a question of the official management of certain great business interests of the nations much more than a problem of punishing or preventing breaches of the peace.

Among these interests perhaps the most obvious is the use of the sea, the inevitable international area and the highway of the nations. The problem is to keep it open and safe,

safe from the pirate or individual marauder, and safe from the shock of contending nations who pursue their enemies upon this world domain. This problem will be discussed more fully in the chapter on Britain. For the present it is sufficient to note its obviously international character.

Then there are certain strategic sites of special importance, an importance so great as to overshadow the problems of their own population. Gibraltar is an extreme example. Its insignificant population is little more than an appendage of the garrison. Its interests as compared with those of the nations whose busiest trade route is controlled by the great rock, are so insignificant that all question of democratic privilege is completely forgotten. The double passageway of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus presents a like problem, though it is less easily detached from adjacent territories and the problem of its local population is not so readily subordinated. But it is alike in this that the world interest is paramount. The people who live there have rights which must be respected, but they can not be permitted to control the waterway, nor yet to block the highway, almost equally important, which crosses it from north to south.

The great canals, Suez, Panama, and Kiel, are quite similar, but with the important difference that they are artificial and have been built at enormous expense. Those who have made this outlay have acquired a title which can not be ignored, yet one which can not be allowed to obscure their obviously international function.

Certain small nations, Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Switzerland, and others, have something of this paramount international character. They are nations with a considerable population and a historic national consciousness for which we instinctively claim the usual privileges of self-determination and independent sovereignty. Yet they have something of the Gibraltar character in that their occupation or use by a

great power would give it an overwhelming advantage over its rivals. Such states necessarily lose some of the ordinary attributes of sovereignty and become in a sense wards of the powers whose fate they can not but determine. They are international interests.

Quite distinct are those peoples who are wards because of inability to manage their own affairs in a manner to meet modern requirements. There is an irreducible minimum of decency, order, and safety which all parts of the world are now required to provide. The doctrine of liberty is no longer construed as giving to any people the right to breed pestilence or rob and kill peaceable persons, or withhold from the world the resources which civilization has requisitioned for its higher uses. There is still much of all this in the world, but it is recognized as an abuse, and it is a legitimate international problem to remove it. The peoples that can not eliminate pestilence and anarchy and make it safe for men to go and come within their borders must be helped to do so or made to do so. For such peoples a receivership must be established. This does not mean that they have no rights, but that they are incompetent to protect their rights, and still more, to protect those larger rights to which all local rights are necessarily subordinate. All backward peoples are thus of necessity the wards of the nations. Under present conditions the guardian is necessarily a nation, but the interest is plainly international. The perception of this fact has led to a proposal that international agencies be created for the administration of these trusts, more particularly for the administration of the German colonies which this war is seemingly going to throw upon the world for disposal.

Most important of all international interests, however, are the great, civilized nations themselves in that range of their interests which do not come within their recognized individual jurisdiction. The great civilized powers are after all the

great disturbers of the peace, the great destroyers of civilization. If the savage becomes a ward by reason of his inability to keep the peace and protect life and property, then by the same token the great powers call for guardianship. The problem is to find a guardian.

Let us recognize at the outset, if possible, that the important thing is to get the work properly done, rather than to get it done in a particular way. There are always those who wish procedure to be logical. There are others who demand only that it should be effectual. Possibly if we perfectly understood all factors in our problem, the logical and the effectual would be seen to be very nearly identical, but with our half knowledge the seemingly logical often diverges widely from the effectual. It is characteristic of the very successful Anglo-Saxon that he invariably prefers the effectual, no matter what its seeming incongruity. It is in this Anglo-Saxon spirit that we approach the study of this much debated subject. We seek an effectual administration of international interests in a manner consonant with their international character. The presumption is enormously in favor of any existing administration which meets these requirements, as it is in favor of the further use of experienced and efficient agencies. It is the logical thing to provide international agencies to administer international interests, just as it is the logical thing to have the community own its bakeries because all citizens eat the bread. But such logic often reposes on mere verbal suggestion. The real question is, which way gives us the most and the best bread. It is a slow and difficult task to create effectual administrative agencies. It means knowledge which transcends the individual's power to acquire and guiding traditions which transcend his personal sense of obligation. Such an administration can only rest back on a coherent and well defined entity such as only national bodies have yet been able

to supply. The creation of such a great spiritual entity is a matter of secular slowness. It can be done, it almost certainly will be done, but by what methods and whether for immediate availability is not so clear. It is rather to be anticipated that for a long time to come we shall find the great, mature, disciplined nations the most effectual agencies for purposes of international administration. The important thing in the meantime is to recognize clearly the nature of the trust and their accountability to the community of nations.

With this general observation we may reserve for discussion in other chapters the various concrete interests which are involved in the present war. The freedom of the sea is essentially the problem of Britain, so long its guardian. The problem of Belgium, nation and international bulwark, is necessarily the subject of an entire chapter. Constantinople, the problem of a thousand years, calls for treatment which may require a break with all tradition. The German colonies, again, must be considered, not as cases under a general rule, but in relation to adjacent territories and the problem of their political development. If full account be taken of local peculiarities, these problems raised by the war will be found capable of individual solution.

There remains the great problem of establishing an international agency for the one task for which the nations are individually incompetent. All the other tasks, the control of the sea, the occupation of strategic sites, the protection of little nations, the administration of backward territories, may be,—and thus far have been,—distributed among the great powers, but the control of these powers themselves obviously requires a higher authority. That authority can be no other than the joint authority of these nations themselves or a preponderant portion of them. Proposals to form such a joint authority and to equip it with machinery suitable for its function have acquired unusual importance from the ap-

parent adhesion of the President of the United States who has given prominence to this subject in all his addresses and pronouncements relative to conditions of peace. Statesmen of nearly all the Allied nations and even the chancellors of the German Empire have also expressed their approval in more or less guarded phrase. The subject therefore rises quite above its usual status of theory and speculation, and becomes one of the great practical issues of the day. As such it deserves our careful consideration, both in its present form and in its origin.

The earlier proposals were purely permissive and moral. Little more was attempted than to have a place and an agency always ready to arbitrate the differences of those who were unable to reach an agreement unaided. The verdict rendered by this tribunal was to have no other sanction than its presumptive competency and impartiality and the force of international opinion. No doubt such an arrangement would meet certain requirements. Its defect lay in its basic assumption that nations were willing to live and let live and asked only for equity under this principle. Now if never before, the world should realize how far this is from the facts with which we have to deal.

Slowly it became apparent that an element of force was necessary in dealing with a problem whose essence was force. Proposals to compel the submission of disputes to arbitration, to enforce the acceptance of the award, and the like, were made,—always with this result that they raised the question of who or what was to do the compelling. To the popular mind this question has never come home with its true force. The writer has been interested to note with what ease proposals of internationalization of every sort find acceptance with the public. If the Dardanelles proves a bone of contention over which the great powers exhaust their energies, the popular remedy is always there. Internationalize the straits

and make them all stand back. It rarely occurs to any one to ask, who is to make them stand back. Even after Germany has snapped the bonds of international law like tow burned in the fire, the assumption is still unthinkingly made that she would stand in awe of an internationalized Constantinople. There is an easy and very creditable explanation for this persistent illusion. We live under conditions of social order so secure that obedience to the judgments of tribunals is a matter of course. We never think of trying conclusions with the policeman's club or the armed power of the state. For us the pronouncement of recognized authority is final. We naturally assume that the pronouncement of recognized authority will everywhere be final. Yet nothing is more certain than that it is the policeman and the armed power of the nation, no matter how unnoticed and forgotten, which give to constituted authority its finality.

This fact has not escaped the attention of practical men. Attention has therefore been devoted of late, and especially since the outbreak of the great war, to the question of sanction or enforcing power. This can be furnished, of course, only by the nations themselves, and must be in essence, however disguised, a super-state. Proposals looking to this end are best represented by the strongly urged League to Enforce Peace which numbers among its promoters many distinguished names, and commends itself, as we have seen, to the statesmen of most of the nations now at war.

The League proposes a union of nations pledged to submit their differences to a tribunal, if "justiciable," or to a commission of inquiry if the issues are adjudged vital to the existence or honor of the nation. In the latter case, according to plans which have been given the widest currency, it is not proposed to make the commission's report binding upon the parties to the dispute. They are pledged, as members of the league, only to await the result of the inquiry. They are

then free to go to war if they elect to do so. It is judged that this very moderate demand will commend the plan to those nations whose power and pride make them hesitate to commit their existence and honor to the keeping of other nations. Finally and chiefly, the members of the league are to use their power, military and economic, to compel obedience and the observance of pledges to the league. It is plausibly urged that a power so overwhelming would effectually awe any rebellious power.

It is plain that such a league would involve a great encroachment upon the traditional authority of the nations. It is not simply the right to make war which is withdrawn or curtailed but the right to adjudicate or investigate all those questions which give rise to war. In current plans, this encroachment upon national prerogative is held within the most moderate limits, but this moderation is confessedly prudential and temporary. The concession of the right to go to war after investigation is a reluctant one, not to say a specious one, for the intention is plainly to make war virtually impossible by the investigation. More would be demanded if more were judged possible, but in this transition state it is thought best to leave the nations at least the outer semblance of national prerogative. But the avowed purpose of the proposed league is to prevent war, and this can be accomplished only by developing an extensive and powerful supernational authority. The assumption usually is that with the establishment of such an authority, national differences would tend to disappear and that the supernational authority would have little to do. Such an assumption seems unwarranted. If the nations become submissive and indifferent to national aggrandizement, it can only be because they have ceased to be the doers of the real things, as in the case of the States of the American Union. But the lessening interest in the states has not meant a lessening activity

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on the part of the Federal government. It is because the Federal government has absorbed the substance of state authority that we no longer care much about their individual interests or aggrandizement. When we recall that all equilibriums among nations, localities, families, and the like are continually being upset by new discoveries and inventions, above all by the unequal power of growth which so mysteriously manifests itself in peoples, we may assume with certainty that the supernational authority thus established would either break down or be progressively extended and strengthened. If the nations continue to be the real power, the old ambitions, jealousies, and conflicts of interest will continue. If international authority holds these turbulent elements in permanent equilibrium, it can only be by increasingly absorbing such of their functions as have international reactions. This would mean the gradual establishment of a vast administrative mechanism with numerous functions and an extensive personnel, in short, the formation of a true super-state.

Such a super-state once formed and experienced in its administrative functions, would almost inevitably take over in turn those international trusts which for the present are administered by the nations. The policing of the seas would ultimately be done by ships flying the flag of the league and owning only its authority. Gibraltar and the Dardanelles could hardly fail to accept like administration. Belgium and Denmark and the great canals would continue under international guaranties of a sort very different from those they have hitherto known. Above all, the tropics and all the lands of the backward peoples would be the charge of the super-state. Or, not to make too violent an assumption, if these various trusts were still administered by individual nations, it would be by delegated authority and under the sanctions of the super-state.

The writer, for one, is not deterred by this prospect. Let us hedge and hesitate as we will, the conclusion is unescapable that the world is moving toward Cosmos rather than toward Chaos. If it is not, it is not worth bothering about or staying in. Nor can the writer conceive of this Cosmos as essentially other than a state with its organs for repressing disorder and organizing for effective coöperation the multifarious energies of nature and man. This organization does not take place spontaneously nor without coercion of reluctant and suppression of malignant forces. The world unity must be essentially a state. Nor can the argument that international authority is inconsistent with national sovereignty be recognized as having any weight. Absolute sovereignty is and always has been a fiction. No state has more authority than it has power, and no state has unlimited power. The very existence of other states limits the power of the state, and there is no reason why that power should not be further limited in the interest of the ends for which states exist.

But all this is ultimate and immeasurably remote. Between us and the attainment of ideal internationalism stretches a long, long road of difficult progress, and it is near its hither end that lies the problem with which we have to deal. For the coming settlement will be after all only a transition adjustment, one destined to give place,—peaceably, let us hope,—to another and to many another before the end of the road is reached. And the way is not plain nor is the distance measured, however clear the goal. Turning, therefore, from ultimate or ideal internationalism to internationalism as a practical problem of the immediate present, let us consider how far it is available as a solution of present difficulties.

It is a precaution never to be omitted in such cases to inquire what light, if any, history has to throw upon our problem. Very few people seem to be aware to how large an

extent the experiment of international control has already been tried. Despite the complicating circumstances that are always present, certain of these cases are exactly in point and their outcome is the most reliable guide we can have.

A significant case is that of Denmark. Controlling by her situation the entrance to the Baltic, she is yet too weak to protect herself against her powerful neighbors. In the interest of the European balance of power, the great powers of that day, England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, pledged themselves in 1853 to respect the integrity of Denmark and to join forces against any one of their number who should violate it. But in 1864 Prussia and Austria, having quite changed their views as to their needs, attacked Denmark and despoiled her of Schleswig-Holstein. France found herself too busy and too little interested to interfere. England threatened to the last, but ultimately backed down, and Russia, most concerned of them all, was powerless to prevent the spoliation.

It will of course be urged that this was not a fair test, that not all powers were represented, and that only a single object was included. It will be clear on reflection, however, that these were elements of strength rather than of weakness in the scheme. If all the nations had been included, would Argentina or Guatemala or Turkey or the United States have been likely to oppose Germany and Austria if a country so nearly interested as France refused to interfere? And if they could not stand together on this vital question which they had distinctly foreseen, is it likely that they would have risked a war with such powers on other and more unexpected issues? The case was a very favorable one and illustrates another factor with which we have always to deal, namely, national growth. Prussia had prospered and the vision of sea power had come to her. The difficult Danish straits gave but unsatisfactory access to her long Baltic sea coast and in

war time were impassable. Her navy which must protect her toward the east and toward the west, must be able to pass the Danish peninsula at will, or but half of it would be available against either foe. In short the idea of the Kiel Canal had come to her, and the Danish neck must be acquired. Pretexts, the most barefaced imaginable, were found, the situation of the hostile powers shrewdly estimated, Austria won by false inducements, and the deed accomplished.

Belgium offers another case, almost identical with the foregoing, save that there were fewer guarantors and no acquiescence in the spoliation. But again the agreement was violated because conditions had changed and one of the guarantors deemed it advantageous to violate its pledge.

Whether we invoke internationalism as the custodian of some special and local interest or as the general arbiter of all international disputes, we encounter the same difficulties which wrecked these experiments. The larger applications of the principle do not essentially change the problem. The argument of preponderant force takes no account of the ease with which great combinations are formed in our day. It is impressive to say that in a league of twenty nations, the nineteen could always bring the one disturber to book. What guaranty have we that it would be nineteen against one? So it was argued about Denmark, that four could always control the one. But it proved to be three against two, and that at a moment when one of the three was embarrassed and another weakly led. In a combination of twenty nations this situation might easily repeat itself. Nothing is more deceptive than general talk about "nations" with counting on the finger tips. As a matter of fact the nations are very unequal in size and are so situated that they fall into natural groups which have no choice but to act as units. If an international agreement were reached neutralizing the Dardanelles and signed by all the present powers of Europe, and

Germany should violate the agreement and attempt to seize the straits herself, the other powers could not line up against her. Holland, Belgium, and Denmark would be compelled to remain neutral or join with her, as she might choose, under pain of annihilation. The same might be true of Norway and Sweden, to say nothing of the Balkan states. Opposition could come only from a few great powers. But it is almost certain that Germany would choose a time for such an adventure when one or more of these powers would be embarrassed, and that inducements would bring one or more of them to her side. There has been hardly a decade in the last hundred years when a statesman of the sagacity of Bismarck could not have found conditions favorable to such an enterprise. And the Dardanelles once seized and Constantinople occupied by Germany and her allies, they might very possibly hold it against all comers and through it attain their end of world domination.

Even greater than the danger of direct violence would be the danger of intrigue, the manipulation or corruption of international agents, the scheming to control their appointment, and the accusation, true or false, but deadly in either case, of partiality. And if the administrator were not partial when partiality was sought, the accusation of partiality would be the certain device for removing the unpliant official. It is a situation in which Potiphar's wife could play her rôle to perfection. Nor would these dangers menace internationalism less in its rôle of world arbiter than in its function as local administrator. The losing nations would be dissatisfied nations, and their dissatisfaction, whatever its cause, would be laid to the charge of the league, engendering schism and faction within the group of the nations.

And there would always be losing and dissatisfied nations. The great and eternal disturber of equilibrium among nations is growth, unequal growth, which makes the equities of

today seem the inequities of tomorrow. The losing will falsely explain their loss. The growing will protest against their straitened allotment of opportunity. They will not willingly give of their growth and their strength to swell the ranks of other peoples and assure the triumph of other cultures than those they love. We may decry these impulses but we can not escape them. These forces that menace the nations are the forces that built the nations and the forces that must maintain them. The fundamental weakness of all schemes to stabilize international relations is that they assume rigidity and finality where the norm is flux and growth. They are like attempts to survey town lots on a glacier or to prescribe once for all the size of a boy's shoes.

Viewed in what is perhaps its most significant aspect, the present conflict is a struggle between these two principles of rigidity and plasticity. The western nations, mature in their development, have attained to relative permanence of frontier and the idea of finality has become fundamental in their thought. The nations of Central Europe and still more of Eastern Europe have established their boundaries more recently and with less conformity to nature, convenience, and race. To a large extent these boundaries are obviously artificial and perhaps provisional. It is impossible for these nations to attribute thus instinctively to their arrangements this character of finality. It seems to them a monstrous thing to conceive of the present European hodge-podge with which they are but too familiar, as a finality, a thing to be petrified and held fast forever. With this consciousness of plasticity comes inevitably the dream of consolidation, of leadership, of world dominion. This is with them, not an argument or a conviction, but an instinct. In this struggle, therefore, two great race instincts are in conflict, and each race tries to interpret the other in terms of its

own instinct. Each utterly fails to take account of the instincts which it attempts to harmonize.

This conflict of instincts is pathetically and amusingly illustrated by the reception of the peace league proposal in Germany. This reception has taken two opposite but perfectly consistent forms. On the one hand the proposal has been scornfully rejected as a scheme to put Germany at the mercy of a combination dominated by her present enemies. The assumption was that the league would be under Anglo-Saxon leadership and that it would mean Anglo-Saxon world empire. On the other hand, the German chancellor early in the war announced that Germany not only approved such a league but that *she would be willing to assume the leadership of it.* This proposal has recently been repeated with the suggestion that Germany should take the initiative in preparing plans for such a league and the farther naïve suggestion that the natural capital for such a league would be Berlin. We laugh at such proposals, but they are perfectly serious, and the German can not understand why we laugh. It will be noted that whether he accepts or rejects the proposal, the one thing he sees in it is the possibility of a dominating leadership ending in world empire for a single race. This is fundamental to all his thinking, an axiom of his political philosophy. A league of nations, to his mind, could not be other than an instrument for world domination by a single race. He would accept it with perfect sincerity and set to work all his powers of organization and intrigue to secure that domination for his own race. It is not inconceivable that he should succeed.

There are other minor difficulties in the way of the program of inclusive internationalism as it was originally proposed, difficulties in themselves sufficient to insure its failure under present conditions. One is the group dependence of

nations which deprives them of the liberty of action which the plan of the league presupposes. How can we ask Holland to promise in certain eventualities to attack Germany or even to withhold supplies when we know that she will be annihilated if she does so? The same of Denmark, of Rumania, of Bulgaria. What possible freedom of choice have Portugal and Finland and the Poland that is to be? They have no option but neutrality or coöperation with the nation that can destroy them. The world is made up, not of many independent nations, large and small, but of a few great groups, vague in outline but predetermined in their essence, which necessarily act as units.

Again, it is provided that in those matters concerning which nations refuse to surrender the right of war, they shall hold that right in abeyance. They may not fight until after their quarrel has been investigated, but then they may. But then they can not, or if they do, they must do so under vitally changed conditions. How can we expect Japan to give Russia a year's notice of her intention to defend a cause which she dares not arbitrate, when we know that her only hope lies in promptness and surprise? Such a proposal simply disarms the quick nations in favor of the slow, the little nations in favor of the big. Whether this would be in favor of ultimate equity is doubtful, but the nations unfavorably affected will hardly consent thus to give away their case.

Most of all are to be feared in such a league the possibilities of racial propaganda, the inevitable formation of parties, the coalition of nations having common interests or instincts, the deepening schism between groups, as the forces of growth, energy, or accident slowly tipped the scale toward the one or the other, the reappearance within the league of the hostilities which it was meant to suppress. How certain the charge that the winning group was the favored group! How inevitable the suspicion of partiality, a suspicion as fatal as

the fact! How irresistible the temptation of the losers to secede, to redress the balance with the sword! When Florence, hampered in her growing industry by the feuds of her country barons, suppressed them and destroyed their castle tollgates, she thought to insure peace by forcing them to live within her walls where she could watch and control them. The result was that they brought their feuds with them and rallied the Florentines to the one or the other side. Florence was rent with strife for a hundred years until in despair she banished them in a body to fight it out away from her presence and carry their mischief where they would. Until men are peaceable, such a league to enforce peace will be a trap and a pretext for war.

But under peace conditions, it may be urged, men will be peaceable. Germany would not care to seize the Dardanelles if she were certain of being free to use it. She would not seek colonies with all their burdens of administration if she were certain to have the freedom of their markets and her fair share of their raw materials. Assure her this by internationalization and she will be content. So in her distress she would fain assure us. Would that it were so. But if this war has taught us anything, it is that Germany wants,—not the freedom of this our world,—but its lordship. We utterly mistake the temper of nationalism in these its more virulent forms if we do not perceive that it desires to prevail, to dominate and subordinate other nations and other civilizations. Germany does not believe in a fellowship of equal nations. She believes in a triumphant Germanism. Freedom of the seas, freedom to use the Dardanelles, freedom to trade with the tropics, all these she has had and these nowise meet her demands. She seeks the control of the world's vantage points and the world's resources, that she may make them serve the ends of Germanism. There is nothing unique about this except the virulence and ruthlessness which

it acquires from German character, but it is in square contradiction with the purpose of the proposed league, and if Germany joins such a league it will be to use it for her purpose.

The objections to the proposed league have been urged at some length because of the great and influential support which the project has received and because of the writer's conviction that it involves very great peril. In particular we should be on our guard against the thoughtless argument that "it will do no harm to try it." It may do infinite harm to try it. The natural and necessary concomitant of any such scheme is disarmament, partial or complete. There is no known way of effectually enforcing such a measure. If actual armament is reduced, there are still ways of accumulating military advantage by the cornering of necessary materials, the equipment of munition plants, the specialization of national industries in directions favorable to military preparedness, the manipulation of national education and the like. *The nation that wishes to evade the purpose of the peace league can do so.* Germany, by a misdirected military move has roused the peaceably disposed nations and armed them against her. She can not hope to prevail against a world in arms. Her next move must of necessity be to again disarm the world. For that purpose a peace league with its program of universal disarmament is admirably suited.

Once more we grasp at straws. Will not the war change the German temper? Yes and no. It is reasonable to hope that Germany will ultimately learn the lesson of these experiences. The German people can not suffer as they have suffered without at last reflecting to some purpose on the blindness of conceit, the abysmal ignorance, the world alienating arrogance, and the maddening brutalities that have neutralized all their science, their industry, and their organization and dragged them down to defeat. These things will sometime be written so that Germans will read them and will

understand. No people can be wholly immune to the corrective influences of experience. *But this change will not come soon.* One of the most extraordinary phenomena of history is the persistence of Prussian character. Such as they have been in this war, they have been ever since they were known in history. Yet they have again and again passed through these chastening experiences. While conceding therefore, that the Germans will be influenced by this experience, we must not expect that the change will be so immediate or so far reaching as to constitute in itself a safeguard for the peace of the world.

Yet it may easily seem to be so. Over and above all the bitterness and resentment which will follow defeat, will appear a war-weariness approaching utter exhaustion. This weariness will conceal from us, perhaps even from the German himself, his deeper and more permanent sentiments. He may easily seem broken, humble, perhaps contrite. Even without the dissembling of which he is a master, he may easily disarm those who are incapable,—as they always have been incapable,—of understanding his intractable nature. Under such circumstances the enthusiast with whom the wish is so easily the father of the thought, may think the candidate ripe for baptism into the circle of the changed in heart. Alas for the peace of the circle when old passions return with the new currents of life.¹

But the foregoing objections which the writer has felt compelled to urge with so much earnestness, hold only against plans of *immediate, universal* internationalism. Internationalism is immediately practicable and necessary, but it is practicable only among a limited number of nations. Universal internationalism will sometime be practicable, but not

¹ The same point of view is expressed by Mr. Roosevelt in his vigorous assertion that to include Germany and Turkey in a league to enforce peace would be like attempting to eliminate burglary by including all the burglars in the police force.

now. Successful internationalism must rest on a spiritual basis of common aims, common instincts, and common sympathies. No nation is ready for internationalism until it has outgrown even the wish to dominate other nations that have learned how to provide the common decencies of nationhood. The nation that even feels the inclination to impose its will upon the civilized Belgians, is not ready for internationalism. It must come to feel an instinctive aversion for that sort of thing. Above all, it is necessary that this sentiment should exist toward the members of the group itself. The true league of nations finds its analogue rather in good society than in the mechanically organized state. As we exclude the ill bred person from the society of the well bred, setting thus the highest possible price upon good breeding, so the ill bred nation that has not learned the decencies of live-and-let-live, can not be more effectually corrected than by exclusion from the society of those who have learned the lesson of civilization.

The league we seek is in existence, guaranteeing to an extent that few appreciate, the peace of the world. Its nucleus is the great fellowship of independent British nations (misnamed the British Empire) in whose circle our own country has long unconsciously held its place on almost exactly the same terms as the rest. These nations with their wards control one third the surface of the earth and one third of its population. Within this vast area there is peace. No one makes or dreams of making war upon another. All are moved by a common impulse,—so much more effectual than a common agreement,—to enforce peace upon other less pacific peoples. This league was not made; it grew, as all living things do. It needs but the privilege of larger growth.

The present war with its fellowship in arms has been an immense stimulus to this vital league. It has lifted it from the unconscious into the conscious realm and defined and

intensified its purpose. Does any one imagine that if the existence of Anglo-Saxon civilization were again imperiled, our country would wait two years and a half before it lifted a finger in protest or preparation? The spiritual reunion of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, the only reunion that they desire or need, is Germany's unintentional contribution to world unity thus far.

But there is other growth and more significant. France, with her wards, twenty times the homeland in area and vitally related to territories in Anglo-Saxon trust, has been added to the league of the changed in heart. It is not implied that France has ceased to be imperialistic. No nation has. The desire for colonies, the desire to control the untamed peoples and subdue the uncouth to the uses of ordered life is the corollary of virility and manhood. But France no longer desires to rule Italy or Spain as Napoleon made her do. She has entered the circle of the well bred. The same for Belgium with her vast trust of the Congo. Do we realize what a guaranty of peace is contained in these handclasps across the Channel? If we assume that by the exercise of vigilance, forbearance, and tact, our own country can answer for the peace of that Latin America for which it unwittingly made itself sponsor nearly a century ago, then two thirds of the world's surface and two thirds of its people are already within the fold.

It is by no means certain that this is the limit of our effective achievement. The bulk of the remaining world is the Mongolian East. Of this, China is at present inert. The controlling element is Japan, her control having been assured during the present war, both by her aggressive policy toward China and by her astute diplomacy regarding ourselves. By the one she obtained a virtual suzerainty over China and by the other she obtained our recognition of it.¹

¹ The "notes" exchanged between Viscount Ishii and Secretary Lansing amount to a treaty recognition of Japan's "paramount interests" in the East.

What will be Japan's part in the struggle between Cosmos and Chaos? It would be idle to assume that she is bound to her present allies by any such bonds of sympathy as those that unite the Anglo-Saxon peoples or even the British and French. There is no kinship of race or culture. Nor has the Orient had reason to look upon the western nations as natural protectors of the weak. But considerations of advantage of which the Japanese have shown themselves singularly appreciative, constitute a very effectual pledge of co-operation with the group above indicated. All discussion of the ease with which Japan could seize the Philippines or the possibility of the capture of Hawaii or of a successful descent upon the California coast are beside the mark. Japan is a naval power and must remain so. She will not and can not risk collision with the power that controls the sea. That power is and must continue to be the league above mentioned. During three and a half years of the great struggle Japan watched to see which way the scale would incline. When the decision became plain, Viscount Ishii voiced the sincere and inevitable decision of the Japanese people when he said: "Japan has decided to cast in her lot with the English speaking peoples of the world." This decision rests on the larger opportunism rather than on affection, but it is not therefore untrustworthy. It is certainly preferable to the sullen acquiescence of a beaten and revengeful Germany.

Our league as thus enlarged is so nearly all embracing that it has but to take note of its power and extent to assure peace in the world. It must expect to maintain that peace with a very large element of mobilized force as long as there are peoples in the world that are willing to use their force, not to maintain order, but secure domination. That price must cheerfully be paid for the boon which it can assure and which as yet can not be assured without it. But if the price be paid and the boon assured, the outsiders will not long re-

main unreconciled. Let it be established beyond reasonable doubt that the Anglo-Saxon solidarity has come to stay and that coöperation with France and Japan is a settled fact in international relations, and the present century will witness such a transformation of German policy and of German sentiment as no coercion or artificial fellowship could ever effect.

Such a conclusion will be unwelcome to those who hope, as the sanguine have always hoped, that this struggle would be the last. The air is full of cries that if this war be not the end of war, if it end not in the full recognition of internationalism, then we shall have fought in vain and our peace will be but a truce. But victories are never final in this struggle between right and might, and if all is vain that is not final, how vain our human struggle has been.

It is a relief to note that the manifest impossibility of international confidence between the chief contestants in the present struggle has made itself felt even in the circle of the sanguine. The American society of the League to Enforce Peace whose earlier plans we have had under consideration, now announces a revised plan, with much of complicated definition and machinery, which makes provision for certain of the special cases which we have considered. Membership is to be restricted and based on fitness as determined by a vote of the existing membership. It may also be complete or partial, the members being pledged in the one case to use both military and economic pressure to enforce the mandates of the league, and in the other case economic pressure alone. This is evidently a recognition of the delicate position in which certain of the smaller or more exposed nations find themselves. Simultaneously there comes from English sources a cautious and limited proposal of a "League of Free Nations" whose constituency could not be other than that already noted. The questions of procedure and ma-

chinery which so greatly interest the advocates of these proposals, need not here detain us. What concerns us is to note that the limitations thus admitted imply the complete abandonment of the original principle. The plan, if adopted in this form, would mean essentially the perpetuation of the present Allied group, with the addition of certain machinery whose usefulness has yet to be tested. The prospect is less dazzling but far more hopeful. For in fact such a plan as this corresponds to the great reality.

Internationalism is a thing, not of the flesh, but of the spirit. It is a growth, not a contrivance. What we need is to recognize it, not invoke it. The league that we have dreamed of is here, less symmetrical and mechanical than that of which we had dreamed, but infinitely more vital and effective. Its widening circle passes from the English to the British, from the British to the Anglo-Saxon, from the Anglo-Saxon to the democratic. It has but one more step, — from the democratic to the human. That is a long step, but a step to be hastened rather than forced, and not to be hastened by force.

NOTE. It is interesting to note that our present administration that has insisted not only upon a league of nations, but upon disarmament as its corollary, now urges a tremendous increase of our navy, an increase apparently intended to make it the largest in the world. This may seem inconsistent with the idea of international guaranty. On the contrary it marks the first sane appreciation of what such a guaranty implies. It is a popular fallacy that internationalism would make national defense unnecessary, the assumption being that social action in like manner relieves the individual of the necessity of protecting himself. But does it? Let anyone who so imagines, visit a bank vault and observe the intricate and ponderous mechanism installed to protect the bank's funds. Could the bank count on police protection if it left the front door unlocked and the money heaped upon the counter? When that becomes possible, it will be legitimate to cite the analogy of social protection of the individual as an argument for internationalism and disarmament. Even the most successful internationalism could only protect those nations that do their utmost to protect themselves.

CHAPTER IX

DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES

It is the bad luck of the dike keeper that when the flood breaks through he is always busy working at the breach. The suspicion is inevitable that he did not do all that might have been done to stop the breach, that he was negligent or incompetent,—possibly even that he opened the breach himself. So with breaks in the dikes between nations. The menace has been there for months or years. By a vigilance and a resourcefulness almost superhuman, the diplomats in charge,—possibly on both sides,—have been endeavoring to prevent the break. At the moment when the break comes they are at their busiest, contriving check and brace and counterweight, but all in vain. Their work goes down to ruin and almost invariably drags them down with it. Then the comfortable burghers whom nothing but disaster arouses to consciousness, overwhelm in their turn the wretched keeper and all his work. Why all this intricacy and contrivance, these subterranean works carried out without our knowledge? Why were we not called to the dike? We could have averted the disaster.

The metaphor is doubtless imperfect as all metaphors are. The storms that beat upon the dikes of the nations are largely human storms, with a measure of consciousness and volition which it is not meant to deny. But when all allowance is made for this element of knowledge and choice, these storms so far transcend common knowledge and individual volition that they closely resemble the great nature forces of wave and flood that breach our dikes against the sea. Nor does the analogy end here. There can be no reasonable doubt

that diplomats have been as a class devoted, patriotic, and skillful, honest keepers of the dikes. There is scarcely a recorded case of betrayal of trust, rarely even one of negligence. Incompetence has been frequent enough, but not more frequent than in other responsible positions, not so frequent even as we think, for failure is always construed as incompetence by a public never cognizant of the deeper facts in the case.

Yet now that the dikes have broken, the demand is again heard for drastic remedies. We challenge, not the individual diplomat nor yet the individual negotiation, but the whole principle and practice of diplomacy. There must be an end of secret diplomacy, an end of secret treaties. Even more drastically it is demanded that the very privilege of treaty and of negotiation itself be withdrawn as between individual nations, all relations being subject to supernational regulation. These demands, like certain others noted in the preceding chapter, derive an added interest from the endorsement of the President of the United States who has not hesitated to give to these principles a foremost place among the conditions of peace. They therefore call for our careful consideration.

The proposed curtailment of diplomatic and treaty privilege as between individual nations is in a class by itself. It is in fact a feature of the plan for a league of nations already discussed. If this plan is to be adopted in its comprehensive and unqualified form, a certain limitation of independent diplomatic relations is inevitable. Little leagues and private understanding might easily render nugatory the provisions of the larger agreement. The privilege of such private understandings is therefore quite logically withheld.

Quite logically, but not so certainly effectually. This is one of a multitude of popular remedies which look to ends without sufficient regard to means. What means has the

family of nations at its disposal for preventing such private understandings? It is specifically in connection with the plan for a complete league of nations that this restriction is proposed. Such a league would include Germany, Austria, and Turkey. It is needless to say that for a very long time to come sentiments of bitterness toward the western powers and of common interest as among themselves are likely to characterize these peoples. Suppose Germany and Austria see an opportunity to advance their own interests by a policy of solidarity. What is going to hinder them? Even the most flagrant violation of the league provision would be difficult to detect and still more difficult to punish, but the really dangerous cases would not be the flagrant ones. The trouble is, there is the usual insensible gradation from the admissible to the inadmissible, and that in two ways.

In the first place, no one can contemplate an absolute prohibition of agreements between nations. Such a prohibition would have no counterpart or analogy in either individual or federal relations. The states of the American Union are not prohibited from making agreements with one another, and such agreements are frequent. Their rights in this connection are of course limited and can not legally be used against the defined federal interest, but it is plain that they could be and would be so used if any group of states were unfriendly to the union. The one flagrant case of such use is familiar, but the really significant cases are of constant occurrence, cases of sectional solidarity unfavorable to federal interests which nothing but the overwhelming preponderance of federal loyalty holds within the limits of safety. Reduce the privilege of local international agreement to a minimum, and it will still be possible to find in it a medium for the expression of disloyal sympathies and local cohesions having all the dangers of present alliances.

The second difficulty is that international coöperation and

solidarity depends but little on overt official agreements. Let the law forbid marriage between undesirable parties, and the usual result is that they cohabit without marrying. We have dissolved trusts, but seldom prevented the concerted action at which we aimed. So we may prohibit treaties and alliances within the league of nations, but we can not prevent concerted action or gentlemen's agreements where sentiment and interest favor such action. The chief result of any such prohibition would be to substitute the informal for the formal, the clandestine for the open. A closer view of actual conditions in our day will disclose the fact that even now, without the desired prohibition, treaties and alliances play a minor part in the concerted action of nations. Most of the actual correlation is informal and unofficial. It is the ententes (the understandings) that hold and the alliances that break down in the present war.

We thus see two serious obstacles in the way of eliminating the clique in the community of nations, first, the impossibility of detecting and punishing the agreements in question, and second the possibility of maintaining the clique without such agreements, by means of perfectly informal and intangible understandings. It is not meant to imply that legal action can do nothing to limit practices of this kind, but that the clique spirit is peculiarly difficult to control, quite as difficult in the community of nations as in the community of men. No repressive action of this sort will contribute much to the solution of our problem.

The abolition of secret diplomacy is the reform most prominently urged in this connection. This demand comes from the most varied quarters. The representatives of that school of democracy who essentially reject the principle of representation in democratic government and who would refer all issues directly to popular vote, quite consistently apply the same principle to the regulation of foreign relations.

The demand for open diplomacy is essentially a demand for referendum diplomacy. It is chiefly from these more radical elements that come the caustic references to "traditional and musty diplomacy" and the often expressed fear lest the forthcoming settlement should be another diplomats' peace, another plot around the table, a new deal at the old game. There is in such criticisms a certain assumption that diplomatic negotiations are essentially machinations, deals made by persons who are irresponsible and unrepresentative, and on a low moral plane. The moral straightforwardness of the people is thus invoked to save the world from diplomatic chicane.

But the criticism of traditional diplomacy comes from other quarters which represent very different political assumptions. Thus, ex-President Eliot of Harvard University has expressed regret at the secret conduct of the negotiations of 1914 by Sir Edward Grey, while paying a high tribute to his ability and disinterestedness. He objects, not to the decisions or the outcome of the negotiations, but to the principle on which they were conducted. In view of the very considerable openness which has always characterized Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy, and his insistence upon the publication of treaties, such an objection is a serious one.

There can be no doubt that a considerable ground exists for these criticisms. The history of diplomacy offers numerous examples of chicanery which were made possible only by secrecy. The well known case in which Bismarck entered into a secret agreement with Russia in a sense diametrically opposed to the known agreement with Austria is a characteristic case. In this case Austria was depending on her understanding with Germany, all unconscious that she was being betrayed by her ally. If the agreement with Russia had been open and known, the agreement with Austria would have lapsed automatically. Such cases of extreme dis-

ingenuousness are uncommon, but secret agreements against some third power that was an object of legitimate fear or illegitimate aggression, have been exceedingly frequent. There can be no question that secrecy has enabled nations to combine against other nations, for purposes either of war or peace, as they otherwise could not have done. At a time when we are seeking to prevent hostilities, the prohibition of secrecy is a form of disarmament.

Another and quite different objection which is urged with a certain justice is that secrecy lessens the accountability of the diplomat and enables him to adopt a policy not sanctioned by the people. It is undemocratic. As regards formal ratification, this is undoubtedly true. The people can not be directly consulted as to agreements reached and may even continue for years unconscious of the obligations which have been entered into on their behalf. This is abhorrent to the theory of direct democracy, that is, democracy in which the people do not delegate their powers but decide questions directly by popular vote. It is this school of democracy which most loudly voices its protest.

But if we concede the necessity of delegating the people's powers,—a necessity nowhere so obvious as in the field of foreign relations which lies farthest from the familiar facts of daily life,—the objection loses much of its force. The transactions of diplomacy may be secret, but its policy is unmistakably determined by popular will, so far as that will finds expression in government, and the people are by no means without the power of holding the diplomat to account. The mandate of the people to its agent would then be something like this: "We do not know what steps are necessary to accomplish our ends, but we wish coöperation with this power, protection against that power, etc." Such a mandate is not more difficult to enforce or more liable to abuse than any other, save in so far as international interests are farther

beyond the people's ken than matters of domestic concern. For this difficulty no form of procedure offers an adequate remedy.

It may as well be stated at the outset that the writer has but limited faith in plebiscite democracy. There is a place for the plebiscite, and the possibility of a referendum as an emergency measure, to break a deadlock or to punish malfeasance may be freely granted. But the wholesale adoption of plebiscite methods means the rejection of the expert in the whole business of government. For centuries the expert has been the ever increasing dependence of modern society. The field of knowledge so immeasurably transcends the capacity of the individual mind, that the individual can appropriate its advantages only through the intermediary of specialists of many kinds. Government is no exception. If self-government is held to mean popular mastery of the expert problems of which modern government consists, then self-government is an iridescent dream. The theory that we must have direct personal expression of opinion on problems of governmental detail as a means of making the people intelligent is an absurd misconception. We do not study medicine in order that we may intelligently employ a physician, still less in order that we may dispense with his services. Our intelligence,—the only intelligence that is feasible or relevant,—consists in the ability shrewdly to estimate the results of his ministrations.

Nowhere is the difference between this intelligence which shrewdly estimates results and the specialized intelligence of the expert more marked or more important than in government. The enactment of wise corrective legislation is as delicate a task as a piece of corrective surgery. It is for the people to note their malaise, to choose their surgeon, and to order the operation. For all of that they may be competent. It is not for them to perform the operation. The referen-

dum movement, whatever local correction of abuses it may have effected, has everywhere developed its inevitable weaknesses. It has gathered its whole force, not from the superiority of popular decisions, but from the incompetency of former intermediaries. The only advantage of the intermediary is the advantage of expert knowledge. Our intermediaries have not been specialized experts. The fact that they knew no more than we did, has not unnaturally suggested the possibility of dispensing with their services. Some of the democracies that are being born in these days of travail bid fair to revolutionize both the theory and practice of self-government as we know it. The evolution now observable in certain states toward a parliament whose lower house represents individuals and the upper house the specialized organs, industrial, commercial, and cultural, which make the modern state, is distinctly a truer application of the representative principle and a higher type of democracy. Society is not made of individuals alone, but of individuals and specialized organs of which the non-participant individual knows almost nothing. To represent the former only is not democracy as regards our great, modern, specialized societies, whatever it may have been in the days of simpler things. It is this radically unrepresentative character of our representative institutions which has discredited them and made them the prey of the lobby, that illegitimate and extra-constitutional third house through which alone the organs of society find expression. This explains the revolt against representative government, but it does not justify it. This is the age of the specialist, and despite all its dangers, the specialist must be our hope and must have our confidence.

This may seem something of a digression, but it is in fact an indispensable preliminary to our main conclusion. No plea for referendum diplomacy is to be admitted under the disguise of open negotiation. We need the expert in every

department of government, and nowhere so much as in the management of foreign relations, the matters which lie farthest from our ordinary knowledge. Especially do these considerations need to be brought home to the American people. It is from them that this demand for plebiscite diplomacy chiefly comes. It is not our superior democracy but our superior ignorance, that motivates this demand. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that we, as a people, do not even know the existence of those great material interests the careful adjustment of which is vital to the problem of peace. Hence we soar in the untrammeled ether of pure generalization and caustically refer to those who sit around the table and make "new deals at the old game." The peoples of Europe that live in physical contact with those material factors that make or mar their destiny, have this immense advantage over us that they know their incompetency. The basic assumption of our further discussion must be the frank acceptance of the expert in this, the most specialized of all functions of government. The recent assertion of an American scholar that there were not more than four Americans living who had the knowledge and skill necessary to represent America at the peace table may be an exaggeration, but it emphasizes an important truth.

Accepting, therefore, the expert, what are the conditions under which he can work successfully to accomplish the just ends of negotiation? There can not be a moment's hesitation in answering this question. The preliminary stages of negotiation must have the benefit of privacy. There are delicate stages in almost every diplomatic transaction, sharp disagreements and unreasonable arguments which if published would rouse resentments and jealousies that would make further negotiation impossible. The notion that the people are calm, and judicial, and peace loving, and that it is diplomatic scheming which engenders strife is utterly erroneous.

It is a part of the art of the diplomat to keep his temper, to marshal many and unfamiliar forces, to win by nice alignment and organization, as the great general wins by strategy. Of all this recondite science the people know nothing. But they seek their objectives none the less relentlessly, and when balked, tend necessarily to grasp at the weapon of violence which passion is prompt to put in their hands. It is sometimes assumed that the expert moves of diplomacy have something sinister about them, which tends ever to embroil peoples in war. The fact is that diplomacy is averse to war in its inmost nature. When diplomacy proves unequal to the task and war comes in to cut the Gordian knot, it is a confession that diplomacy has failed. The diplomat himself is almost invariably sacrificed and finds in the rupture the end of a hard earned career.

It is true that diplomacy sometimes deliberately precipitates war, but only when war is judged to be inevitable and the choice of time and circumstance seems of advantage. For every war thus precipitated there are a dozen that diplomacy labors hard to avert and which could not be averted without its aid. Merely as an abstract proposition, the people do not want war, but their passions and jealousies render them exceedingly prone to violence. *It is these passions and jealousies which are the great problem of diplomacy and the sufficient occasion for diplomatic secrecy.*

This secrecy can be and often has been abused. The confidence reposed in the expert may always be abused. But in the last resort we remain judges of the expert's work. Even when no sufficient measures are adopted for the public discussion and ratification of treaties,—measures certainly not lacking in our own country,—successful diplomacy must and does keep in touch with the will of the people. The conception of the diplomat as one whose machinations flout the popular will is ludicrously false. He is normally in an at-

titude of studied subserviency, even while reserving at times the right to "appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober."

Our conclusion is that secret diplomacy, in the sense of confidential negotiations, is not an abuse but a necessity, a permanent condition of the successful performance of the diplomat's necessary functions. For such abuses as occasionally occur the remedy is to be found in the choice of better diplomats and the development of a higher standard of professional honor. There is no short cut or royal road.¹

Passing from negotiations to agreements, there can be no question as to the desirability of publicity as a general principle. This is not a new conclusion. It has been the steadily increasing practice of the more enlightened nations in recent years. That remarkable document, the memorandum of Prince Lichnowski, late German ambassador to England, attests the stand of Britain on this point in an unusual manner. The much desired treaty concerning the Bagdad railway which Germany at last succeeded in obtaining, was held up for many months and finally lost because Britain insisted upon its publication when signed, a step to which Germany refused to consent. In our own case the publication of treaties is practically inevitable owing to the requirement of ratification by the Senate, a procedure which insures publicity, intentional or otherwise. There can be little doubt that this practice will become more general.

But it must not be overlooked that there are certain treaties of a perfectly legitimate character which would be vitiated by publicity. Such are treaties of military alliance which contain specifications as to military procedure in the event

¹ It is interesting to note that when Mr. Wilson's unqualified endorsement of open diplomacy seemed about to become embodied in a binding enactment, he hastened to explain that he approved of publicity only for the treaties as finally negotiated, secrecy being indispensable for the negotiations themselves. He has, in practice, quite frankly availed himself of at least this much of the privilege of secrecy.

of war. A mere pledge of alliance may be published,— indeed its publication may be just the means of accomplishing its purpose. But treaties specifying the extent and manner of military coöperation and the objectives aimed at have the same occasion for secrecy as a general's plan of campaign. Such treaties have been frequent and necessary in Europe. If we have not resorted to them, it is because our isolation has hitherto made military alliances unnecessary. The result is that in one more important particular we are disqualified for judging Europe. Meanwhile our isolation seems gone forever and it may well be our procedure rather than that of Europe that will require revision.


Once more we shall be adjured to form a league of nations and abolish forever the danger of war and the odious safeguards which it seems to necessitate. So be it,— if so it may be. In the preceding chapter we have given reasons for moderating our expectations as to the immediate immunities to be hoped from such a league,— more exactly, perhaps, as to the possibility of forming such a league to include the nations with which we are now at war. And until they are included, be it noted, the league must be in a measure a league of offense and defense having something of the character above noted. Not till the league becomes both inclusive and stable beyond the possibility of collapse or even serious disturbance can the conditions of ideal publicity in treaty agreements be attained. Such a condition is to be sought by every means in our power, but not assumed as a fact while it is as yet but an aspiration.

Meanwhile it is reassuring to note that the element of secrecy in treaties is much less than is supposed. Secret treaties are after all not very secret. Details are withheld, but the general tenor of such agreements is always discovered and usually frankly avowed. The Bolshevik publication of the secret treaties of the Allies brought no surprising revela-

tions. If the reasoning of the foregoing pages is correct, it is only this general purport of treaty agreements of which the public can take profitable account. As regards this general purport, the diplomat is now held to a very real account by peoples capable of so doing, and it is doubtful whether publicity in matters of detail would make public control more effectual. The treaties of the last hundred years have pretty effectually reflected the will of the peoples who permitted themselves to be bound by them.

It is hardly necessary to allude again in this connection to the unenforceability of a provision against secret treaties. Let us forbid all we like, and yet if Germany and Austria make such a treaty, what are we going to do about it? We might never find it out. If we did, we could only declare it invalid, and if they still chose to be bound by it, what then? Would we use war or boycott to force them to desist?

Openness and straightforwardness are qualities greatly to be desired in all human relations, great and small, but they are the spontaneous product of confidence and goodwill, not matters of contract and treaty stipulation. Publicity in public affairs, never useful in matters of technical detail, is to be desired and expected as rapidly as the conditions of fellowship are realized. To most if not all of the nations the great war has brought as its chief compensation an enlarged sense of fellowship and a greater appreciation of the interests and needs of other peoples. May frankness and candour appear as a pervasive spirit rather than as a futile stipulation in the Great Peace.



PART II
THE NATIONS

CHAPTER X

GERMANY

IN peace as in war, Germany is everything. No doubt her allies have been very important factors in prolonging the war, contributing both by their military power and still more by their strategic position to the difficulties of the Allies. Correspondingly they will present their full share of difficulty to the peace conference. But in the one case as in the other Germany is the key to the situation. As it is useless to defeat her allies unless we can defeat her, so it is useless to settle their problems until we have settled hers. Every question, territorial, racial, commercial, connected with the various countries now at war, turns sooner or later on the supreme question, what about Germany? We must try at the outset, therefore, to get a clear idea of what we wish to accomplish with regard to our arch antagonist. As regards the war we have answered the question with fortunate positiveness. "Unconditional surrender" is the plain demand of the American people. "War to the end, to the very end of the end," is the stern declaration with which the powerful Clémenceau voices the undoubted determination of all the Allies. If there have been moments when this determination seemed to be called in question, they have but given opportunity for its reaffirmation by statesmen and peoples. We are determined to see it through, to make the power that sought the decision of force, accept the decision of force, "force without stint or limit." But what then? For as regards our present inquiry, this "end of the end" is but a beginning, and our war formula carries us no farther. It is true that we hear suggestions

about wiping Germany off the map, and Germany is doing much, and ever more and more, to reconcile us to some such procedure. But what does this wiping off the map mean? Does it mean the annihilation of the German race, or their expulsion from their land, or even the carving up of their country and its distribution among neighboring nations? It is plain that we have neither the temper nor the opportunity for any of these things. Nobody wants German exiles or German territory. All such proposals are therefore mere expressions of war passion which contribute nothing to the solution of our problem. Whatever our sentiment toward Germany, we can not get away from the fact that there is to be a Germany after the war, a Germany that we must live with and that can make us an infinity of trouble, no matter how badly she is beaten now. The problem of adjustment will be almost inconceivably difficult at best. It will help us little to get Germany where we can dictate terms to her if we do not know what terms we wish to dictate. What then should be the position of the German people in the future community of nations?

The writer, for one, is utterly opposed to any policy of soft heartedness or leniency toward the German nation. The world can not for a moment tolerate its pretensions or its temper, and any harshness that may be required to compel their abandonment is a harshness which we must be prepared to exercise. Despite our wartime fulminations, it is a matter for grave concern whether at the critical moment we can be hard enough for the hard task. The Allied nations are not brutal, not even under German provocation. If they prove equal to the difficult task before them, it will be because that task presents itself as reasonable and necessary to their minds. What must that task be?

There are two ways of answering this question. The first we may call retrospective. It recalls Germany's deeds

in recent years and attempts to estimate her moral guilt with a view to retributive action. The account is appalling and any attempt to calculate her debt overwhelms the mind and swamps all kindlier feelings in a tempest of moral indignation. It is hardly to be doubted that the sober verdict of history and ultimately of the German people itself, will be that this war, in its unprovoked aggression and its unparalleled brutality, is the most criminal in history. With these facts in mind it is easy to conclude that no penalty is too severe for Germany's guilt, and no status too low for her in the future family of nations. But unfortunately such a conclusion brings us to no practical solution of our problem. Retributive justice calls for a payment that would condemn the German people to perpetual bondage, a relation impossible for us, even if thinkable for them. The debt as thus assessed leaves her hopelessly bankrupt. As in the case of other bankrupts, some fraction of the debt must be accepted in lieu of full payment. What shall that fraction be?

There is but one practicable way of settling bankrupt accounts, the way adopted by all rational societies. That is to let the past be past, to cancel the hopeless debt, and let the bankrupt whom we can not get rid of, start again in life under such restrictions as may be required for the safety of his fellows. In a word, protection of the community of nations rather than retribution must be the guiding principle in our settlement. We are fighting to make the world a decent place to live in, and it is much to be desired that we direct our efforts solely to that end.

Why are we in this war? Not because Germany sank the *Lusitania*, or butchered babies, or attacked neutral commerce, or otherwise violated international law. Not that there is the least doubt about her having done these things, or about our judgment of them. But whatever justification these facts give to the war, they are not the issue,— the

great issue,— in the struggle. That issue is between two principles of organization, the principles of freedom and coercion. Both sides look forward to a united humanity. The one side believes that that union must be effected under the leadership, the direction, and the *authority* of a single superior people, a people that has more energy, more mental power, and more organizing ability than any other and that is therefore privileged,— nay, divinely commanded,— to impose its will and its wisdom upon the world's less favored peoples.

It is perfectly consonant with this doctrine that this people recognizes the superior right, the divine authority, of a single individual or a limited class among themselves, but that of itself does not concern us who are outsiders to this relation. We have paid altogether too much attention to this figure in shining armor who rather symbolizes than embodies the principle at issue. It will be the gravest of mistakes if we challenge the right of the German people to have such leadership and such organization as they choose, or question the actuality of their choice, even though we believe their choice has a certain bearing upon our problem. The result of such a choice can hardly be other than to rally German patriotism to the support of the system thus attacked, and to fix upon the free institutions whose triumph we desire, the stigma of foreign intervention. Nor can we regard lightly the possibility that the destruction of social institutions by outside agencies before the people has become matured to the change carries with it the menace of bloody revolution and social disintegration. The example of Russia is before us, and the responsibility for German plotting in this desolating terror is not the least of the counts in Germany's terrible indictment. Our pressure would doubtless be less clandestine, but if really exercised against the defacto institutions of a neighbor state, we

can hardly fail to incur like odium and with greater justice, for it would be for us a violation of our most cherished principle.

No, ours is no feud with domestic autocracy. It is a larger issue. It is what we may call the *race autocracy* of the German people, their belief in the superiority of a single race, and in the right of that race by reason of its superiority, not merely to lead, but to *dominate* all other races. When the leaders of German industry, the great men who do things in Germany, some time ago memorialized their government regarding the necessary objectives of the war, they specified numerous territories which must be annexed,—Poland, Courland, Belgium, a part of France, etc.,—and then added that these territories must never, on any account, be allowed a voice in determining the destiny of the German Empire. In other words Germany must subject to her authority large populations of advanced civilization, but must not allow them, either now or at any future time, to share the privileges that belonged exclusively to the superior German people.

It matters very little how much Germany intended to take as the result of the present war. It has suited her purpose, at various stages of the conflict, to disclaim in larger or lesser measure, the vast objectives attributed to her by her critics and by her authoritative spokesmen. This is small matter. In these great schemes of world conquest, as in the offensive of a single campaign, the prudent commander sternly limits the objectives which are then and there to be attained. Germany did not mean to conquer the world *now*. She could not have organized such enormous gains without a vast development of resources and personnel. It is even possible as the Kaiser has stoutly affirmed, that he had never planned world dominion. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. General Foch is probably not yet planning his

entry into Berlin.¹ But it is perfectly plain that if Germany had realized her limited objectives in the present war, she would not have stopped permanently with them, but new designs would have followed to be attained at her convenience. All discussion of the extent of her proposed present aggression is beside the mark. The question is as to the principle on which she was proceeding. And when we learn that she was already parcelling out Australia among her supporters, we may assume that even her immediate objectives were not over modest.

It is but fair to recognize that there is an enormous amount of historic precedent for Germany's plan. Most of the organization of mankind has hitherto been of this kind. She can cite the awe inspiring example of Rome in her favor. Nor can it be doubted that there is some ground for her assumption of superiority. Without conceding for a moment her claim to a unique position among the races of the world, we must recognize her wonderful power of organization, her integrity of administration, her energy in the development of natural resources, her genius for applied science, all as entitling her to a very high place among civilized peoples. She is no doubt in a position to confer very great blessings, as regards these important matters, upon some of the less developed peoples to the east and south over which she has sought to extend her authority. All this and more we may admit, but the one great issue remains. *She believes in the right of a superior race to dominate the rest of the world by force and to make other peoples its servants in perpetuity.*²

¹ Written about October first.

² The writer has quoted elsewhere the allusion by Professor Rudolph Huch to the British and French as races which are "incapable of attaining a high humanity, incapable of influencing the world. Such nations are destined to hew wood and draw water for the dominant nations. If they can not fill this inferior office they must perish." "America Among the Nations," p. 357.

And what do we, the Allies, stand for? Or, to make our inquiry a little more concrete, since the Anglo-Saxons are the most numerous and prominent of Germany's antagonists, and since both writer and readers of these pages are Anglo-Saxons, let us ask what the Anglo-Saxons stand for. We have little reason to fear that our French or other Allies will seriously dissent from our conclusion.

The slogan, as we know, is liberty. It is liberty bonds that we are buying and liberty bread that we are eating. The French motto consecrated by the Revolution and now inscribed on every public building in France, is Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. This may seem more comprehensive, but it is in fact only a more elaborate statement of the great Anglo-Saxon principle which in practice works out into the same trinity. Not that the Anglo-Saxon believes at all in the mere removal of restraint. He has found by sad experience that this does not result in liberty but in disorder and in all manner of interference with the legitimate functions of life. If there is anything that the Anglo-Saxon hates, it is disorder, and he knows that order does not result spontaneously from the removal of restraints, but from a carefully adjusted balance between restraint and privilege. The Anglo-Saxons are a strong governing race. They have never hesitated to lay a heavy hand on disturbers of the peace, whether individuals or nations.

Nor do the Anglo-Saxons cherish the foolish notion that the races of men are equal. They have lived too much in contact with all sorts and conditions of men not to know that races like individuals, whatever they were meant to be or may sometime become, are at present in their capacity for government or anything else, very far from equal. And they believe quite as much as the Germans in their own superiority as a race. It would be the sheerest affectation not to do so. They have measured themselves with every race

in the world in almost every capacity, and without settling the question of absolute rank, they have the evidence of their senses that many of the races of men are immensely their inferiors. There is no mawkish self disparagement in their bearing toward these peoples. Such of them as are unable to maintain the decencies of national life, they do not hesitate to constrain, as need may require, in the interest of that order which they believe to be necessary to the peace of the world, even compelling them in appropriate connections to recognize the superiority which is the warrant of their authority. The Indian sentinel that stands guard at so many of Britain's doorways, must present arms whenever the white man passes. That is not a gratuitous obeisance, but the very means best suited to the accomplishment of the white man's necessary task. All of this is but a way of saying that the Anglo-Saxons are a practical people. They do not believe in liberty or anything else beyond the point where experience proves it to be serviceable to human interests.

But in this very practical way and within these proven limits the Anglo-Saxons do believe in liberty and equality as the Germans do not. Though both would assert their belief in liberty within practical limits, their judgment of what those practical limits are is so different that it works out in a diametrically opposed political policy and an opposite view of how the unity of mankind is to be brought about.

This belief in liberty and equality appears in two ways. First, the Anglo-Saxons recognize the civilized nations as equals. This does not mean that they think Italians, Spaniards, French, and English are equal in all respects, but they are alike in this that they have all learned to maintain order and live decently with other nations. That is the test of competent nationhood. Possibly some one of these peoples is more competent to manage national interests than

the others, but that does not seem to the Anglo-Saxon a reason why that people should seize their territories and assume the management of their affairs.¹ Such a notion has become distasteful to them, just as it becomes distasteful to well bred men, even if hungry, to grab food from one another's plates or raid one another's larders. It is the live-and-let-live temper, the sportsmanship and good breeding of the civilized nations.

But there is a second development of this temper, this instinct of liberty and equality which is more remarkable. Britain has gotten together an extraordinary and heterogeneous aggregate of peoples all of whom have at one time recognized her authority. Some were originally colonies peopled by emigrants from her own race. Others were colonies acquired by conquest from other strong races which became involved in conflict with Britain. Still others were backward peoples that were unable of themselves to provide the peace and order required for nationhood and so passed into trusteeship. This great aggregate was formed in deference to no special theory and was at first subjected to authority of quite the traditional kind.

But as the strenuous period of consolidation passed, the Anglo-Saxon instinct showed itself. Little by little Britain has relaxed her hold upon the more capable parts of this vast domain, trusting only to the spirit of friendliness and fair play to maintain the necessary accord. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, being obviously competent to man-

¹ In the early days of the war when Germany was carrying on a propaganda in neutral countries, her emissary to Sweden, in a public address in Stockholm, developed the familiar German thesis that the superior organizing ability of the German people gave them a right to organize the world. An auditor interrupted him with the question whether that gave Germany the right to organize Sweden. With perfect candour and characteristic German tact, he is said to have replied that he thought it did. Can we imagine an Anglo-Saxon saying, or even thinking, such a thing?

age their own affairs and maintain peace and order within their borders, and under the bonds of good breeding to live at peace with one another, it became repugnant to Anglo-Saxon instincts to exercise authority over them. With the Boers whose unwilling pledge to keep the peace was less reassuring, the case was not so clear, but the aversion of the Anglo-Saxons to holding competent peoples in tutelage made the subjection of South Africa impossible. India and Egypt are not able as yet to guarantee the essentials of peace and order, but they are being hurried on toward self management. Hence comes the paradox of British development, that while Britain has been consolidating a quarter of the world under her control, she has at the same time been relaxing her control and leaving these peoples free again, so that now they take their place, to the full measure of their capacity, alongside of France, Italy, and the rest, nations that have never known Britain's control, as free peoples, managing their own affairs and at liberty to do anything they choose except injure one another.

This is *race democracy*, the recognition of liberty and equality as the working basis of nations in their relations to one another and the ultimate principle of human unity. It is a thing that can not exist until nations learn good breeding, that is, until they learn to dislike lording it over other nations that are able to manage their own affairs and keep the public peace.

The Germans have noticed this relaxing of British control and have quite misunderstood it. They can not understand how a strong race should willingly relinquish control over other races. They have often extolled the excellence of British colonial administration, but have noted this relaxation of authority as a weakness. This and the consequent slight development of British military power, are the grounds for the oft repeated charge that the British are a decadent

race. This aversion to the exercise of authority has seemed to them nothing less than a degeneration of their moral fiber. Heinrich von Treitschke, the most representative of German writers on these subjects, declared that the British Empire was a sham which would fall to pieces at a touch, all because it lacked that overlordship which seems to the German the only possible way of uniting men.

The other nations now associated with Britain have less extensive but similar records. Our own history is a conspicuous example of the Anglo-Saxon principle. Our several states, though more dependent upon the Federal Government since the great nation-wide interests of railroads and the like have developed such proportions, are none the less free, and there is little disposition to curtail their freedom. We put an end to Spanish rule in Cuba, but we refused to establish our own in its stead, as the Germans were sure we would do. In our trusteeship of the Philippines we have rivaled Britain's liberality to the Boers and with even less guaranty. The record of France is hardly less liberal, though perhaps less judicious and successful in certain cases.

It may be noted in passing that the nations that have attained to this race democracy have, with practical unanimity, adopted the democratic principle in the management of their home affairs. They do not recognize any authority as divinely established over them, but establish their own authority and the rules for its exercise. This, of course, is quite natural, for the spirit that recognizes liberty and equality among competent nations, would naturally recognize liberty and equality among the men of their own nation. But we must not confound the one democracy with the other. Above all we must not assume that the mere adoption of democratic forms of government by the German people, especially if done under pressure or in times of great national distress,

would insure the spirit of live-and-let-live in the larger relation between the nations.¹ The matter goes very much deeper. We are dealing with the character of a race, or more exactly, with a certain stage in the development of a race that has not yet become sensitive to the higher forces that regulate the relations between men and nations.

One more fact must be noted before we are ready to draw our conclusion. Race autocracy and race democracy can not permanently get along in the world together. It is hard for those who are democratically minded to realize this. Why, it may be asked, should we not keep our way and let Germany keep hers until she is tired of it? Why must we fight her because she lacks good breeding? The answer is that she insists upon fighting us, and that quite consistently. She believes that the superior race,—which is of course her own,—not only may but must establish its authority over all the rest. As it is her duty to confer this higher organization upon a stubborn and misguided world, she can not consistently rest from her labors until her task is accomplished. There is no live-and-let-live in the creed of autocracy.

This, then, is that hated thing that we must put out of the world, *race autocracy*, the arrogant assertion of race superiority and the assumption that race superiority carries with it the right and the duty to subjugate and control all other races. This is what we have called militarism, a name which suggests rather one of its outer manifestations than its inner spirit. That spirit has been just as manifest in German industrial aggression as in recent military campaigns. It is this that we have declared must be destroyed.

¹ This seems to be exactly what is now happening. The morning paper announces: "The Germans are hastening their constitutional and electoral reforms in the hope of presenting a government with which the United States and the Allies will deal in restoring permanent peace." Such a structure would be built upon sand.

It is an exceedingly difficult thing to accomplish, for this militarism or race autocracy is not so much a thing as the absence of a thing, the absence of good breeding, of the sensitiveness to others' feelings and the sympathy for others' ideals which makes us averse to coercing those who have learned the art of decent living. We must trust to the slow influences of peace to develop this restraining instinct. Meanwhile we must repress this pious hoodlumism as best we may, and in our settlement take stern measures to "stop this swashbuckling through the streets of Europe," as Lloyd George has so admirably called it. We must not hesitate at any measure necessary to that end.

Just what practical measures does this require of us? This above all else. *German authority over every race or people other than their own, must cease.*¹ If the Germans wish to be governed in the German way, we shall make a great mistake to interfere, but knowing as we do that Germany believes in dominating other peoples, and that without limit, with no intention ever to make them free or self sufficient, it is the plainest of duties to ourselves, to the principle that we stand for, and to the peoples that are helplessly concerned, to see that our settlement does not sanction at any point or in any degree the triumph of this German principle.

Do we realize what this means? It means that when we release Germany from the grip of our armies, there must be no German dependencies, no alien provinces, no overshadowing alliances, no strangling agreements. Germany must be nothing but Germany, and that limited to those peoples that unmistakably choose to cast in their lot with her. For the

¹ Recent reports of German barbarities in the administration of the African colonies,—barbarities for which even the present war had not prepared us,—have added emphasis to this conclusion, if emphasis were needed. It can not be too strongly insisted, however, that this is not the issue. If Germany's treatment of her wards had been free from cruelty, it would still be open to the graver condemnation here noted of condemning them to perpetual servitude.

trusteeship of backward peoples, the guidance of weaker allies, and the exploitation of others' territories her avowed principle of political organization as yet disqualifies her.

There is another aspect of the case which is more immediately our own. Germany is situated between the two greatest peoples in the world. On the one side is the Slav with territories forty times the size of Germany, and on the other side the Anglo-Saxon with territories seventy times that of Germany. Wedged in between these two mighty races, Germany fears extinction, politically from the one, culturally from the other. Hence the frantic effort to become also a great empire by the annexation of territories at hand and overseas, the seizure of capital, the acquisition of natural resources, and the conquest of world markets and commercial privileges. Aside, therefore, from her divinely appointed mission of world organizer, Germany has a very concrete and local reason for counterbalancing her huge rivals by a prompt and strenuous expansion. Whatever the legitimacy of such an expansion in the abstract, a study of the concrete situation shows it to be impossible. There are no more colonies to annex and no suitable neighbor lands to assimilate. The only alternative, and one which Germany clearly sees and frankly accepts, is to destroy the British Empire to get materials to build her own. Germany doubtless argues that turn about is fair play in the highly gratifying occupation of empire building, but the British Empire and the Anglo-Saxon race whose future is thus menaced, can hardly so regard it. More cogently, the world whose peoples are concerned primarily for the maintenance of peace and the privilege of undisturbed development, may take exception to this theory of rotation. For Germany makes no charge that these trusts are mismanaged. Her plea is solely that of privileged exploitation.

Both the empires that Germany menaces and the world at

large whose interests quite transcend her claim to rotation of privilege, must unite in telling Germany that her dream of empire is gone forever. Present trusts are too firmly established, present overseas colonies too far developed, and present order too nearly assured to permit of violent readjustment in her supposed interest. This is no wrong or injustice. Not every people can have imperial opportunity. It is the exceptional privilege of the few whom coincidence and the world's need requisition for the work. Austria has no dependencies and expects none. Japan must shape her plans with reference to other forms of national achievement. Germany came too late and went at it wrong. She must frankly recognize and we must recognize that her opportunity has passed by. Our settlement must be based above all on the recognition of this principle that *there can be no imperial future for Germany*. That is the stake for which she threw the dice in this war, and she has thrown and lost. Any lingering notion that some measure of imperial privilege, some portion of imperial domain, are hers by right on the score of nationhood, a right to be conceded now or on the occasion of some future rehabilitation, is fatal to the cause for which we have fought.

But if Germany may not wear the purple, she must still be clothed and fed. We may as well recognize that it is a sheer impossibility for the civilized world to keep the German people permanently in repressive custody. We have the strength to do it, but we have not the stomach to do it. It is repugnant to the whole principle on which our lives are ordered, to the whole philosophy on which our claim is based. Germany must have opportunity, if not the opportunity that she seeks. The change of temper in the German people on which the permanent solution of the problem must depend, will not be brought about solely by repressive measures. No doubt a crushing defeat will have a powerful

effect in diminishing their arrogance and dampening their world conquering ardor, but if we leave them nothing worth doing except world conquest, that ardor will revive. Let us stop and ask ourselves, what do we wish Germany to do? Would we not have her devote herself to honest industry, to the development of her natural resources and to the gentle arts of civilization? If so, then we must see to it that she has every opportunity, every inducement, to expend her great energies along these lines. No churlish policy of hitting Germany wherever she shows herself will accomplish our purpose. If we want her to be decent, we must give her the privilege of being so.

It must be recognized, however, that Germany has herself made this liberal policy exceedingly difficult. Quite aside from the passions engendered by the war and the consciousness of the monstrous wrongs that Germany has committed against civilization, her industrial and commercial policy for many years preceding the war has had a predatory character and an imperialist purpose which have stamped it with illegitimacy. If we must suppress German imperialism and encourage German industrialism, then we must be quite sure that German industrialism is not German imperialism in disguise, as it has been in the past. We can not open the world's markets to German industry and German commerce if they continue to take orders from the General Staff.

It is difficult to see what guaranties the Allies can ask or Germany can give as security against this danger. It is probable that for a time precautions must be taken of an onerous character, especially as regards the apportioning of certain raw materials which are to be much in demand following the war. Difficult as these adjustments must be, they are not beyond the wisdom of modern statesmanship if the principle governing the settlement is kept clearly in mind.

We want Germany to be transformed from a bullying military power into a constructive industrial nation. We must not block the road to that transformation. Any notion that the world can prosper by the suppression of Germany's industrial competition and by the manacling of Germany's great power of world service is a profound mistake. Our business men know, if the rest of us do not, that the German market is one that they can not afford to lose. It is the glory of the Anglo-Saxon to have learned, as he has pushed his trade among the remotest peoples, that these peoples can be profitable to him only as he makes them rich. That is the lesson of British trade in India and in Egypt. Can we have the steadiness of vision to perceive, in these passionate times, that the principle is of universal application?

Undoubtedly the suggestion that Germany desist from her dreams of empire and become an honest industrial nation like "the nation of shopkeepers" that she has so often mocked, will be rejected with scorn by certain elements which have been dominant in German higher circles in recent years. There is none the less reason to believe that Germany may reconcile herself to the now unwelcome alternative. The case of Holland is closely analogous, though on a smaller scale. Holland once was among the foremost of the great imperial powers. She lost her primacy in conflict with a rival that was at that time far less considerate than those with which Germany now has to deal. It is doubtful, however, if Holland now regrets her loss of empire and its burdensome responsibilities. Doubtless she feels keenly her helplessness in the presence of the great swashbuckler, but she probably does not envy him his rôle. It is not beyond hope that Germany should some day come to think and to feel in the same way. When that time comes she will find herself quite automatically one of the group of free, world serving nations, sharing to the full the privileges which they

are at present forced to deny her. For in the end, it is the free, world serving nations who will guard the backward peoples and fill the empty places and share the earth's increase. Whoever performs these tasks of empire will perform them at the bidding of the free nations and to them will render account.

In the following chapters we shall have occasion to take up the case of the several territories, adjacent and overseas, and the problems of international interests and relations which call for special consideration under the principles herein set forth.

CHAPTER XI

BELGIUM

AMONG the victims of German aggression, Belgium unquestionably claims first attention. Her complete innocence of any part in provoking the war, her helplessness, her claim to German protection by virtue of treaty guaranty, her heroic resistance, and finally, her fearful sufferings, have made her the sacrificial offering for the world and won for her the world's compassion. It is hardly necessary to recall the treaty agreement of 1838 by which Prussia, France, and Britain pledged themselves to guarantee the independence of the little nation, pledging her, meanwhile, to form no alliances and to refrain from other usual precautions against aggression. Nor need we recall the momentary candour with which the German Chancellor recognized the wrong of the invasion and pledged reparation, or the later disgraceful attempt to prove the helpless little state the aggressor. The main issue as regards Belgium has fortunately never been doubtful. Whatever else may have been in doubt, the restoration of Belgium is a point regarding which the Allies have never faltered.

For this restoration there are two reasons. The first and sufficient reason is the mere fact that Belgium existed and was minded to continue as she was. Failing some flagrant wrong against the peace of Europe, of which she has never been guilty, it is fundamental to the principle of liberty and equality which is the common faith of the Allies, that that existence should continue. It is easy to see that Germany wanted Belgium and that in a thoroughly peaceable Europe, the closest possible relation between the two countries is to

be expected and desired. But in view of the conclusion already reached that no extension of German territories is admissible under present conditions, the re-establishment of Belgian nationality follows as a matter of course.

But this argument is quite overshadowed in the present instance by the fact that Belgium is strategic ground, the one natural gateway between France and Germany as between Germany and Britain. Through this gateway have poured the conquering or marauding hosts that from time immemorial have passed eastward or westward in the struggle between the two great peoples that are separated by the Rhine. Here too have landed the British armies like that which conquered Napoleon at Waterloo, and from here as from no other point an invasion of England might be undertaken with hope of success. The strategic character of Belgium was never so well illustrated as in the present war. Everyone knows how the unexpected resistance of Belgium held up the German advance for days and thus gave to France the time to mobilize the troops that stopped the German advance at the Marne. Suppose Germany had held Belgium and that her advance on that fateful first of August had started from the western Belgian frontier? It is as certain as things human can be that the Germans would have occupied Paris and Calais and that the whole result of the war would have been different. So far as we can now foresee, that must always be true. The possession of Belgium by Germany would put both France and England in her power.

Conversely, though to a far less degree, the possession of Belgium by England or France would give them a strong position as regards Germany. It would advance their front line and bring them that much nearer to the heart of Germany, wherever that may be. But the advantage would be inherently defensive rather than offensive. The Belgo-German frontier is short and correspondingly easy for Germany





to defend. Moreover there lies close behind it the immense natural barrier of the Rhine which can be strengthened indefinitely. The chief industrial centers of Germany, to say nothing of her remotely located capital, all lie to the east of this barrier. Germany's affectation of terror lest her enemies should get possession of Belgium need not be taken very seriously. She did, indeed, greatly fear such a move on their part, but only because it would checkmate her in her long cherished plans of aggression.

The reasons, therefore, which led the three nations, in a loyal endeavor to preserve the balance of power, to neutralize Belgium and to pledge their support of her neutrality, were very serious reasons and have lost none of their validity. Belgium is a natural neutral ground, important to all and a matter of life and death to England and France. Her maintenance as a neutral nation is indispensable so long as these three nations remain enemies, really or potentially, and this they plainly must remain so long as Germany believes herself divinely commissioned to control the destinies of civilized men.

But what is involved in the restoration of Belgium? First of all the restoration of Belgian territory to the sovereignty of its own people. As regards internal affairs this covers the requirements, for the Belgian people are amply capable of providing for the needs of civilized government. But as regards their place in the family of nations, Belgium will be as helpless as before. Her people are too few and her frontiers too open to enable her to defend herself against her powerful neighbors who can never be indifferent to her political status. Will the restoration of Belgium automatically restore the guaranties which have hitherto determined her status? Obviously not. For three powers, emerging from a prolonged and bitter war as conquerors and conquered, to assume a joint trusteeship would certainly be a dubious pro-

ceeding, but when the very cause of conflict was the violation of this same trusteeship, to resume it would be absolutely farcical. An orphan ward, in the care of three trustees, is kidnapped by one of them, her person outraged and her property squandered. When apprehended the miscreant gives as his excuse that he but anticipated what he believed to be the intended action of his co-trustees. He is compelled to give up his victim and to make such restitution as is possible. So far, so good. But how about the guardianship? Shall the kidnapper retain his position?

The mere mention of restoring the joint guaranty of Belgium reveals the incongruity, the impossibility of such a proceeding. There is reason to believe that the original tripartite agreement was made in good faith. Prussia had at that time and for many years after, no imperialist aims which menaced the independence of Belgium. If threatened at all in the earlier years, it was by the jingoistic policy of France under the second Empire. But following the German victory of '70-'71 and more particularly following the accession of William II, the temper and policy of Germany gradually underwent a radical change. The policy of a balance of power gave way to that of German supremacy which has been characterized in the preceding chapter. With this new policy Germany inevitably became disloyal to the spirit of her earlier guaranty, and its violation was only a question of opportunity. That violation did not begin with the crossing of the frontier on August first. Long before that Germany had built her network of double tracked strategic railways up to the Belgian frontier with their huge terminals that no possible peace requirements could justify, thus completely altering the physical situation. Meanwhile she had long made it plain to France that the building of strong defenses on the Franco-Belgian frontier would be re-

garded as a hostile act. It is plain that she had long marked Belgium for her own.

With this plainly declared change of policy on Germany's part, the compulsory renewal of her guaranty could not be sincere, and an effort to secure it would be but an incitement to hypocrisy. If the world entrusts the vital interests involved in Belgian neutrality ever so little to German guaranty, it will do so to its grave peril.

What then? There is but one practical alternative. Germany's railways have destroyed the neutrality of Belgium and made it a spearhead on the German shaft pointed always toward the west. We can not destroy these railways. The destruction of railways is a familiar incident of war, but an impossible condition of peace. Any such crippling of Germany in her legitimate peace interests would be justly criticised as vandalistic and would rankle long in the hearts of the German people. The German breach of neutrality is permanent. The menace must be met in kind. Belgium is to be reconstituted by the Allies. She must remain their ally. They must be her permanent guaranty against Germany, the only power from which she fears or has occasion to fear aggression. And since in any future war she is certain again to be the first to feel the blow, she must be prepared to parry it. The narrow frontier between Belgium and Germany must be the first line defense of Western Europe against the German. Moreover Belgium must be prepared to man these defenses. Whether the armament of the future be much or little, Belgium must henceforth bear her share. She must never again be disarmed and exposed with naked breast to the enemy under the fiction of neutrality. It is a great change from a shielded neutral to a frontier guard, but one imperiously dictated by the logic of events. More exactly it is not a new situation, but a new

recognition of a situation long existing and revealed by the tragedy of the invasion. There is no occasion, as there certainly is no disposition, on the part of England and France to interfere in the domestic affairs of the well managed little kingdom, but in their one great international concern the three powers are necessarily a unit, and to affect independence or separate action would be merely disingenuous. Whether the short frontier in question is the strategic one, the one most capable of defense, is a question for experts to determine. If it is not it should be made so. No marked difference of race hinders the rectification. If Germany should protest and seek the reason for the possible encroachment, she should not have far to go to find it.¹

It will doubtless be urged here that Belgium should have the benefit of international guaranty. Beyond a doubt, but once more we must remind ourselves of what is meant by guaranty. It is merely a pledge of all the nations involved to use their force as needed to secure the end guaranteed. International guarantees are too often conceived as substitutes for force. On the contrary they are always force, actual or potential. And international force like national force, has need of strong positions and efficient instruments. If Germany sees that the frontier is open and that by a quick move she can seize a dominating position, the mere pronouncement of any number of nations will not deter her. By all means let the nations of the civilized world guarantee Belgian neutrality, but it will be a guarded frontier that will enforce their guaranty.

But the worst of our problem is yet to come. The Allied demand for "restoration, restitution, and guaranty" has become associated in the public mind especially with Belgium. We have considered briefly the question of restoration and

¹ For the possibility of extending Belgian territory on the east see note at the end of Chapter XII.

guaranties. It remains for us to consider the question of restitution.

The material losses sustained by Belgium in the destruction of property, the interruption of industry, and war contributions are probably the heaviest in proportion to her resources, of any of the belligerents. Even such occupied countries as Serbia have suffered less in material wealth since they possessed little except their soil. Belgium on the contrary, being primarily an industrial state and the most densely peopled in Europe, had accumulated vast wealth and that in a form peculiarly subject to injury. Being almost wholly in enemy possession and stiff necked in her opposition to his purposes, she has felt the full force of his fury. By common consent all the Allies, even those that, like France, have suffered immense injury, concede that Belgium has a preferred claim. Before examining the question how far Germany may be expected to discharge this obligation it may be well to call attention to one aspect of restitution that has been too little discussed, namely restitution in kind.

The immense destruction which the war has wrought has created a dearth in many lines, notably in many kinds of mechanical and industrial appliances, which will be felt long after the war is over. Thus, the writer inquired recently the price of an automobile. The dealer mentioned a certain sum,—the price fixed by the manufacturer,—but could not fill an order. Pointing to a car that was passing he remarked: "If I had that car I could sell it for twenty per cent. more than that. The price of the new car is fixed at the factory, but on a used car I can set my own price, and the demand is so great that I can get more than the price of new." Obviously under such circumstances the owner of a car would not feel indemnified for its loss by getting back its cost. He wants his car because he needs it and can not replace it. Ships furnish a well known example. Holland

has refused to put her ships at the disposal of the Allies, even if fully insured. She does not want the insurance. She wants the ships ready to earn the enormous profits which will come with peace. If the ships are lost, it will be years before she can replace them.

This is the situation of Belgium as regards much of the loot that has been carried off by the invaders. Aside from works of art and like objects which have been removed with German thoroughness, a process in which certain persons of exalted rank have distinguished themselves, and the return of which should be enforced with pitiless rigor, Belgium has been subject to another form of pillage for which there is hardly a precedent. As has already been said, Belgium is primarily an industrial state, and as such, one of Germany's great competitors. When first occupied by Germany, there was an obvious attempt to preserve the industrial plant, and every inducement was offered to employers to resume operations and continue to give the population employment. Belgium was at that time regarded as a German province and was protected in its industrial interests like any other section of the Empire. But when later it became apparent that Belgium could not be retained, the policy of the invader changed. A systematic removal of all valuable machinery, raw materials, and industrial movables of every sort was undertaken and Belgium was stripped bare. Doubtless the intention is to destroy buildings and other immovables if the evacuation actually takes place, the complete destruction of Antwerp and Brussels being contemplated, it is said, in that event. The object is, of course, to destroy Belgian competition after the war. If Belgium will not work for Germany, she shall not be allowed to work against her.

We are too apt to confine our thought to the money loss involved in such a program. The time loss is here even more important. We are so accustomed to having access to

a plethoric market where you can buy anything and in any quantity if you have money enough, that a compounding of injuries in terms of money is too readily accepted as satisfactory. But after the war no such market will exist for years to come. There will be no end of things, and among them chiefly these great requisites of industrial reconstruction, which will not be purchasable for love or money. Germany is perfectly aware of this and is taking every precaution that her factories shall be equipped and stocked ready to start the moment peace is declared, while her victorious rivals are confronted with the painful task of rebuilding. Even if Belgium received an adequate money indemnity, she would have to stand as a petitioner,—in part at least before German purveyors,—and wait their pleasure for the necessary equipment.

The remedy in this case is obviously *restitution in kind*. Not necessarily the identical machines, for their present availability is doubtful, but equivalent articles from German factories or German stocks sufficient to reinstate Belgian industry in the shortest possible time. Both in purchasable equipment and in raw materials, Belgium should be supplied before Germany receives her allotment. Failing these precautions, Germany whose factories are essentially intact, will make a rush for world markets from which Belgium will long remain excluded, and into which she will later have to force her way against an entrenched and determined enemy.

No doubt Germany will protest against this on all manner of grounds, equity, humanity, and the like. Consistency is not a German characteristic. But however inconsistent, such pleas are likely to have their weight with the Allies. With an unsubdued Germany we can deal sternly, but with a beaten Germany there is danger that we shall be soft hearted. It will perhaps be well for us at that time to recall that Germany has pursued this policy of weakening her enemies in-

dustrially with a view to their ultimate subjection, all with a thoroughness that we hardly yet appreciate. Thus in the famous Hindenburg retreat in the spring of 1917, not only were buildings, railways, roads, and bridges utterly destroyed, but fruit trees were sawed down or girdled and even the soil, in some cases, treated with chemicals so as to destroy its fertility. This was not spite but war, war projected far beyond the present struggle into the days of peace, to prevent the little savings of the French peasant, destroy the productivity of the soil, and lessen to as great an extent as possible, the number of Frenchmen who should be born into the world. The forces thus launched will, to a large extent, continue after peace,—a war after the war. If it was our right and our duty to combat German aggression in its military form, it is equally our right and our duty to combat it in this half military form whose consequences are equally to be feared. The writer makes no *pléa* for mere destructive retaliation. It is to be hoped that no German factory will be destroyed except as an incident to legitimate military operations. But it is equally to be hoped that Germany will not be allowed to profit by this deliberate spoliation of an industrial rival.

But no restitution in kind that is within Germany's power can liquidate her debt to Belgium. For every article recoverable a score have been destroyed, not to speak of the markets lost, the years of labor wasted, the lives sacrificed, the families disrupted, the shame endured, injuries for which money indemnification is a mockery. Even the direct property losses which can be measurably expressed in terms of money, attain a figure which, without our recent experiences, would have seemed fabulous. The loss to industry during the first year of the war, in buildings destroyed and machinery destroyed or removed, is estimated at a billion dollars, while agriculture lost in buildings, implements, and crops, seven hundred and eighty millions more. Meanwhile war con-

tributions, systematically exacted throughout the period of occupation, from cities, provinces, individuals, corporations, from anything, in short, from which money might be extorted, attain a staggering total for which as yet no reliable estimates are available. Meanwhile Belgium has borrowed from the United States alone in the short space of eighteen months, the sum of one hundred and fifty seven million dollars to feed her starving people, while similar obligations have been incurred toward other governments,— all this in addition to some three hundred millions spent for like purpose in charity. The direct property loss alone amounts to several billions.

This, of course is but the beginning of injuries suffered. German authorities state that in a single year there were a hundred thousand convictions in Belgium by military tribunal. We may safely assume that most of these were incident to the invasion and that they constituted in the aggregate merely a colossal injury to the Belgian people. The nameless injuries unofficially inflicted and above all the ruin of Belgian industry with its resulting demoralization of the people swell the account beyond the limits of the imagination.

Any proposal that Germany should fully indemnify Belgium for these losses breaks down from sheer, demonstrable impossibility. To exact the full toll would be to sell her land under the hammer and her people into bondage. There is a limit to what Germany can do, and a much narrower limit to what it is expedient to compel her to do. We must beware of settling such a question in a spasm of moral indignation. Not only would such a payment ruin Germany utterly, but it would ruin Belgium. We have considered elsewhere the difficulties in the way of such adjustments.

But impossible as it is thus to square the account, this is a connection in which the conscience of the world simply will

not be placated without a measure of reparation. Not only have the Allies been a unit in demanding it from the first, but German voices have been heard from time to time demanding reparation to Belgium in the interest of the national honor. Doubtless such voices are rare, but the fact that they are heard at all from a people which could complacently hear from its prophet of world dominion the injunction to "leave to the conquered nothing but their eyes to weep with" is an indication of the enormity of Germany's crime in the eyes of all men.

Aside, therefore, from the restitution in kind which has been urged, a reasonable,— that is to say, a practicable,— indemnity may be — must be,— exacted. It would be well that this should cover certain specific losses the nature of which leaves least reason to fear a demoralizing reaction upon the people. Such would be the payment of loans made by the Allies which must otherwise become a burden upon the Belgian taxpayer, the return of war contributions which have been largely taken from the active industrial capital of the country and again are largely represented at present by loans for which tax payers are responsible, and the restoration of buildings required for industrial purposes. From Germany, too, might be secured the equipment or the funds, one or both, for fortifying the eastern frontier against her future aggression. Possibly the object lesson would have its value. How much this indemnity can or should be made, having regard always to the danger of general demoralization, it is impossible for the writer to form any idea. There are other claimants to be heard,— none quite so deserving as Belgium, but still entitled to a hearing before Belgium is fully recompensed. When the utmost has been exacted that it is safe or even possible to demand, Belgium will still be compelled to begin life anew under conditions closely approximating to economic ruin.

CHAPTER XII

FRANCE

THE reasons which induced France to enter the war, or more exactly, the reasons which induced Germany to attack her, were many and varied. To the popular mind the issue was, for France, the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and for Germany its defense and retention. There can be no question that this is a completely erroneous conception of the situation. France had long since decided never to go to war to recover Alsace-Lorraine and Germany knew that the issue was dead unless she revived it. On the other hand, France had prospered greatly in the field of colonial enterprise, and in company with Britain, by the simple fact of anticipating Germany's tardy ambition, effectually blocked the way to the realization of Germany's vast designs. Moreover France had accumulated,—thanks in part to Germany's earlier indemnity exactions,—a huge capital, the power of which Germany had more than once been taught to fear. Germany, balked in her expansionist designs by French occupancy and by French finance, boldly determined to appropriate both her colonies and her capital. The fundamental fact which we must not lose sight of is that it was Germany that had the grievance and Germany that was the aggressor. For France more than for any other of the great powers, this is a war of defense. We need not rest this conclusion on French assertions or on any estimate of French character. It inhered in the situation. The claim of Germany that Britain and France were the aggressors is palpably absurd. They were the possessors and Germany the dispossessed. They were creditor nations and Germany a

debtor nation. A successful war would have given them little that they did not already possess, unless it be immunity from the menace of German attack, while a successful war for Germany would have won her an imperial domain and an enormous loot. The nations that have much to lose and little to gain by war, have given hostages to keep the peace. Those who are familiar with recent European history will not forget that the French general election, held but a few weeks before the outbreak of the present war, returned a distinctly pacifist majority to Parliament and virtually assured a policy of semi-disarmament, the peril of which was averted only by the heroic extra-constitutional insistence of President Poincaré. The forcible recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was certainly farthest from the thought of this prosperous and pacific people.

But the war came and not only revived the old passion but furnished new and compelling reasons for the recovery of the lost provinces. If France could live at peace with Germany, she could spare them, though not without loss. If she must fight Germany, they were indispensable. What then is the problem of Alsace-Lorraine?

The population comes first to mind. To the novice, indeed, it is the only consideration. What is their race, their nationality, their affiliation, their history? The answer to these questions will illustrate the difficulty of these easily proposed ethnic solutions.

In race, these provinces have the normal border character of a no-man's land. The predominant racial stock is neither French nor German, but belongs to an earlier race. This, however, counts for little, as we have seen. In language there is much mixture. Alsace is and always has been predominantly German in speech, though French is spoken in certain frontier districts. But this German is a most extraordinary dialect, entirely unintelligible to one who understands only

high German. In Lorraine a little less than half the territory is French. Taking the two provinces together, a little less than one-tenth of the population are accounted as French speaking and the area in which French predominates is not much greater.

But these figures are most deceptive. In the first place Germany easily manipulates these figures by recording as German all who speak German, regardless of whether they speak French also, a procedure of immense importance in a border province where a knowledge of both languages is common. When we remember that throughout the period of German occupation, the German language has been employed in the schools to the exclusion of French, and that by the above procedure Germany has succeeded in reducing her Polish population to negligible proportions,¹ we may assume that these statistics hardly correspond to fact, or if they do, the fact loses its usual racial significance. It is doubtless true, however, that the population is predominantly German, and in Alsace almost wholly so, the more so as France during her control of these territories, made no effort to force the French language upon them.

But whatever the proportion, the dividing line loses most of its significance from the fact that it is not a line at all. Throughout practically the entire area the two languages are intermingled, especially in Lorraine. There is very little advantage in assigning an area of mixed speech to one side or the other.

A farther fact which greatly modifies the significance of these data is the enormous displacement of population which followed German occupation and which would undoubtedly attend another transfer. When Germany took possession she substituted for the tolerant policy of France, a program of strenuous Germanization. This and other features of

¹ Her stock assertion now is that "there is no German Poland."

German rule were displeasing to the population, Germanic though it was, and all who could feasibly leave the country, did so. The nearby French city of Nancy promptly received an addition of a third to its population. It was one of the suggestive results of the war that the German dialect of Alsace dominated whole quarters of this French city because the Alsatians objected to being *Germanized*. Altogether it is claimed that a full quarter of the population left the provinces, despite the great industrial development which offered them such inducements to remain. Their places were of course taken by German immigrants. During the present war, as the possibility of reference of the question to popular vote has forced itself upon German attention, this displacement of population is said to have been systematically continued, unsympathetic proprietors being expropriated and their holdings disposed of to loyal Germans. Germany probably has little reason to fear the results of a plebiscite. All this raises the question, however, as to the validity of such a plebiscite, even if the principle were conceded. If we are to consult the wishes of the Alsatians, it is pertinent to inquire, who are the Alsatians? Have the exiles no rights? Have the immigrants full rights, especially those so lately rushed in to stuff the ballot box? It is impossible to give a sweeping answer either way. The exiles are hopelessly lost; the immigrants for the most part there to stay. There is nothing to do but accept the situation. Yet Germany would ask nothing better in the case of Belgium or the Baltic Provinces than to refer their case to a vote if she is given the privilege of preliminary seizure and forty years of forcible preparation.¹

¹ It is well to recall that the dominant Pan-German party demand not only the annexation of Belgium, but the expropriation and German ownership of its essential industries. The very monstrousness of German demands serves in no small degree to camouflage them from their victims. The decent world has simply lost the power to believe things.


To the claim that Alsace-Lorraine is historically a part of France, Germany replies that it is also historically a part of Germany, and that that connection is older and of longer standing. This is true, especially as regards Alsace, which belonged to Germany from 925 to 1681, or between seven and eight centuries, while the connection with France was only from 1681 to 1871 or less than two hundred years. But the German is careful not to recall what we are all too prone to forget, namely, that there was no Germany at that time. There was a German people existing in the shape of numerous petty states of which Alsace was one, but there was no German nation and consequently no conscious German nationality. Alsace during these early centuries developed a nationality of her own, but no other. Not till she became a part of France in 1681 did she have any chance to develop the sentiment of allegiance to a great modern nation. She came to France, therefore, racially but not politically, German. It is a surprising attestation of the liberality of French character, that though her government was at that time wholly autocratic, the policy adopted toward the new province was one of extreme tolerance and moderation. It was completely successful, with the curious result that Alsace became as loyal as any French province, while retaining its essentially German character, thus hopelessly complicating the ethnic-political problem. We have seen that race at the best is not a sufficient determinant of nationality. In such

that Germany coolly professes. Yet Germany has been doing these things for decades. One reason why "there is no German Poland" is that Germany has long been expropriating the intractable Poles. Many years ago when the writer was a student in the University of Berlin, a distinguished professor created a sensation there by denouncing this policy of forcible displacement as too drastic. He urged that Germany had only to leave the Pole without education, save of a rudimentary character, and the better-educated German would soon displace him by natural means. This amazing proposition in governmental circles was regarded as almost treasonably lenient, and the professor was for a time in marked disfavor.

a confused and contradictory form as this it becomes well-nigh negligible.

Turning to the physical or strategic problem, the data are still conflicting. Lorraine is physically a part of France, though the dividing line is not sharp. There is no serrated ridge or commanding stream plainly destined by nature as a boundary,—unless we regard the Rhine as such, which has its difficulties. The whole district is rather the barrier, which of course makes it debatable ground. Turning farther south, there are two natural and rather pronounced parallel barriers, the Rhine and the Vosges Mountains with a broad valley between them. This valley is Alsace and the mountains or the river became the international boundary according as the one people or the other proved the stronger. On the whole the mountains have had the advantage, as is indicated by the fact that during the period of linguistic determination, German was established in the valley. But during the period of political determination, France had the advantage, and established, as we have seen, her nationality in the valley. It is still something of a draw game, but with this reflection that the whole territory is a region of tremendous strength, giving its possessor a power of offense or defense which the other can not match. Those concerned for the world's peace may well be interested in the character and designs of the holder.

We come finally to the most important consideration of all, the natural resources of the district. These consist chiefly of that great determinant of national destiny, iron, together with a large deposit of potash of which Germany has otherwise a practical monopoly. We here approach what is beyond question the most important problem of the entire peace settlement. It is a sad fact that the supreme factor in the determination of national destinies is one of which the American people in its discussion of this question, has seemed as yet



almost wholly unconscious. It is a familiar truth that in war the victory always inclines to the side that has the most men and the amplest equipment. Leadership of course counts for much and may, in a given war, decide the issue. But leadership is a short-lived thing. If a Napoleon gives the victory to France, it is only for a short time. Napoleon passes, and a Moltke appears on the other side and turns the scale. The personal factor is but a ripple on the surface. It is the great undercurrent of men and resources that determines the result.

But even here we have not reached the final term. We have seen that resources develop population. In 1750 it was generally assumed that England had reached her limit of population at the long stationary figure of eight millions. Then came the discovery of coal and the development of her great industries, and her population rose to thirty-eight millions. It was coal and iron that made the extra thirty millions.

Exactly the same thing is happening in Germany today. Her population has gained about thirty millions in forty years, and it is iron and coal that have produced the extra thirty millions. Meanwhile France has not increased, and it is at bottom primarily for this reason, that she lacks the iron and coal. It is iron and coal that produce the men and it is iron and coal that arm and equip the men. Hence we come to the farther truth,—the almost appalling truth. It is natural resources that determine the strength and the ultimate destiny of nations.

The question naturally arises, whether there is any limit to this principle. If a country like Germany or France were one vast coal and iron mine with absolutely limitless supplies, would it have limitless power? Would it not have, after all, other limitations of space or food which would affect the result? Yes, undoubtedly, if it remained in its

original boundaries. But that is exactly what it would not do. Such a country would develop and equip a very large population, all that it could raise or buy food for, and with this population it would conquer additional territories in which it could raise more food and develop more population, and so on to the end. If its supplies of iron and coal were far superior to those of other powers and if they were not early taken, before the nation had time to grow to them, there could be but one result. That nation would dominate the rest.

This is almost the exact situation in Europe today. It is of course impossible to tell with exactness how much of these minerals lies buried in the earth, but estimates have been made in Europe with great care, especially in the matter of coal. According to these estimates Belgium has a coal reserve of 11 billion tons, France 17 billion tons, England 189 billion tons, Russia 233 billion tons, and Germany 409 billion tons. A billion is a very large number and even the smallest of these reserves may give us a reassuring sense of sufficiency. But in a matter in which annual consumption rises into the hundreds of millions and in an age when a single steamship burns a thousand tons a day, these figures become distinctly finite. The important thing to note is that Germany has today substantially half the coal reserves of Europe, while France has next to none. These two countries are nearly equal in size, but one has about twenty-five times as much coal as the other. That difference is already expressing itself in the normal way. The two countries had fifty years ago about the same population. Today Germany has thirty millions more than France because they entered the industrial era, the one with coal and the other without. That difference in coal supply has only begun to express itself in population. France can not hope to redress the balance unless she can get larger supplies of coal. In that

industrial development which is preëminently the measure of modern national power, France is a case of arrested development.¹

In the matter of iron the balance is less unequal and Germany is certainly in a less fortunate position. By far the largest of her ore beds is in the extreme west, a huge deposit lying right astride the present Franco-German frontier. This ore bed was carefully examined by German experts at the time the frontier was drawn, but with imperfect results. They reported that only the eastern portion of the field was valuable and so the western part was graciously left to France. Improved methods, however, quickly invalidated their decision and left Germany to mourn the loss of a splendid prize which had been within her grasp. It is significant that one of the first objectives of the German army was this iron mine, the seizure of which robbed France at the very outset of practically all her material for war and compelled her to depend on imports from America. The seizure of her slight remaining coal fields completed her helplessness. It is for that reason that the French people were doomed to pass the past winter in unwarmed houses.

Viewed in the light of these facts, the disposal of Alsace-Lorraine acquires an entirely new significance. Germany will cling with the utmost desperation, to this great ore bed, not only to the eastern portion which has been the source of three quarters of her supply in the last few decades, but to the French portion as well which it was her first care to acquire and which has been exploited with feverish activity throughout the war. It is this iron mine of Briey that the

¹ "Let us not deceive ourselves. *It is not common language, literature, or traditions alone, nor yet clearly defined or strategic frontiers, that will in the future give stability to the boundary lines of Europe, but rather such distribution of its supplies of coal and iron as will prevent any one of the great nations of Europe from becoming strong enough to dominate or absorb all the others.*" Macfarlane, "The Economic Basis of an Enduring Peace."

Germans have in mind when they talk about a "slight rectification of the western frontier." To possess this ore bed would not only disarm France completely and make her dependent upon distant allies, but it would limit her population, prevent her industrial development, and in the long run make her a ward of Germany. Germany will not relinquish without the most desperate of struggles what is virtually a guaranty of her eventual domination. She now has the coal; with a "slightly rectified" Alsace-Lorraine, she would have the coal and iron both necessary for the task. Not willingly will Germany let such a prize slip from her grasp. There is reason to fear as Maximilian Harden has declared, that "if necessity compels us to sign such a peace (surrendering Alsace-Lorraine), seventy million Germans will tear it up." And for all these reasons the French people, to whom the experiences of the war have brought home these truths with new force, will cling with the tenacity of despair to this condition of their safety and their independent existence.

It is one of the curious caprices of nature that these vital conditions of power and growth to modern nations should be located in spots that were predestined to be the frontiers between great peoples. If the German coal and iron deposits were in Hanover and the French in Touraine with only innocent farming land between the two nations, the problem would be immensely simplified. As it is, forty per cent. of Germany's coal reserves are in Silesia, an eastern and essentially Polish province which would be lost to Germany if the more radical plans for the reconstitution of Poland should be carried out,—which helps to explain Germany's insistence that there is no German Poland. The rest of her coal is on the western frontier, most of it west of the Rhine. All that France possesses lies in the same uncertain region. The iron is held in even more dangerous equipoise. Nature

could hardly have better contrived to keep these races at odds, or shall we say,—to force their ultimate union?

Returning now to Alsace-Lorraine, we have to note the important fact that their restitution to France would give her the iron, but it would give her no coal. Only one of the great western coal fields, that of Saarbrueck, extends slightly into the territory of Lorraine. All the rest that lies to the west of the Rhine is located in the Rhine Province, as the territory is called which lies between Lorraine, Luxembourg, and Belgium on the one hand and the Rhine on the other. The restoration of these provinces would therefore have this extraordinary and highly unsatisfactory result, that it would give about all the iron of central Europe to France and all the coal to Germany, a most doubtful guaranty of peace. It would be like making peace between two blood feudists by giving to each hostages out of the family of the other.

The fate of Alsace-Lorraine is as nearly determined as anything can be by the present war. Elsewhere everything is still in a state of nebulous generality, but here the frontiers of our purpose are definite and concrete. France is to have Alsace-Lorraine. It would indeed be a neglect of the most elemental precautions if the decision had been otherwise. But in the light of the facts here set forth, it may well be asked whether this promises peace or a renewal of the conflict. Against that frontier,—*which is henceforth our frontier*,—the Teutonic storm will beat with redoubled fury. Germany will not purr peacefully with such an appeal to her predatory instincts constantly before her eyes. She will not be deterred by any international warnings to “keep off the grass.” It will be force, not mere international agreement, that maintains that frontier, force not potential merely, but in large part actual, equipped and ready for its strenuous task. All the awful mandates of the powers will avail nothing if Germany finds the frontier unguarded and rushes the

iron and coal mines and a few strategic points from the too trustful powers.

Why has the world decided on just this territory of Alsace-Lorraine? Is it so clear that this is the measure of nature's equity, the sufficient guaranty of the world's peace? Nothing of these. Alsace-Lorraine is to be returned because Alsace-Lorraine was taken away. The Europe of yesterday was a hodge-podge of accident, but in this world of new forces and changed conditions, it is still yesterday that gives the law to today.¹ With all our talk of destroying Prussian militarism, we can not bring ourselves to disarm the monster, because, forsooth, the arms were his of old. The writer has small hope that his suggestion will commend itself to a world obsessed with the idea that the surface facts of local prejudice and habit are the legitimate determinants of nationality. Yet human progress has been a continual struggle against these surface accidents, a continual yielding on their part to the inexorable forces of environment. But however hopeless the suggestion, there is but one suggestion possible as the result of this reasoning. *The Rhine Province and the Palatinate should go with Alsace-Lorraine.* That territory cuts a huge notch out of the natural unity of the west Rhine territory, with no other result than to take from the western peoples practically all their coal and make their frontier indefensible. Its cession to France would restore the boundary of Caesar, the boundary of nature. It would still leave Germany twice as much coal as it would give to Belgium and France. It would be, under modern conditions, a boundary virtually immune from aggression as between peoples measurably equal in equipment for defense. Finally, it would give to France the possibility of that industrial development that is now so unrighteously denied her, a development without

¹ "Das ewig Gestrig das immer war und immer wiederkehrt,
Und heute gilt weil's gestern hat gegolten."

— SCHILLER, "Wallenstein."

which she has no future and German domination of the continent with all its illimitable possibilities becomes assured. It is the irreducible minimum of concession if we are to have peace on this border which is the Armageddon of the nations.

It will of course be objected that this leaves Germany insufficiently supplied with iron. There is truth in this. Importations from Sweden and from the recently discovered deposits of Lapland, a pretty safe supply even in war, and possibly from imperfectly explored southern sources, must less conveniently eke out her supply from other home sources. Possibly we might reconcile ourselves just now to seeing a nation that is equally predatory with steel billets and steel cannon, a little straitened for the present in her supply. But after all this question is irrelevant. There is no iron in the Rhine Province. If Germany is to get her iron in the west, she must have Alsace-Lorraine and perhaps some "rectifications." That we do not propose to give her. But the Rhine Province has coal, *our* coal, and it is on our side the river.

But here comes the stubborn fact. It was not so from the olden time. These people are Germans. Yes, and so are the Alsatians. France won them by fairness and tolerance. She can win the others by the same. Doubtless a transfer would mean an exodus of the irreconcilable among this German population. But it is an open question whether there would not be as many who would welcome the transfer. The people of the Rhine Province do not love the Prussian. In any case, the people that has solemnly proposed that all non-Germanic population in America and Australia should be transported to Africa can hardly complain of a transfer that exiles and oppresses no one, even if it should result in something of voluntary exodus to congenial lands across the river.

France, like Belgium, has a vast claim against Germany

on the score of property destroyed and injuries of every sort inflicted. As already indicated, however, these claims rest on a technically different basis. France is a great power, a long standing and recognized rival of Germany, and not under German guaranty. It is not claimed that this difference is more than technical. France was peaceable and her warfare against Germany was of that legitimate sort which can not be held to justify military reprisals. Still, technical though it be, the difference is such as to give Belgium a prior claim. If it be practicable to indemnify both without injurious reactions upon themselves and upon the world, by all means let it be done, but on this point the writer has already expressed his doubts.

The great question of colonial possessions, a question in which France is deeply interested, may be reserved for separate consideration.

NOTE. A glance at the map on page 181 will disclose the fact that the Rhine Province lies in part between Belgium and the Rhine. The annexation of this part to France would be highly unnatural. It would therefore be the natural thing to make Belgium rather than France the beneficiary in this region. This would have the farther advantage that adjacent Belgium is Flemish, that is, low German, in speech, essentially the same as the Rhine Province. The writer has made no effort to decide this question of local convenience. The Allies in this region are considered as a unit and the transfer here proposed is urged on behalf of the group rather than of any particular member. An extension of Belgium and possibly a modification of the Dutch frontier might well be necessary in case of this transfer.

CHAPTER XIII

ITALY

THE entry of Italy into the war was in a sense unlike that of the other Allies. It had no immediate connection with the crisis which seemed to determine the action of the others. Indeed, Italy had seemed to share the apprehensions of Austria at the rising power of Serbia. This previous attitude together with her alliance with the Central Powers and her long hesitation before taking the decisive step, made her action seem peculiarly deliberate and calculating. Probably the difference was mostly seeming, for the action of those powers that made most of the Serbian and Belgian episodes was really determined by very serious considerations of self-preservation. It was no burst of moral indignation at violated pledges or impudent demands that swept France and Britain off their feet, though that indignation was tremendous and sincere. This wave of emotion greatly aided those governments in quickly marshalling their people to protect their vital interests, but it was those interests which the statesmen of those powers believed to be jeopardized, that were the real ground of their action. The emotional outburst in those countries served, therefore, to somewhat screen the deeper movement of the nation.

In Italy this screen was lacking. The psychological moment for moral protest had passed when Italy, after prolonged parley with both camps, finally took the decisive step. It is true that ardent protagonists of the Italian cause have attempted to claim for Italy a share in this moral spontaneity so honored in popular judgment. We are told that the Italian people forced a cautious and reluctant gov-

ernment to enter the war in vindication of its honor and on behalf of the sacred rights of humanity. There was undoubtedly pressure from a certain section of the Italian public, and no doubt these sentiments were urged and sincerely entertained, but they have impressed the world less than similar sentiments in other countries. This seemingly calculated pursuit of self interest is noted, not by way of criticism of the Italian people, with whom the writer claims a personal relation of friendship of more than thirty years standing, but rather in their defense. Their case is quite as strong as that of the others, but it does not look so and has in fact made less appeal.


Italy entered the war chiefly for two reasons, antagonism to Austria,—one of the deepest antagonisms in Europe,—and desire to better her very unsatisfactory strategic position. The first reason, antagonism, was the popular motive because it rested on facts that were within popular memory. It had, of course, its generous counterpart or aspect in irredentism, the desire to redeem their kinsmen from the hated Austrian rule. The second or strategic argument was the one that actuated the Italian statesmen and military leaders. It was abundantly justified by the situation. To a considerable extent the strategic and ethnic demands coincided. To a much greater extent they were made to seem to do so.

The antagonism to Austria is based on very substantial grounds. Her rule over the once highly civilized independent states of northern Italy, was both unnatural and unenlightened. The friction engendered by it increased steadily to its close in 1866. To this was added another source of friction when in 1870 Italy broke with the Vatican, a rupture seemingly unavoidable if Italy was to be consolidated. During this long period of struggle, Austria remained the one uncompromisingly Catholic power, upholding not merely the Catholic faith, but the Catholic claims to temporal rule.

Indeed, throughout the earlier struggle for independence and nationality, Austria appears, not only as claimant for Italian territories on her own behalf, but always as the staunch upholder of Papal claims. As the feud between the Quirinal and the Vatican has never been settled, so the feud between Italy and Austria has necessarily continued. It is difficult for one not familiar with internal conditions in the two countries to appreciate the inevitableness of all this. Austria is a group of alien and even antagonistic nationalities united almost solely by fealty to their personal sovereign and their loyalty to the Catholic faith. For these states, if their union is to be preserved, the Catholic faith is an indispensable *political factor*. In Italy, on the other hand, we are dealing with a single race whose natural political union was long blocked by the Catholic church as ruler of the centrally situated Papal States. For Italy, therefore, it was absolutely essential that the Catholic church should disappear as a *political factor*. These two nations were therefore squarely opposed in a matter that was vital to each. The result was antagonism, deep and long standing, which has become an instinct of their people. Nor can we escape the conclusion that this antagonism is a living one, not merely a memory. The forces that produced it are in part still active and contributing to its maintenance. Austrian rule over northern Italy has greatly diminished, but it has not wholly disappeared, while the fundamental conflict regarding Catholic claims, though perhaps less keenly felt than formerly, is still present. This antagonism is therefore one of the great factors to be reckoned with in the approaching settlement. Resting as it does upon Italian unity, Austrian diversity, and Catholic claims, it must apparently continue as long as these continue. The dissolution of Austria might remove it, for it apparently does not hold against the component parts of the Austrian state, but only against the government

which represents their union. The renunciation of the claim of the church to territorial sovereignty might also remove it, would certainly reduce it. The disappearance of Italian unity is a contingency which we seemingly need not consider.

Turning to the problem of Italy's strategic frontier, her grievance is plain. The Austro-Italian boundary was determined in 1866 under peculiar conditions. France and Italy had just fought an indecisive war against Austria. Successful on land, they had met decisive defeat in the Adriatic, and it is doubtful what the result would have been had Austria not been overwhelmingly defeated at the same moment by Prussia. This defeat of Austria by a power which was anything but an ally of France, alarmed the latter and made her come to terms with Austria on her own account and with little reference to the interests or wishes of Italy, thus relinquishing what seemingly was within their grasp as the result of Austria's embarrassment. Most of Austria's Italian territories were ceded,—not to Italy, but to France, who thereupon exchanged them for Savoy, an Italian territory on her own frontier. This peculiar transaction definitely foreseen by France, is perhaps responsible for the establishment of a frontier which France would hardly have accepted had she been the one to guard it. Its most glaring defect was the retention by Austria of the Trentino, a purely Italian district of immense strategic strength. The Trentino is doubly Italian, for not only do the people speak Italian, but the district is on the southern slope of the Tyrolese Alps, whose summits are the natural boundary between the Italian and German peoples. The retention of the Trentino deprived Italy of her natural defenses against her age long rival and enemy, while it gave to the latter the best possible opportunity to attack her neighbor for the recovery of the territories that she had unwillingly parted with. To these natural advantages have been added some of the most power-



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ful fortifications in the world, the building of thirty-five powerful forts having converted the whole region into one vast fortress.

Even this is not the whole story. The Trentino thrusts itself like a blunt wedge into the great plain of northern Italy. It is from the northeastern corner of this plain, far beyond the Trentino, that Italy must operate if she is to fight Austria. The Trentino in Austrian hands thus becomes a frowning bastion threatening the flank of any army that passes and the communications of any army that has passed. It would be difficult to find a parallel for this extraordinary defense. It is plain that Austria established this frontier in expectation of trouble and with the intention of holding the whip hand.

A somewhat similar though less striking situation holds in the east. Here the Isonzo River is the natural boundary though not quite the linguistic boundary between the two peoples, the Italian speech extending somewhat beyond it. But once again Austria established the border somewhat to the west of the river in order that her own front might be impregnable and the Italian front exposed.

We need not waste any anathemas on Austria. All the powers involved were manoeuvering for position, and neither Cavour nor Napoleon III would have scrupled to take advantage of such a situation if they had been able to do so. But looking at it from the standpoint of European or world peace, it is clear that the arrangement is a vicious one. No war sentiment should pervert our judgment and induce us to reverse the situation giving to Italy the chance to overawe her antagonist. But a boundary based so far as possible on natural features and separating the antagonists on fairly even terms is desirable in the interest of general peace, especially since ethnic boundaries so nearly coincide. The cession of the Trentino to Italy and the rectification of the

Isonzo frontier in conformity with natural boundaries and so far as may be with race limits, are the most indisputable of Italy's claims. It will be noted that precedence is here given to natural over ethnic frontiers. This is the sound principle in all cases where the two are fairly identical. An ethnic frontier is never sharp edged. Language boundaries are both vague and shifting, while natural boundaries in a region like this are often inexorable. To make the crest of a mountain range or the summit of a pass a national boundary is reasonable, even if a few persons have carried their language over the divide. The proper drawing of the political boundary usually effects the rectification of the ethnic frontier speedily and without hardship, whereas the ethnic factor has no such power over nature. The two rectifications noted would each require slight ethnic adjustments. A proper mountain frontier in the north would require the inclusion of a portion of the Tyrol with a few German speaking inhabitants, while a strategic boundary in the east would leave a few Italians under Austrian rule.

But unfortunately neither Italy's demands nor Italy's problems end here. The great Austro-Italian frontier is the Adriatic. It may seem extravagant to characterize a body of water a hundred miles wide as a boundary, but all the problems of a frontier exist here in their most acute form. Unfortunately here too we find Austria holding the same whip hand over Italy, this time through a caprice of nature. The Italian side of the Adriatic is featureless and indefensible, a low unbroken coast line without a single harbor suitable for modern commerce or for a naval base, except possibly at the extreme south where Brindisi has been constrained into the service of the Orient mail and Taranto does duty as an indifferent naval station. Briefly, Italy, of necessity a maritime and naval power, has on her east coast no facilities for either commerce or defense. The east coast of the

Adriatic, on the contrary, is a perfect maze of rocky islets, deep fjords, and ample harbors, while at the northern end lies Trieste, one of the finest harbors in Europe, and at the other an embarrassment of riches in the way of natural refuges for a navy. Such is Cattaro, a fjord whose narrow but perfectly practicable entrance between towering cliffs is scarcely visible from the sea, but this once passed, it opens into a great inner lake resembling in size, shape, and environment the famous Lake of Lucerne. The conquest of Montenegro by Austria was effected primarily to give her possession of the mountain dominating this naval stronghold. Another is Avlona, a deep bay, its entrance protected by an island, in the inner recesses of which ships of war could lie in perfect security. Still another is the channel of Corfu, a body of water between the island and the mainland almost entirely surrounded by towering mountains. Here are harbors and islands and naval bases in plenty for both coasts, but all piled up on one, a most inequitable caprice of nature. Here again, precisely as in the mountains to the north, the power holding the east coast is perfectly secure from attack and the power holding the west coast absolutely defenseless. This disparity of position results in a further disparity, in that Austria finds it unnecessary to maintain a great navy and is thus free to devote her resources to her army, while Italy is compelled to maintain both, and that of course to the disadvantage of both.

Italy covets this coast. It is clearly a strained and unnatural territorial program but one to which she is forced by the exigencies of her position. These exigencies are her real and comprehensible motive, but they are not her chief argument, for the simple reason that Austria can advance even more compelling ones. To give the eastern coast of the Adriatic to Italy would obviously be an advantage to Italy, but it would even more obviously be ruin for Austria. It

would take all of her sea coast and leave her an interned nation like Serbia. Worst of all, it would not find a natural frontier, no matter where the line might be drawn. The interned Balkan states would never be reconciled and would make endless wars of protest. If Italy held her ground, she would find in these protests and the constant menace from the rear a continual incentive to extend her borders. We should have introduced one more formidable factor into the trouble-making Balkan situation.

Considerations like these would hardly deter Italy, continually menaced by her position and confronted with a power so hated as is Austria, but Italy is not unconscious that to the world and to those allied powers whose coöperation can alone realize her ambition, these are very serious objections. To her own people, too, as to every other, strategic considerations make but a feeble appeal. She has therefore turned to another argument which everywhere in our day enjoys possibly exaggerated popularity and an argument which in this case she has certainly abused,—the argument of race. *Italia irredenta*, unredeemed Italy, is the slogan by which Italy has roused the enthusiasm of her people and appealed to the sympathy of mankind.

We have seen that as regards the mountain frontier this argument coincides fairly if not exactly with the argument of natural defense. It there reinforces an argument already conclusive. It may also be urged fairly for the city of Trieste and part of the Istrian Peninsula at the tip of which lies the city of Pola of ancient Roman importance and now the chief naval base of Austria. Beyond this, all the way down the eastern coast, Italian is more or less in use on account of the constant intercourse with Italy, but it is clearly an exotic. The traveler along this coast, familiar in a degree as he is sure to be with the sound of Italian and wholly unacquainted with Serb, is apt to get an exaggerated

impression of the Italian character of the region. Statistics, even if imperfect, are a much safer guide. According to the census, Dalmatia, the narrow coast state including the islands, which is most under debate, contains more than 600,000 Serbs and but 18,000 Italians. The latter form but three per cent. of the population as against ninety-six per cent. of Serbs. Italian irredentists will say that the census is unfair, all the bi-linguists being counted as Serbs. It is safe to assume that Austria has not erred in favor of Italy. Still, it would be a very extravagant irredentist who would claim ten per cent. of Italians for Dalmatia. If it be argued, as it justly may, that under Italian rule in this bi-lingual country, assimilation would be rapid, it must not be overlooked that this quite gives away the irredentist case. Italy can not claim these people as her unredeemed brothers, and then shift her ground and say that though they are not Italians, she could speedily make them so. The claim of race has absolutely no validity as regards Dalmatia, and not a wholly satisfactory one as regards Trieste and Istria, for even here there are far more Slavs than there are Italians in Dalmatia. Yet the secret treaties published by the Bolsheviks show that an agreement existed between Italy and her Allies to the effect that she was to receive the Trentino, the Isonzo district, Trieste, Dalmatia and Avlona. We have briefly to consider the wisdom of this arrangement. As regards the Trentino and the Isqnzo district, the case is and always has been clear. The Allies have always and openly stood for this accession, and even Austria offered the most of the disputed territory in a vain effort to secure Italian neutrality. That is one of the settled things in a program of Allied victory.

The other claims fall into three groups; — the Italian speaking district of Trieste and Istria, the coast strip and islands of Dalmatia, and the naval base of Avlona. Of these

Dalmatia is the weakest. Foreign in population and indisputably foreign in location and strategic and economic dependence, its transfer to Italy could be contemplated only as a part of the program of complete Austrian dismemberment, and even so would be hazardous and unnatural in the extreme. The defeat of Italy in the north is not too dearly paid if it has saved Europe,—as it seems to have done,—from this unnatural bargain, a bargain to which the Allies undoubtedly gave their consent purely and simply because of their desperate need and because Italy would not take the risks of war for a less price. No friend of Italy can fail to share her extreme solicitude for the danger that ever menaces her from this sinister coast, but equally, no thoughtful friend can fail to recognize the risk attending this too ambitious solution of the age long problem.

The case of Avlona is wholly different. That, as has been explained, is purely an isolated naval base, used only by the fleet, and approached only from the sea. There is as little temptation to expand such a possession as there is to expand Gibraltar. The position is of all those available for the purpose, the one nearest to Italy and the one best adapted to her purpose. It completely commands the entrance to the Adriatic, subject only to the check of other like bases,—Cattaro, Corfu, or Durazzo,—which may be held by other powers. There is but one excuse for Italy's possession of such a post, namely her lack of a suitable base on her own coast. That excuse is apparently sufficient. It is further to be noted that Avlona is not a part of Slavic territory, but of Albania, a district almost certainly incapable of nationality, its population being divided in language, religion and sympathies and predatory in the extreme. With the inevitable division of Albania, Italy may occupy Avlona without injury or risk to Serbia.

There remains the district of Trieste-Istria, more or less.

Here, as we have seen, the fact of Italian race, that is, Italian speech,—for the basic blood is probably Slavic,—makes its strong appeal. The Italian people, little moved by considerations of national function, see in this fact of language a sufficient reason for the union of this district to the Italian kingdom. Whether the inhabitants of the district share this desire is not easy to determine. There can be no doubt that they are strongly attached to their language and desire to retain their Italian character, and it is quite possible that they see in such a union the natural if not the only means of doing so. So much may undoubtedly be conceded for that portion of both populations which lives its life comparatively unthinkingly as regards the larger problems of the national destiny.

But it can hardly be doubted that the few who are more immediately concerned with these larger interests are aware of other factors which seriously complicate the problem. Trieste is a splendid harbor, just such a one as Italy would wish to possess, but it could not under any possible arrangement, be made to serve Italian purposes. Even if Italy's maximum purpose should be realized and Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia should be annexed, scarcely a square mile of Italian territory would be served by Trieste. On the other hand, Trieste is the only harbor which serves the great Austrian hinterland, and as such, Austria's sole communication with the sea. It is true that Dalmatia is Austrian territory and that it has numerous minor harbors, but Dalmatia is a detached coastal strip completely separated from Austria proper. Moreover, the mountainous character of this coast gives these harbors no satisfactory access to the regions farther inland. Dalmatia is essentially a detached interest, enormously valuable to Austria as a defensive outpost, but commercially capable only of serving itself. For serious access to the sea both Austria and Hungary are limited to a single port.

Trieste is the terminus of the great railroad line leading to Vienna, while Fiume, just across the narrow neck of the Istrian Peninsula, serves as the unique outlet for the great plain of Hungary. If Trieste were annexed to Italy, therefore, Italy could not use it and Austria would have to use it. In its actual function, Trieste will remain Austrian, no matter what flag may fly over her harbor. It is most unfortunate to have political arrangements thus squarely at odds with economic function. It is true that Austrian rule over people of Italian speech has produced friction, but that is due primarily to a suspicious and repressive policy on the part of Austria, motived, no doubt, by fear of this same annexationist movement. Indeed this fear and this policy have gone far to create the danger which Austrians dread. There are Italian writers who claim that irredentism is an Austrian invention. The policy of Austria in 1866 was conspicuously unfair to Italy, and the consciousness that Italians so regarded it, has made Austria fearful of the Italian attitude everywhere. A repressive policy on her part toward Italian speech and national aspirations generally was the natural but unfortunate result. If instead of this, Austria had adopted a policy like that of France in Alsace, it seems not improbable that the Italians in this small and practically detached district would have contentedly accepted her rule, as the Alsatians accepted that of France, the reason for race separation being much more obvious in the former case than in the latter. There is reason to believe that the changes which this war will effect in Austria, undoubtedly the most considerable which will be anywhere effected, will quite change the conditions of Austrian rule. In any case, this is one of the clearest cases in which other than race considerations are the paramount interest. The proposal that Trieste be given to Italy to be held as a toll gate on Austria's main route to the sea merely because three quarters of her

people speak the Italian language, is not one to be seriously entertained.

Italy, too, has her colonial problems. She is deeply interested in the possible dismemberment of Turkey and is an eager claimant for a share in the spoils. In 1911, as a result of her seizure of Tripoli, she found herself in an inconclusive war with that power whom she could not force to make a peace recognizing her occupation of Tripoli. Debarred by the powers from attacking Turkish possessions on the Adriatic coast, she finally seized a group of islands,—the so-called Dodecanese,—to bring Turkey to terms. Still Turkey refused, and the occupation was continued until the inevitable popular sentiment made withdrawal difficult. The peace which ultimately followed provided for a farther,—though still provisional,—occupation of the islands, but the ensuing Balkan wars prevented Turkey from complying with the conditions stipulated for their restitution. Thus temporary occupancy hardened into permanency, a typical case of the way such things go. Now Italy wishes to be confirmed in the possession of the islands, a very strategic group, and also to be assigned a territory on the mainland adjacent. The feasibility of such an assignment naturally depends on the settlement of the Turkish problem to be discussed elsewhere. It involves the most vital questions of European policy and the policing of the world's trade routes in the interest of peace. But the question of Italy's interests is a different matter. It is impossible for a disinterested outsider to avoid misgivings as to the results of such ventures on the part of a country inherently poor,—for no country without iron and coal can ever be largely populous or rich,—and a country already burdened with heavy responsibilities of this kind. Italy already has Tripoli and Eritrea. The proper administration of dependencies is not a money making thing. Their development implies large investments of capital. Italy had

little disposable capital before the war, and she will have less after it. There is grave danger that her colonies will become starveling affairs, or that the necessities of the administrator will draw her into a policy of predatory exploitation such as has clouded the memory of Spain and blighted the lands committed to her keeping. Trusteeship is something that Italy can not afford, and predatory exploitation is something that the world can not afford. Italy may well be cautious.

These considerations apply with even greater force to the project, also endorsed by the Allies in their hour of need, that in the event that the German colonies were acquired by the Allies, Italy should also receive additional African territory. It is to be hoped, in the interest of Italy herself, that this promise, like that regarding Trieste and Dalmatia, will lapse with changed conditions. The trusteeship of backward races is a stern necessity,—not a privilege to be grasped at. Eagerness to acquire under such circumstances implies a false conception of the relation involved.

CHAPTER XIV

AUSTRIA

THIS term,—here briefly used for the Austro-Hungarian Empire,—undoubtedly covers the most serious problems of the war and of the modern political world. It was in the necessities of this strangely assorted group that the war originated, and it is here that are to be encountered the most stubborn difficulties in the way of settlement. The Austrian Empire sets every precept of political experience at defiance. It is not based on unity of race, or on the supremacy of a dominant race. It was formed by outside pressure, continued by fraud, and is maintained by balanced antipathies. It has been described as “a political abortion, the petrified residuum of a confusion of Babylonian languages.” Yet it is one of the most dangerous of all governments to meddle with, because the antagonisms which characterize it inhere, not in the government, but in the elements of which the nation is composed. Few suggestions are more popular for the forthcoming political reconstruction of Europe than that of abolishing this incongruous combination. It is not always remembered that to abolish the combination might not remove the incongruity.


The main features of this combination are familiar. The Empire consists of two essentially independent states which are united only in their sovereign and in what amounts to a defensive league against other powers. They have their army and their representatives with foreign powers together, but are otherwise as independent as any other nations. Each of these partner nations consists of a number of distinct races, most of them having historic or racial affinities with

outside peoples. These racial units in some cases lie partly in Austria and partly in Hungary. Finally, some of these races, notably the Germans and the Magyars, have thrown out colonies which lie like scattered islands in the territory of the other races. There is of course the usual number of foot-loose individuals who have scattered themselves throughout the whole empire.

Of these various races, the Germans, Bohemians, Moravians, Italians, Galicians, Slovenes and Dalmatians are under the sway of Austria. They lie, in the most awkward imaginable arrangement, like a wide open lobster's claw, the big and little fingers enclosing the more compact Hungary which includes in its turn the Magyars, Slovaks, Rumanians, Slavonians, and Croats. Attached to both these countries but not belonging to either are Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are administered by a special bureau under the war department. Certain peculiarities of the various units must be noted in connection with their aspirations and the proposals made with regard to them. For we are confronted with the momentous proposal, a proposal already far advanced toward accomplishment, that this historic empire, so long one of the pillars of the political structure of Europe and ruled by the oldest European dynasty, is to be dissolved. Such a dissolution would of course only liberate forces long held in uneasy equilibrium, forces which must necessarily react in new and unknown ways upon the equilibrium of nations and perhaps in turn form new combinations. It is of the utmost importance that we understand the nature of the forces thus liberated and that we forecast, so far as possible, their several reactions.

The two chief elements in the dual empire and the nuclei of their respective groups, are the Germans and the Magyars. There are about ten millions of each and both are situated in the valley of the Danube. The Germans are located in





a compact mass in the western or upper Danube valley, with a comparatively narrow southwestward extension in the Alps,—the Tyrol. It is important to note, however, that they are solidly united along their whole western and northwestern front to the Germans of Germany from whom they are but accidentally and artificially separated. This territorial unity with the larger German body is the all important fact. The founders of the German Empire did not wish to include the Austrians, both because of their ancient pretensions to leadership which militated against the supremacy of Prussia, and because Germany hoped, through their ascendancy in the Austrian combination, to bring the whole motley group under her control, a very shrewd and successful calculation. But if the dual empire is dismembered and the Austrian Germans are thrown on their own resources, they could not do otherwise than join their kinsmen. This union is everywhere recognized as inevitable and one to which the Allies could not consistently take exception. While consistency is not quite inevitable in international action there can be no doubt that in this case the union would take place without protest. This would extend German territory from the Baltic to the Adriatic and give to Germany her much coveted base on the southern sea, for no thin screen of Italian littoral would hold back such a power from so necessary and natural a consummation. The possible consequences of such an extension of German territory will be reserved for later consideration. It is sufficient now to note the fact.


It is farther to be noted that the Germans have their islands of settlement more widely scattered through the Empire than those of any other race,—some of them extending even beyond the eastern border to the vicinity of Odessa. The significance of these settlements should not be overlooked when they become centers, not of Austrian, but of imperial

German influence. Finally it should be added that the German unattached man of business is more ubiquitous and correspondingly more influential than any other.

The Magyars are located compactly almost in the center of the empire, though a very large island of Magyar population is situated right in the elbow of Rumania where it is entirely surrounded by Rumanians, and other smaller settlements are scattered throughout Transylvania. Unlike the Germans, the Magyars have no racial kin in Europe except the Turks from whom they have become widely differentiated and who can give them no backing. The proposed dismemberment would leave the Magyars an inland nation of about ten million inhabitants. Despite the utmost deference to ethnic considerations, the population would still be sadly mixed. Numerous German communities are scattered through the territory, while a large Magyar population would be excluded from it, a constant incitement to eastward expansion across a wholly arbitrary frontier and at the expense of a woefully mixed population. The only natural frontier would be the Carpathians on the north, and even to attain this inevitable barrier, it would be necessary to include a considerable area of Russian population¹ with consequent temptation to Russian irredentism. The Magyars could hardly feel that the lines had fallen unto them in pleasant places.

To the north of the German Austrians and the Magyars are three bodies of Slavs, the Czechs or Bohemians, the Moravians, and the Slovaks. The first two are under Austrian and the third under Hungarian rule. Altogether they number slightly more than eight millions. The distinction between these groups is historical rather than racial, but not the less considerable for purposes of practical coöperation. Nevertheless they seem able to act together at least for pur-

¹ The so-called Ruthenians, a name adopted by Austria to conceal the fact that these people really belonged in the Empire of the Czar.





poses of opposition, and the recent extraordinary achievements of their troops in Russia has given the combination an unexpected interest in the eyes of the world. For military purposes they have already been recognized as an independent national unit, a recognition which seems to prefigure their later recognition as a nation. This has long been the aspiration of the Bohemians who constitute about one half their number. The union of the three elements for political purposes seems to be recent, and the program of the others, especially of the Slovaks, is probably less matured. Of all the subject nationalities of the dual empire none are so likely to insist upon independence and none so likely to attain it as this group. It is therefore most important to consider the difficulties and the possibilities of the proposed arrangement.


First, the territory, no matter how carefully delimited, would still have a mixed population. A large part of historic Bohemia, for instance, the part devastated during the Thirty Years' War, was resettled by Germans and is now German in population. It is all but certain, however, that the Bohemians would insist upon having this territory on historic grounds,¹ and since the alternative would be to give it to Germany, we may assume that the Allies at the present juncture would acquiesce in their demand, the more so as the whole territory has long been accustomed under Austrian rule to a unit administration. This is merely one of the numerous limitations which are forced upon the ethnic principle the moment we begin to make a practical application of it. Yet it is a very serious limitation, for it insures the perpetuation of the race struggle between Czechs and Germans, a struggle which has been characterized by a bitterness

¹ As this goes to press it is reported that the Bohemians (doubtless German Bohemians) have asked Germany to take over this German territory. Another report says that the new Bohemian government offers food to Austria on condition that this territory is guaranteed to Bohemia.

and a purely provocative obstructiveness unparalleled in parliamentary annals. The only difference would be that the Germans would now be the under dog and the Czechs would now avenge themselves for centuries of real or fancied oppression. It is easy to understand how the cry of these Germans would go across the border, and how willingly, in certain eventualities, the big brother would lend a listening ear. It is to be noted further that large German settlements nearly cut the Slovak territory in two, and other settlements are sandwiched in between Bohemia and Moravia. In addition there is a large percentage of German population in the districts accounted Bohemian and Moravian. The prospect is not bright for a happy family in the new Czechoslovak state.

Turning now to the internal character of the country, we again face troublesome conditions. Bohemia is largely industrial, more than half the industries of the Empire being located within this territory. The Slovaks, on the other hand, are an agricultural people. There is in every country,—as notably in our own,—a tendency to jealousy between industrial and agricultural districts. When it is remembered that the connection between the Czechs and the Slovaks is recent and untried and that most of the industries of Bohemia are owned by Germans, it is safe to predict that the course of true love will not run smooth between these newlyweds.

If we turn to the territorial arrangement, it will be at once apparent that it is very little suited to purposes of defense or administrative convenience. It is long, straggling, and irregular. Its frontier, enormous in extent and for the most part based on no commanding natural features, would be the despair of a strategist. Bohemia and Moravia constitute a sort of peninsula thrust into German territory, one of the most isolated racial habitats in the world. Once




the Germans are united and in possession of their entire racial habitat, this peninsula could be pinched off by an easy drive across the narrow neck. International guaranties will be invoked to prevent this and to guarantee the integrity of the exposed nation. Conceding the efficacy of this guaranty, it may still be doubted whether territorial integrity would secure independence. To control a state so situated, Germany would not need to occupy the border fortresses. Her railroads with their constant economic argument, would give her every facility. It is precisely in this way that Prussia controls certain minor German states in imperial questions, they being unable to vote against her on account of their situation and economic dependence. The necessity for access to the sea which could only be secured on Germany's terms, would assure that domination in the present case, no matter what the agreements or the guaranties of the nations.

Still to the north and stretching farther east lies Galicia or Austrian Poland. Most of the southern boundary is marked by the mighty range of the Carpathians, though annoyingly enough, this happens not to be the true ethnic boundary. The dominant race of eastern Galicia has crossed the Carpathians and occupied a considerable territory on the southern slope. This territory, under the present partnership arrangement, is very properly assigned to Hungary, while Galicia historically limited by the Carpathians, belongs to Austria. There can be no question that, if we are to dismember the Empire, the Carpathians must continue to be the line of division, the overflow of the northern race being left to take the consequences of its venturesome trespass.

Since Galicia once belonged to Poland, the easy popular disposition of it is to restore it to a reconstituted Poland. But this is a superficial proposal and one quite inconsistent with the ethnic principle. About two thirds of Galicia is

Russian in race and in certain of its historic antecedents. If race is to be the criterion, this part of Galicia should be restored to Russia, a proceeding which may have its embarrassments at the present juncture. This problem need not detain us, however, at present. It is sufficient to recognize that the natural disposition of this fragment would be to restore it to its northern kinsmen, whoever they may be. That, the Galicians may perhaps be left to determine, though this is a case where even their choice may not insure harmony. Curiously enough, the Galicians are reputed to be comparatively content with their present allegiance. The Austrians, themselves in minority in Austria, have needed the support of some other race element to insure their control, and it has usually been their policy to win the Galicians by special concessions. Hence the almost unique phenomenon in this part of the world of a comparatively contented people. This content is of course only relative.

To the east of the Magyars lies the much more extended domain of the Rumanians. The Rumanian problem is ethnically the simplest of all the problems of the Balkans, yet even so it presents almost insoluble difficulties. The key to its solution is found in the fact that an independent Rumanian kingdom already exists. This, however, includes less than half the Rumanian area. To the east of independent Rumania lies Bessarabia, a well defined area between the Pruth and Dniester rivers. This is solidly Rumanian in population except in the coastal region where a patchwork of German, Bulgarian, Turkish, Russian, and Rumanian settlements are an effectual bar to any ethnic claim. The claim of Rumania to this coastal strip, however, is as good as any other, and since it necessarily goes with the hinterland of Bessarabia to which her ethnic claim is indisputable, there can be no ground for hesitation. The only excuse for Russian occupation has been the great plan of Russian ad-



vance to Constantinople, a plan which if realized along this route would wipe out Rumania altogether. It was perhaps to Russia's interest to keep Rumania small and weak, but such interests will hardly prevail under present conditions. The annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania, though effected in the first instance by Germany and for her own ends, is perhaps the most obvious and feasible act of ethnic justice which this region permits. It is a recognition of race unity and at the same time it is opposed by no other consideration. Rivers are not ideal boundaries, but the Dniester is as good as the Pruth. Bessarabia is not vital to Russia in any sense. It includes no great city, no necessary seaport, no important trade route. Its transfer would break no fond ties, interrupt no long standing tradition. It is one of the few one-sided questions.

To the west of Rumania and in the angle of its bent contour lies Transylvania, now a part of the Magyar kingdom. A very large area is here predominantly Rumanian, an area nearly as large as that occupied by the Magyars themselves. It is upon this that the Rumanians have especially set their heart, and this that would undoubtedly fall to their lot in the event of the dismemberment of the Dual Empire. The addition of this large tract would not only greatly extend the Rumanian domain and unite the Rumanian race, but it would round out the country very handsomely, giving it a compact form, a splendid river waterway, and a very satisfactory sea coast.

But closer examination discloses serious obstacles in the way of this attractive plan. The first of these obstacles is political. Transylvania is united to Rumania by race, but not by political tradition. This is a superficial fact, but one often more potent at a given moment than the more permanent facts of nature. It is difficult to know what the aspirations of the Transylvanians are, but it is safe to

assume that in case of internal strain, there would be a tendency to cleavage along this line.

This tendency would be accentuated by the physical features which here assume such immense importance as seriously to offset if not altogether to outweigh the claims of race. Sweeping around the deeply indented curve which marks the present western boundary of Rumania runs the great chain of the Carpathian Mountains, one of the most considerable as well as one of the best defined natural boundaries in Europe. This divides Transylvania from Rumania proper in a way that no political union can ever efface. Not that this is a bar to political union, but it is an obstacle, and one which, in a complex of conflicting forces, may assume large importance.

On the other hand, Rumania by this extension would acquire a perfectly arbitrary western border with no natural defenses whatever. So lacking is this ethnic frontier in natural feature and so vague in its own nature,—for language areas fade into each other unless separated by very pronounced barriers,—that when the recent Rumanian campaign was decided upon with the avowed purpose of annexing Transylvania, it was announced that the River Theiss was the Rumanian objective, this being the first natural feature which it was feasible to recognize as a national boundary. But such a boundary would give nearly a third of the Magyar territory to Rumania and would repeat within her borders the race feuds which have made the dismemberment of Austria seem necessary. The only difference would be that while the Magyars have hitherto oppressed the Rumanians, the Rumanians could now oppress the Magyars. It is of course possible that the controlling powers would not sanction these extreme ambitions of Rumania and would restrict her to the true ethnic limits, but in that case the limitation of a completely artificial frontier would be inevitable.

Restricted within these narrower but still unnatural limits, the ethnic problem becomes simpler, but it is still embarrassing. Unlike the hinterland of Bessarabia, Transylvania is not solidly Rumanian in population. There are numerous islands of Magyar and German dotted all over it. Worst of all, there is in the angle of the Carpathians and thus in the very center of the Rumanian oval, a very large district which is decisively Magyar. The completed Rumania, therefore, is shaped much like a doughnut with the hole full of Magyars. It would be difficult to imagine a worse situation. The small scattered settlements of Germans or Magyars might be gradually assimilated in a country otherwise Rumanian, but so large a district as this will almost of necessity persist, compelling recognition of its language in schools, courts, and administration, and bringing its inevitable feuds. The fact, too, that the kingdom of the Magyars on the west is but a hundred and fifty miles away, and that traditions of Magyar supremacy many centuries old would make the Rumanian yoke doubly onerous, would provide almost ideal conditions for political restiveness and instability. Only the most extraordinary race tolerance, a tolerance to which not one of these races has approximated as yet, could prevent the re-emergence of all the traditional Balkan troubles.

The Dobrudja is a coastal strip lying between the lower Danube and the sea. Its population is extremely mixed,—Russians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Turks,—but with Rumanians fairly in the ascendant, especially in the north. But even were the Rumanian ascendancy less assured, it would be preposterous to assign it to any other power. It gives Rumania her only sea coast, while it would give to Bulgaria,—the other possible claimant,—nothing, except the power to injure Rumania. Nothing more absurd has emanated from war passions than the suggestion emanating from German sources, that the whole of the Dobrudja be given to Bul-

garia. But while the allegiance of the Dobrudja is not open to question, its southern limit which is necessarily arbitrary, is not so easily settled. As the result of Rumania's bloodless intervention in the second Balkan war, the boundary was moved some distance to the south. The district thus annexed has virtually no Rumanian population, while the Bulgarian population is considerable. So far as the writer is aware, no important strategic advantage was secured. At this distance it looks very much like one of those impulsive and unthinking assertions of race cupidity which it is the function of race breeding to restrain. If Rumania loses this ill gotten gain in the redrawing of the map of Europe, she need not be an object of commiseration. To the north of Rumania, wedged in between her notched northern border and Galicia is the little crown land of Bukowina. The southern portion,—about enough to fill the notch,—is Rumanian in population, the remainder Russian. A reapportionment would certainly give the Rumanian portion to Rumania. It is possible that political tradition, natural features, or other consideration would dictate the transfer entire. It can not be too strongly insisted that mere race,—that is, speech,—in this Babel of the world, is not a sufficient criterion for our purpose. These people care often more for their church than for their language, and then again, more for their political tradition than for either. It is of interest to indicate ethnic arguments, but altogether inadmissible to dogmatically assert their complete validity. It is equally preposterous to assume that the people themselves can solve these world problems by an expression of preference based on provincial prejudice and local faction. The settlement should be based on the fullest deference to their interests and on a very considerable deference to their present preferences, but there are times when their preferences may well be sacrificed to their interests, and their interests to the interests of humanity.

It should perhaps be added that the Rumanian habitat extends across the Danube into the northeastern corner of Serbia, and small Rumanian settlements are also found south of the Danube in Bulgarian territory. It would be the height of unwise to include any of these in a Rumanian kingdom. There is even a considerable Rumanian district in northern Greece, hundreds of miles from the home of the race. These people plainly have no alternative but to accept the consequences of their adventurous migration.

In conclusion, the Rumanian kingdom should undoubtedly be extended by the inclusion of Bessarabia. If the Austro-Hungarian Empire is to be dissolved, it must plainly be extended to include Transylvania also, not, however, as far as the river Theiss. Bad as this arbitrary boundary of the larger Rumania would be, it would certainly be preferable, in a readjustment based ostensibly on race, to an arrangement which outraged Magyar unity and guaranteed the perpetuation of race conflicts. But at the best the greater Rumania would be an uneasy state and a sorry compromise. It would have nothing of the homogeneity of the mature nations of western Europe, not even the homogeneity which the smaller Rumania possesses, nor would it have a territory in which that homogeneity could be easily achieved.

To the southwest of the countries we have considered and with a long frontage on the Adriatic, lies the territory of the group of peoples known as Jugo¹ Slavs. This is again a territory lying partly within and partly without the Empire. Outside are Serbia and Montenegro; inside are Slavonia and Croatia which belong to Hungary, Dalmatia which belongs to Austria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina which belong to both. Adjoining this territory on the northwest is the small mountainous country of the Slovenes occupying a very strategic


¹ Jugo is a Slavic word meaning southern. It is pronounced *Yugo* and is sometimes so written for the benefit of those who are accustomed only to the English sound of J.

site at the head of the Adriatic, for it is in the country of the Slovenes that the important little Italian district of Trieste is located. It is also the Slovenes who confront the Italians on the Isonzo border. It is very doubtful whether the Slovenes will be grouped with the Jugo Slavs in the forthcoming settlement, not so much because of their racial distinctness, which is considerable, but because of their location which will almost necessitate a separate destination. We will therefore omit them from the group for the present.

As thus limited, the territory of the Jugo Slavs presents the most compact, unified, and workable unity in all this region. It has a remarkably unified population except along the edges where, of course, something of the inevitable racial mixture is found. It has few of the islands of foreign population scattered about, such as are so perplexingly common in Magyar and Rumanian territory. It has an extensive sea coast suitable for both commerce and defense. The proposal to combine this territory into a single independent kingdom, considerable enough in territory, population, and resources to be self-respecting and self-supporting, is an exceedingly attractive proposition.

But again, closer inspection somewhat dampens our enthusiasm. Down in this part of the world race takes on a new character. It is no longer primarily a question of language. Religion is the all important consideration. And religion is not a matter of spiritual experience nor yet of theological belief, but of allegiance to an ecclesiastical organization. These organizations are not merely state churches in our western sense of the word, but as the result of peculiarities in the former Turkish administration they acquired and in a measure still retain an altogether extraordinary political importance. So important is this factor that when Bulgaria found herself in competition with Serbia and Greece in the attempt to win the Macedonians, she found it impossible to





do so while she recognized the same church authority. The Macedonians could not understand what it meant to join the Bulgarian cause unless there was a Bulgarian church. So Bulgaria renounced the authority of the venerable Patriarch of Constantinople and appointed an Exarch as the head of her own church. It was now possible to win Macedonians to her cause because there was something tangible to lay hold of. Serbia and Greece were not bold enough to take so daring a step, and so they lost out in the propaganda which eventually made Macedonia predominantly Bulgarian. One curious result, however, was often manifest, where two brothers would announce themselves to the census taker, the one as Bulgarian and the other as Serbian or Greek, the fact being that one had recognized the authority of the Bulgarian Exarch, and the other retained the old allegiance.

We have gone somewhat afield for our illustration, but the conditions are essentially those with which we have to deal. Religion is everywhere in the Balkans, and for that matter, throughout the whole Austro-Hungarian domain, the essential basis of nationality. The Macedonian peasant hardly feels it more than the Austrian or Hungarian nobility. The question of Jugo Slav unity therefore resolves itself very largely into a question of religious unity. This unity is unfortunately conspicuously lacking. The Croats, Slavonians, and Dalmatians are Catholics, the Serbians and Montenegrins Orthodox (Greek church), and the Bosnians, strange to relate, are largely Mohammedan and reactionary Mohammedans at that. It was they who fought the sincere attempts of Turkey at political reform in the early part of the nineteenth century. It would be difficult to get more irreconcilable groups. Of course our American suggestion is at once that we found the new state on a basis of religious tolerance, and such a law would undoubtedly be passed. But there is not the least likelihood that real tolerance would result. Such laws exist

in both Austria and Hungary, but they are notoriously and ostentatiously violated, even officially. Yet the Catholic element which rules in Austro-Hungary is undoubtedly the most liberal and tolerant of the three. To propose tolerance to these people is like proposing free love to us. It was this difference of religion quite as much as anything that made Serbia absolutely deaf to all the wooings of Austria. It was this that compelled Austria to employ two hundred thousand men for three years to bring Bosnia under her administrative control when it was assigned to her by the powers. It was religion which led to the murder of Archduke Ferdinand by one of his Bosnian subjects. Curiously enough, this prospective emperor was strongly Slavophile. He was committed to the policy,—detested by Germans and Magyars alike,—of reconstituting the Empire on the basis of a triple partnership instead of a dual partnership as at present, the Slavs being the third partner. Yet it was a Slav who shot him. The reason was that with all his liberality toward the Slavs, Ferdinand was a staunch Catholic, uncompromisingly committed to the maintenance of the Catholic unity of the Empire. His murderer was an Orthodox Slav, to whom Slavic influence in the Empire was as nothing to the maintenance of the Orthodox church. The Mohammedans will hardly prove more concessive. When it is recalled that this local tenacity will be backed up by all the millions of their fellow believers, the prospects for assimilation or tolerance are not flattering. One can imagine how the Roman *Propaganda Fide* would bestir itself if there were any chance of the Croats and Dalmatians going over to the Orthodox faith. Would the millions of Orthodox Russia do less if they saw a like menace to the faith of the Serbians and Montenegrins? It is possible that all these difficulties may be overcome, but the problem is not one of language or blood.

A seemingly trivial incident of this religious difference

has after all serious consequences. The Catholic countries use the Roman alphabet while the Orthodox countries use the much superior Cyrillic alphabet which is in use by the Russians. While it is a comparatively easy task to learn both alphabets, practically very few do so, and religious prejudice increases the difficulty. We are therefore confronted with the curious fact that peoples that speak the same language cannot read each other's books and newspapers. A more perfect device for perpetuating provincialism could scarcely be devised.¹

Leaving the Slovenes for the time being alone,—though they cannot possibly remain alone,—let us now take a wider look over the group of nations thus reconstituted. We have at the north an almost impossible Czecho-Slovakia (we will call it Bohemia for short), a small Hungary wholly inland, a large but uneasy Rumania, and a well situated but poorly united Jugo-Slavia. In addition we have extended Germany and brought her down to the Adriatic, and have given to Poland or Russia, one or both, territories which bring them to the Carpathians. What are the prospects for harmony within this group?

The one power that has most conspicuously gained is Germany, for the extension of her territory through to the southern sea is of immense significance. But in reality Germany would have lost, for she would be getting the small territory of German Austria in exchange for the whole Austrian Empire which she had brought into close alliance and which, by the recently concluded agreement between the two emperors she had virtually annexed. Doubtless German Austria would be more dependable than the larger and less sympathetic

¹ It is but fair to note that these peoples, meeting in representative convention in Corfu, have frankly recognized the difficulties here noted and have notwithstanding reached the conclusion that a working union is possible. This augurs well for the success of the attempt, though it can hardly be said to guarantee it.

combination,— though such an addition to the South Germans would justly give Prussia some cause for anxiety,— but most if not all the new states formed would at present be anti-German and would oppose stout resistance to a German advance in this direction. This, indeed, is the very purpose of the proposed dismemberment, the only purpose that can justify Allied intervention in the affairs of the Empire. Germany will not willingly accept such a situation. Yet it is by no means clear that she would lose or that we would gain by it. Germany could count on her Austrians absolutely, but could we count on these raw new states to resist her blandishments and ward off her intrigues? With the example of Bulgaria before us, it is hard to feel confident in their unchanging loyalty to this or any other cause. And when we recall the German settlements scattered through these states all the way from Vienna to Odessa, and the farther fact of race dissensions which afford so admirable an opportunity for Germany to breach the phalanx, we have still occasion for misgivings about the reconstituted Balkans.

Two of the states thus formed would have no access to the sea. This is simply indispensable for a modern nation. Hungary could, and probably would, be accommodated through the country of the Slovenes, though Croatia would have to give up a little of her territory if Hungary is to retain her present port of Fiume, the only one available for her purpose. The bulk of the Slovenes, however, would go to Germany as a condition of her having access to the Adriatic, an irreducible minimum. If this is not given her, she will take it, or will keep the world on the anxious seat by her obvious intention to do so.

But Bohemia could not be accommodated in this essential matter by any accession of territory. Her path to the sea must always be across German territory, the dismemberment of which by a Bohemian strip is too outrageous a violation of

ethnic proprieties to be discussed. For this indispensable condition of modern life an independent Bohemia would always be dependent upon Germany, the relation which now irks her.

Rumania would be a large and well situated, but physically divided, ill-guarded, and heterogeneous state. Of the lesser states thus formed, Rumania would be the largest, the best equipped, and the most workable. She would have no irksome dependence and no extraordinary needs. Her difficulties would be internal, but these considerable.

The same would be true in ever greater degree of Jugoslavia or greater Serbia. Her position would be excellent and her access to the sea ample,— much better than that of Rumania. Her troubles would come from within. Nature speaks strongly for this combination,— more than for that of greater Rumania, but man demurs. Not much can be done till man consents, but in such a case we need not hesitate to pay our respects to nature rather than to man.

A liberated Austria would not make a happy family. Independent governments do not make independent peoples. Bohemia mistakes the nature of the bonds which gall her. The antagonisms, the conflicts of interest, and the relations of dependence that are so conspicuous within the Austrian Empire, would mostly be there if there were no empire,— would mostly be there and some beside. There must be something to coördinate these jarring elements, at least to the point of livableness. To the Hapsburgs falls the unlovely task. When the din becomes intolerable and the public service waits, and the Parliament becomes a babel, and the Czechs refuse to speak or to hear the German that all know, and insist on speaking the Bohemian that nobody else understands, and chaos ends in deadlock, then Hapsburg speaks, the ruler of a thousand years, and people in all the troubled realm draw a sigh of relief and say: “Thank God, we have

an Emperor to save us from ourselves." Nowhere is monarchy so unlovely, because nowhere has it so unlovely a task. The monarchy may be abolished, but not the task.

The writer doubts the feasibility of a complete dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Autonomy based on national, that is, approximately racial, units is obviously desirable, though even that will prove difficult in almost every unit for the various reasons above detailed. But complete independence, followed as it inevitably would be, by tariff barriers and all manner of commercial and industrial handicap, with oppressive treatment of minority elements and echoes across the border, would cripple the development of all these peoples and ruin some of those most eager for the experiment. The crude and unsatisfactory union of these peoples which history has bequeathed to us is better, far better, than disunion. Its bonds, which are so largely nature's bonds, are less galling than would be those same bonds under mere imputed freedom.

A much more reasonable alternative is federation, but even this as Americans conceive it, is of doubtful applicability. Such a federation would necessarily imply federal functions, federal organs, and federal authority. It is much to be feared that the states to be included in such a scheme have not yet learned the deference and the concessive spirit necessary to the success of federal action. We have seen something of obstruction in our own Congress, but it is as nothing to what is habitual in the Austrian Parliament. This Parliament (Austrian, not Austro-Hungarian) was reconstituted in 1907 on an absolutely democratic basis, election being by manhood suffrage. A man can vote for representative in Austria who could not vote in Massachusetts. The membership elected at that time was thoroughly representative of those classes and interests that are characteristic of our time. There was inexhaustible work for them to do, reforms long agitated and to

which they stood pledged. Yet when, after four years of session, they were prorogued, they had earned no gratitude and accomplished nothing. Race antagonisms dominated everything from the first. The Czechs would vote for nothing that the Germans wanted, and the Germans reciprocated. They would not even speak the hated language of their opponents. Each manoeuvred for the support of other race elements. When the present war began, Parliament was dismissed, not as a tyrannical muzzling of democracy, as we have too hastily assumed, but to suppress the interminable race struggle in the interest of public safety. It may be urged, and with much justice, that present race relations in Austria are unjust and that a juster arrangement would lessen these antipathies. Undoubtedly, and too much insistence can not be placed on the necessity for these juster arrangements. But it is a far cry from present conditions to successful federation. For after all no government can work that can not govern,—that can not break deadlocks and bring about decisions and secure acquiescence and get necessary things done. There are few groups of men that have reached the point where federation can be sure of accomplishing these necessary ends. Most democracies, so-called, have their autocrat in reserve to break the deadlock which they can create but can not undo,—an autocrat known, of course, by less opprobrious names. No place could be found among civilized men where federation would oftener require such a service than in Austria. Perhaps a better could be found than the Hapsburg, but scarcely another whose decisions would be so restrained and whose authority would be so enforced by the tradition of the centuries.

And here some one will suggest the Hague tribunal as the proper successor of the Hapsburg. It is difficult for the writer to suppress, or yet to express, the emotions with which he hears such a proposal. It betrays such an utter lack of

feeling for reality, such an unconsciousness of the forces that really sway the minds of men, such a disregard of the need of that daily, sympathetic, living touch with the conditions to be dealt with, that the very suggestion makes argument hopeless. The Hapsburg may be an autocrat, but his autocracy is beneficence itself compared with the autocracy of an alien absentee tribunal. The Hapsburg seems to us only an autocrat. He is in fact,—he must be,—and for many a long year has been, little else than a conciliator. To a knowledge which no be-lawyered tribunal could ever acquire, a knowledge which is less an acquisition than an inheritance, is joined a reverence and a love on the part of his people which no personal faults ever suffice to destroy or to make inoperative for the performance of his indispensable function.

The writer holds no brief for the Hapsburgs, but he has too much respect for the democracy which such procedure would violate, too much regard for the Hague Tribunal which such functions would imperil, and too much faith in liberty to which even Austria is entitled, to see hope in this destructive and reactionary proposal. The Hapsburg has a task for which he is responsible to his own people. There is another task for which he and they are responsible to the world, the maintenance of the world's peace and of justice toward other nations. For that he and they must be held,—are being held — to a stern accountability. Let us not confound the two tasks. We shall not help Bohemia as we shall not help Ireland, by recognizing a jurisdiction over their case which we can not helpfully exercise.

This brings us to the great transgression, the world's grievance against Austria. She made herself a bridge over which the great marauder crossed to Armageddon. The offense was grievous and grievous must be the expiation. That thing must stop forever. Hence all these proposals. If there were

no Austria, there could be no bridge. Nay, more. An independent Bohemia, an independent Rumania, an independent Serbia, all of them anti-German, would automatically block the way. But would they? Might not a helplessly dependent Bohemia barter her aid, wittingly or unwittingly, for the indispensable that only Germany could furnish? Is it so certain that a Serbia, rent with religious feuds, might not offer through faction the door through which so many a conqueror has marched to victory? Is it certain that Rumania with her Hohenzollern dynasty and her opportunist policy might not play the rôle of Bulgaria? It is a short-sighted statesmanship that sees hope in dissension and helplessness, rather than in union and slowly evolved adjustment. Much more surely the anti-German forces of the Austrian Empire will block German aggression if united than if separated and weak.

What then do we wish as Austria's pledge to keep the peace? First of all, we should demand liberty within the Empire. There is no sufficient reason why Austria,—vast complex that she is,—should be ruled by a German-Magyar partnership. Granting that these races are better qualified for the task than the others,—as they almost certainly are,—their rule is oppressive, repressive, and obsolete. In refusing autonomy to the other race elements, they have made that autonomy inevitable. That autonomy for the Rumanians and the Jugo-Slavs unfortunately can not be effected within the Empire. The war has made that impossible. It will be difficult in the extreme to effect it outside the Empire, yet in the measure of the possible the attempt must be made. Rumania must remain independent and must be extended to the Dniester. Whether the safe bulwark of the Carpathians should be abandoned for an arbitrary line and the Transylvanians and imprisoned Magyars included in free Rumania is not so clear. A satisfactory status for the Transylvanians

within the Empire would seem more practicable. But if they are still to be the serfs of the Magyars, then their union with Rumania is inevitable.

The Greater Serbia is again difficult but seemingly inevitable. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia are not vital to Austria unless as potential factors in national defense. They are vital to Serbia, and if a union can be effected with full consciousness of the delicacy of the religious problem and adequate provision for it, the combination is a natural and hopeful one. Since Austria has made their union within the Empire impossible, she may justly be asked to consent to their union outside it. But this union would not be an inclusive one. Slavonia and Croatia would still be within the Empire and in part at least must there remain. They give Hungary her only access to the sea, an access of which it would be folly to deprive her if we hope for enduring peace. Their religious union with the Empire and their doubtful friendship for the Orthodox Serbians would facilitate if it did not in itself necessitate this seemingly unnatural arrangement.

On the south, too, the union would be incomplete. The Montenegrins, always independent and holding a vitally strategic position, are said to be irreconcilable. No Greater Serbia for them, but the unrestricted freedom of their mountains. Their aloofness is certainly not in the interest of the larger human order, but it may prove unalterable.¹

The preposterous kingdom of Albania, based on no unity either of religion or speech or history, and created at the behest of the Central Powers for no other purpose than to give a pretext for intervention, should be abolished. The southern portion speaks Greek and should be annexed to Greece, as in effect it has been. Austria's former objection to this on

¹ Later reports are to the effect that their king consents to enter the union. His consent practically insures the consent of his people.

the ground that it would give Greece control of the Corfu channel and so of the Adriatic, may now be ignored. Italy's objection on similar grounds is now offset by her own occupation of Avlona. The northern portion can go nowhere else than to Greater Serbia.

Galicia, too, may perhaps reasonably go to her own if there is any own for her to go to,— and if she really wishes to go,— but there would be little objection to her willing continuance in the Empire. For Bohemia and her kindred there can be no better wish than partnership in the Empire. Nor need the Allies greatly trouble themselves to urge a reformation which at best would have come in the not distant future, and which the war must hasten unless our indiscretion interferes with the course of nature.

The Hapsburg autocracy will disappear as soon as Austria can dispense with autocracy. Meanwhile the accumulated prestige of a thousand years of service is a thing not lightly to be squandered. Much to be envied are they who, like the English people, know how gradually to emancipate themselves from autocracy, and yet preserve its prestige, its dignity, and its personal organ for the useful purposes of democracy. In Austria that transformation is exceptionally difficult, but it is possible and it has long been under way.

NOTE. As these pages go to press, the destruction of the Empire seems complete. The Czech Republic has acquired sufficient being to call a president from America, with what degree of popular warrant remains to be seen. Jugo-Slovia, too, has found a spokesman if not a popular voice, and begins its national life by showing its teeth to the Italians in Fiume, thus necessitating American intervention. German Austria looks toward Germany and Hungary is abandoned to solitude and uncongenial republican thoughts. There is nothing yet to prove that the Empire can be dispensed with,— nothing to prove, for that matter, that it has been dispensed with.

CHAPTER XV

TURKEY

THE problem of the Turkish Empire has been for a century the clearest and the most obscure in Europe,— the clearest in that there has long ceased to be any doubt as to the necessity of some sort of receivership for the helpless realm, and the most obscure in that it has seemed impossible to decide what that receivership should be. Turkey has borne a charmed life, protected by her very incompetency from the consequences which that incompetency entails. Time and again she has seemed about to pay the penalty of her inefficiency and her crimes, but each time she has escaped with trifling penalty, escaped to continue and even to exceed her former blunders and misdoings. Will she escape this time? The great settlement hardly involves a more important question. So long as Turkey is allowed to do that which is everywhere else forbidden and to omit that which is everywhere else required, there will be small chance of establishing in the world that better order and health for which we are sacrificing so much. Turkey festers in the world's flesh. Is the newer surgery able and ready to effect a cure?

It is no part of the writer's purpose to inveigh against the Turkish people as criminal and depraved. Still less does this charge lie against the individual Turk. All evidence points to the conclusion that he is a man of many virtues, patient, peaceable, hospitable, industrious, and kind, virtues invaluable in individual relations, but quite incapable of forming a state. Even in his organic capacity in which he is guilty of such incredible crimes as the Macedonian atrocities and the Armenian massacres, it is rather his helpless

incompetency than his criminal instincts with which we have to deal. The Armenian massacres have no such moral significance on the part of the Turk as they would have on the part of a competent western nation,—as they do have on the part of the nation that incited them. It is easy to extenuate the crimes of the Turk. But that does not in the least lessen the misery resulting from his deeds or the responsibility of the civilized world for their continuance. In a sense it increases it. If the Turk is irresponsible, the world becomes by so much more responsible for allowing him to exercise privileges with which he can not be trusted. Refraining, therefore, from moral denunciation, we have to note what it is in the Turkish Empire that is incompatible with modern civilization.

The Empire is based on religion. That religion asserts not only its own superiority but its own exclusive right. The unbeliever has no right to live. If allowed to do so, it is by the grace of the conqueror and on any terms that may seem good to him. Of *rights* there can be no question to a non-Moslem population. This is fundamentally at variance with the whole concept of the western world. The fact that the Turk has been, from the standpoint of this fundamental principle, an easy master, does not in the least change the principle. He has in fact pretty generally spared the conquered. He has first offered them the privilege of embracing Islam, in which case they at once become entitled to all the rights and privileges of the conquering race. This was a corollary of his principle, but it is not the less worthy of note that it made the Turk the most liberal of conquerors. As this privilege has remained open to the conquered, it has attracted certain subject peoples, not always from the highest motives, to the standard of Islam. The Albanians and the Bosnians are examples. But religious allegiance, nowhere more tenacious than in the Turkish east, has generally led to the rejection

of the conqueror's offer. In that case the conquered was allowed to live on condition that he paid an annual poll tax. He was not allowed to serve in the army, could have no arms, and was deprived of all civil rights. This was slavery in principle, though carelessly enforced for the most part. All such subjects were deprived of the benefits of Moslem law, but were assumed to have a religious law and a religious head of their own whom the Turkish government held responsible for their behaviour. The person not registered as belonging to one of these religions simply had no law, no political or civil status whatever, for the idea of a civil state and of statute law independent of religion, the Turk simply can not conceive.

This characteristic of Turkish rule is in a double sense a bar to progress. In the first place it denies in principle the argument of human rights as regards all non-Moslems. The plea that they should be elevated and developed falls flat in the face of this fundamental assumption. They are in essence disloyal. Their very lives are forfeit. What they possess is just so much more than they deserve. If they want more, let them join the faithful. The door is always open. Such reasoning seems very satisfactory to a Moslem.

In the second place, religious law is wholly unmodifiable in theory and largely unmodifiable in fact. Men did not make it, and how should men change it? Such is the argument. Slow change is always going on, to be sure, but this is smuggled in under the plea of returning to an earlier purity from which men have unconsciously dropped away, or it is itself challenged as a departure from the true standards. A religious state is therefore necessarily a conservative state. This is suitable for an early stage of political development in which stability rather than progress is the desideratum, but it is utterly out of harmony with modern requirements.

The second great characteristic of Turkish political organ-

ization is autocracy. This exists in its most unapologized form. The sultan is held amenable to the sacred law of the Koran, but to no other law whatever. The liberty claimed for him is somewhat startling to western ears. Thus, it is regarded as wholly inadmissible that he should be bound by his own plighted word, for this would destroy his freedom of action. Such autocracy is always limited, of course, by many prudential considerations, but the theory is none the less potent and incompatible with modern ideas.

The Moslem religion is military as is well known. In practice Christianity has been hardly less so, but the western civilization has unmistakably come to look upon war as an abnormal condition, a means of maintaining order. The Moslem assigns it a very different function, and his different conception beyond a doubt retards the realization of western peace ideals. The Turkish Empire was built by military organization, the most efficient in the world in its day. For three centuries it held the first place, yielding it only when the art of war was transformed by an alliance with a science and an industry of which the Turk was incapable. With the extermination of the terrible Janissaries in 1826 by a Sultan who had come to fear their power, Turkey lapsed into relative impotence as a military power until revived in modern days by German organizing genius. During this period of relative impotence Turkey has no doubt lost much of her martial spirit without thereby modifying in the least her fundamental militarist principles.

But it can not be too strongly insisted that abstract principles offer no sufficient basis of judgment in such cases. It is the soundest of Anglo-Saxon principles that we are to take no account of men's theories, little account even of men's words, and that we are to judge men simply by what they do or fail to do. It is here that the Turk fails most miserably to meet the test. In every part of his vast empire he found an

advanced civilization. In no part has he preserved that civilization, much less made advance upon it. The writer has traveled some thousands of miles in territories now or recently under the rule of the Turk. In every square mile of the territory thus visited there prevails a squalor inconceivable to a dweller in the western world. Evidences of the earlier civilization are pathetically abundant, but everything is ruinous and decaying. Great regions, some of them among the richest in the world, have lapsed into absolute wilderness through the neglect of irrigation, a necessity in a very large part of the Empire. Roman highways, bridges, and reservoirs are traceable only by scanty remains. Hillsides where the cut-stone wine presses attest the former presence of vineyards and intensive culture, are now overgrown with weeds, and goats browse where once was careful tillage. If the Turk did not do all the destroying, he at least has been unable to rebuild. The reason is perfectly simple. He came into this civilized land a conquering barbarian and made the land and its civilized peoples his servants. He could not and he would not do their work or learn their arts. Yet as slaves and servants to a selfish and unenlightened master, they could not maintain their arts and their appliances. The Turk has been good natured, tolerant, even indulgent, but these are not the qualities that develop a civilization.

The revolution of 1908 attempted to change the fundamental structure of the Empire and eliminate its vices. The power of the Sultan was limited by a constitution. Provision was made for the development of statute law. Races were made equal before the law and liable alike to military service. In short, Turkey was to become a modern state. But such things do not go thus easily. The impulse had come from without, and the old conditions remained within. Above all the new Turkey was officially Mohammedan, and *Mohammedanism* retained necessarily its old connotations.

It was with astonishment and intense indignation that Mohammedans were told in those first days of hectic modernism that they must surrender loot taken, in accordance with immemorial custom, from the patient unbelievers. What the outcome might have been under ideal conditions we can only guess. The conditions were not ideal. The war with Italy, the Balkan wars, and now the world war have swept away the feeble exotic and established the more normal military despotism with which we now have to deal. Never since the days of Othman has the government been more oppressive, its procedure more arbitrary, its autocracy more absolute. And to all this is now added the most appalling massacre in Turkish history.

The Armenian massacre reveals better than anything can well do the fundamental weakness of the Turkish government. We are shocked by its incredible brutality, but in fact it is incompetency rather than brutality which is its chief lesson. The Armenians occupied strategic ground. Their country is an elevated mountainous region sloping downward from the Caucasus to the plain of Asia Minor. Part of the Armenians had already passed under Russian rule. A Russian attack from this quarter was inevitable, and the presence of a disaffected people in this highland outpost on the route which the Russian must take was a very obvious danger. The German-trained dictators of Turkey, aided, no doubt, by the General Staff at Berlin, realized the necessity of taking precautions. A strong and efficient administrative organization could have taken precautions of a humane character. Turkey possessed no such organization. Hence it was agreed that the Armenians must be deported, a natural conclusion, however barbarous. But for this deportation Turkey was as incompetent as for anything else. She had no railroads, no commissariat, no shelters along the way. She had no place to deport these Armenians where they would not fall

into the hands of the enemy, except the desert region to the south and east. Without roads, without shelter, without supplies, and without time or means or skill to create any of these things, she yet had to accomplish the task which was imposed upon her by the conditions and by a merciless ally. Is it so surprising that she made short work of an impossible task by massacre?

This is not said to excuse Turkey but rather to condemn her. If there were no roads, shelters, or supplies, there should have been these things. If there was no administration in Armenia that could make deportation unnecessary, there should have been such an administration. Nay, more, there should have been such a rule that the Armenians, who have known no independence for two thousand years and have ceased to feel the need of it, would have guarded the frontier themselves. The condemning fact may not be Turkish malevolence, but the condemnation is not therefore the less complete.

If there is any moral animus to the Allied cause, there can be but one attitude toward Turkey. The rule of Mohammedans over non-Mohammedan peoples must cease. That rule is vicious in principle, for Mohammedanism is the negation of all rights on the part of non-Mohammedans. It is far more vicious in fact, for the Turk is mentally and culturally the inferior of the peoples he rules. Mohammedan rule in the Caliphate of Bagdad or Cordova was better than its creed. In Turkey it has no such amelioration. Nor does the monstrous character of Turkish rule end with the subject Christian. The Turk is the conqueror not only of Christian races, but of earlier and better Mohammedan powers. The Arab race, with which Mohammedanism began, has long been subject to a race which is a Mohammedan parvenu, a race alien in spirit to that with which Mohammedanism began and a *ruthless marauder* upon its domain. By the law of the Koran

only an Arab and a descendant of Mohammed can hold the position of Caliph. The Sultan, who is neither a descendant nor an Arab, has long held it by sheer right of conquest. The Arab is neither unmindful of these facts nor reconciled to them. Absolutely loyal to his religion, he is not loyal to his upstart barbarian master.

All this is familiar and has long made the dissolution of the Turkish Empire inevitable. Yet at every crisis when that dissolution seemed inevitable, insuperable obstacles have presented themselves. These have been, first, the immense importance of the several territories of the Empire, especially of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and the jealousy of the great powers regarding them; second, the fear of the great Mohammedan powers, England and France, as to the consequences to their populations of an attack on the one great Mohammedan state; and, third, the reluctance of the western nations to extinguish a fellow nation that did not directly threaten their own existence. This last was especially manifest when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Czar of Russia deliberately proposed to England and France that the three powers unite to dismember Turkey, "the sick man of the East," and appropriate his territories. No doubt England and France had misgivings as to the possibility of a satisfactory division and were actuated in part by prudential considerations in that refusal which brought on the Crimean War. But it is equally certain that quite aside from these considerations, the Czar's proposal would have encountered unconquerable repugnance on the part of these peoples.

It is important to note that *all of these obstacles have now disappeared*. Russia no longer claims the Dardanelles and is not likely for many a decade to be in a position to claim it effectively. Even if she did, England and France, now in league and in possession of Egypt, would no longer fear her control of the straits. Germany is the new claimant and

Germany must be denied. But Germany seeks to control by controlling Turkey. The maintenance of Turkey is therefore in the interest of Germany's designs, as it was formerly in the interest of her present enemies.

The fear of molesting the political and religious head of the Mohammedan world has passed. The Sultan no longer occupies that important position. Arabia is again independent of Turkey and her king, this time an Arab and a descendant of the Prophet, now rules as Caliph in the sacred capital of Mecca, while his soldiers are fighting the Turk on the plains of Moab. The Turk is thus branded as an usurper by the authority of the Prophet's legitimate representative.¹

Finally, it must be said that our reluctance to extinguish the Turkish nation has disappeared. The knowledge of what Turkish rule is like, the utter failure of all attempts at reform, both those of internal and those of foreign initiative, and the repeated massacres of tens of thousands of peaceable subjects for no other reason than suspected dissatisfaction with intolerable political and economic conditions, these have deepened the conviction that that government has no right to exist. Meanwhile the active alliance of Turkey with the arch enemy has given the necessary occasion for the long needed action. If this war does not end with a radical solution of this perennial problem, it will convict the Allies in their turn of incompetency and will render futile all other attempts to establish permanent peace.

But our problem, like all such problems, is a concrete one and one bristling with practical difficulties. What are the component parts of the Turkish Empire with which we have to deal, and what is the problem presented by each? The list has noticeably diminished since the Crimean War. The war

¹ The complete failure of Mohammedans the world over to respond to the Sultan's summons to a *Jihad* or holy war when Turkey joined the Central Powers in the present conflict is another indication of his loss of prestige as Caliph.

of 1877-8 saw the loss of Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina in the Balkans, the fastnesses of upper Armenia in the Caucasus, and the Island of Cyprus. Egypt and Tunis slipped away soon after. The war with Italy took Tripoli, Rhodes and eleven other islands. The Balkan War resulted in the loss of Albania, Macedonia, part of Thrace, Crete, Samos, Chios, Thasos, and other islands. Turkey in Europe is reduced to Constantinople and the few square miles necessary for its incomparable defenses, a mere defensive outpost to the real Turkey lying beyond the narrow straits.

It is to this Turkey in Asia, the real Turkey, that we now turn. It is here that the task of the present war lies and here that the work of dismemberment and rearrangement is already far advanced. Looking at the map of Turkey in Asia, we notice certain well defined areas which are more separable and definitely set off by nature than is usual in such cases. At the top and running horizontally on the map is a band of territory about a thousand miles long and four hundred miles wide. Some six hundred miles of this zone on the left is unsupported on the south, a huge projection running westward from the mainland, commonly known as Asia Minor, or in discussions of Turkish affairs, Anatolia. But this zone continues with little change right on to the Persian border, four hundred miles farther, or perhaps we should say, to the Caspian Sea, two hundred miles farther still, though this last is not under Turkish but under Russian and Persian rule. This twelve hundred mile zone is unusually well defined, having the Black Sea and its straits and the Caucasus on the north, a sea at either end, and a sea half the way on the south. And as if this last were not enough, there is a mighty mountain range running along this southern coast and on past the Syrian corner into the mainland itself. But shortly after passing this corner the mountains seem to lose their bearings. The chain swerves to the northeast and then,

after a while, turns southeast again, thus cutting a broad, shallow notch out of the eastern part of our broad zone. And since the mountains are thus crowded to the north in this region, they pile up and fill the whole narrowed eastern part of the zone, which thus becomes a wild, rugged plateau which culminates in the great Ararat of Bible story, a mountain 17,000 feet high. In this eastern mountainous part of the zone is situated,— though very vaguely defined and not all in Turkish territory,— the sore tried Armenia.

Turning now to the notch on the southern side of our zone, we find two rivers rising at its very point and almost together, the Tigris and the Euphrates. The former flows southeastward following the right hand side of the notch, and heads straight for the Persian Gulf, which it reaches in due time by a tolerably direct course. The latter flows southwest, following the left hand side of the notch and makes directly for the Mediterranean at the corner above referred to. But some time before reaching the coast it seems to encounter impassable barriers. It therefore changes its direction, heading also for the Persian Gulf, which it reaches soon after joining with the Tigris. The two rivers thus enclose an immense tract of comparatively level country, Mesopotamia,— between the rivers,— which with adjacent river lands on the east and west, stretches from the summit of the notch to the Persian Gulf.

The mountains which run along the southern coast of Asia Minor and which seem to become confused as they strike the solid mass of the mainland, send a branch due south the whole length of the coast. It was these mountains, of course, that prevented the Euphrates getting through to the corner of the Mediterranean. To the east of these mountains all is barren and desert till we get to the territory of the great rivers which retreats rapidly to the southeast. But on the western or seaward slope is a narrow strip of habitable country beautiful





and rich toward the north, then leaner to the south, until it vanishes in yellow sand just where the great continent links up with Africa. This narrow strip is perhaps the most famous in the world, partly because it is the home of the religion of the western world, but partly also because it has always been the narrow causeway by which alone the great peoples of Egypt and Mesopotamia could get access to each other. It is thus the bridge between Asia and Africa. Looking again at the map, the broad horizontal zone which is the heart of Turkey seems to be perched on two legs, the one a very slender one and quite perpendicular, the other a very broad and long one thrown far to the rear. Between these two is thrust the vast bulk of the Arabian desert, one of the most impassable barriers in the world. This desert extends far to the south in the mighty Arabian Peninsula, an enormous territory green about the edges but desert or semi-desert within. These green edges form still another area, or rather, a series of areas, which must be considered. Economically they are of little importance, though famous as the breeding ground of the finest horses and the hardiest of men. This narrow border is too long, too narrow, and too broken to form a political unity. It has in fact recognized the sway of the Turk only fitfully and in part. But it has a political importance quite without parallel from possessing the holy cities of the Mohammedans, Mecca and Medina, situated on the western borders of the peninsula.

The point to be emphasized in connection with these several areas is their almost complete distinctness, the one from the other. The great horizontal zone, to be sure, is essentially a unit in spite of its more mountainous character and greater general elevation in the east. There is no sharp dividing line physically, ethnically, or historically, and the much mooted project of dividing this area has its warrant rather in recent political events than in nature or history.

But all other demarcations are sharp. The Mesopotamian plain is as definitely distinguished from the Armenian highlands into which its head is thrust as plains usually are from the mountains they adjoin. Historically the two regions have been largely distinct. The western coast strip communicates with the broader land to the north only by a narrow pass across the Taurus Mountains, the Cilician Gates, while it is separated both from Mesopotamia and the Arabian coastland by broad stretches of desert. Habitable Arabia is completely isolated and is indeed broken into several portions, all more or less distinct physically and politically.

Ethnically the problem is even more confusing. Arabia, Mesopotamia, and the coast strip of Palestine and Syria speak Arabic, but in this part of the world language is not the bond of race but religion. Arabia and Mesopotamia are Mohammedan, but the coast strip is hopelessly divided between Mohammedans, Christians, and Jews, these last being historically rather than numerically predominant in Palestine and the Christians, perhaps, in Syria, though in all this coastal strip, the meeting place of the world's religions, we find a bewildering complexity of sects and hybrid faiths.

In the great Anatolian-Armenian zone the Turkish language and the Turkish religion predominate in all but a few coast cities and isolated country districts. This and this only is religiously, linguistically, and in some approximate sense ethnically, Turkey. Toward the east, however, the Armenian element becomes more pronounced, while in the extreme west the Greek is much in evidence, being occasionally in the majority, notably in Smyrna, the metropolis of the entire territory. But Greeks and, even more, Armenians are scattered through the entire territory. To further complicate the situation certain bodies of Greeks speak only Turkish, but write it with Greek characters. There are various other anomalies.

We have now to consider the problem of these several units. The Hedjaz, the Arabia of the holy places, a region of uncertain extent, has become independent under British suzerainty during the war, a result that no peace conference is likely to challenge and that Britain is still less likely to surrender in view of the fact that three quarters of the Moslems of the world are under her rule and that the control of the holy places by a power working in harmony with her policy is essential to the very existence of her empire. Moreover there is every reason to believe that British suzerainty is the choice of the Arabians. In spite of the much fomented and exaggerated Turkish discontent in Egypt, it has long been a well known fact that Moslem interests as such, long convinced of the necessity of suzerainty, have shown an unmistakable preference for that of Britain. The writer has been personally cognizant of two pretty thorough canvasses of Palestine and Syria, both by non-British parties, in which these two questions were put to all sorts of men: "Do you think there will be a change of rule here? If so, what government would you prefer?" The answer to the first question was everywhere in the affirmative. The Turk was doomed. As to his successor all the Moslems and most of the others hoped for British rule. British impartiality in the administration of justice and in protecting Moslems in the exercise of their religion had deeply impressed the Moslem mind. There is every reason to believe that these sentiments, so common in liberal Mohammedan centers everywhere, are shared by the Arabians. If so, British suzerainty in the Hedjaz and the holy places may be regarded as firmly established on the principle of self-determination so dear to the western mind. Other parts of the Arabian littoral like Oman have long been independent under the watchful eye if not the official suzerainty of Britain. She respects their independence and does not interfere with their prejudices or their doings. Mean-

while she renders them the great service of seeing that no one else shall interfere with them. This is suzerainty reduced to its lowest terms, but a suzerainty that is invaluable. In this most limited sense Arabia is British,— a necessary condition of its being Arabian.

The case of Mesopotamia is very different. Arabia is free to be as exclusive as it chooses, for none but the devotee has occasion to set foot on its soil. Mesopotamia is a highway, the one practicable short cut between Europe and India. From time immemorial it has been a busy trade route between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Nothing can long prevent its becoming so again in the infinitely larger sense that modern facilities make possible. The Bagdad Railway is one of the world transforming projects comparable to the Suez and Panama Canals. It would not only become one of the great through traffic routes between the two busiest human centers on the globe, but it would develop in Mesopotamia itself one of the richest regions in the world, a region now utterly dormant, but capable of responding in an almost unparalleled degree to the science, industry, and capital of the west. What Mesopotamia needs, therefore, is not merely the negative guaranties of Arabia, but the most intensive development and scientific administration. There must be immense investments of capital in railroads and above all in scientific irrigation on which the prosperity of the country depends, now as in the days of Nebuchadnezzar. There must be protection and guaranties that the highway thus opened shall not be used for armed forays destructive alike to the country itself and to the great countries to which it offers access. Finally there must be deference to the religious institutions of the country whose people, though not Turkish or pro-Turkish, are devoutly Mohammedan.

There are the most obvious reasons why this task should devolve upon Britain. Her proven deference for native insti-

tutions which has become almost an instinct of British character, her immense aptitude for development of the kind here required¹ and her experience in handling the very similar problem of Egypt, all put her at the head of the list of eligible candidates. But the overwhelming consideration is the proximity of India, which is exposed to attack through Mesopotamia alone. If we recognize her responsibility for the three hundred millions of India, we can not but recognize her right to control the only gateway by which their safety is menaced.

The British Mesopotamia campaign has practically assured British occupation of the country. The capture of Bagdad, glorious with the memories of the Moslem's saturnian days and the great caliphate of Haroun-al-Raschid, was the sign to the Moslems of the new and not unwelcome order. Thence the advance was continued in two directions, one to the northward toward Armenia, where a junction was contemplated with the Russian forces operating from the Caucasus, and one to the northwest toward Aleppo, where a junction was apparently contemplated with British forces operating northward from Egypt along the coast strip. With the collapse of Russia the former movement lost its chief significance, and save for a recent abortive dash for the oil wells of Baku it has long been lost to view. The advance toward Aleppo has also been long unreported, but in view of the splendid success of the advance from Egypt, there is every reason to expect the junction in the near future. Assuming this to be accomplished, it is important to note just what such a completion of this plan implies. It is nothing less than the severance of the Arab speaking areas from the Turkish zone to the north.² The Arabic domain, the true home of Mohammed-

¹ Her engineers are said to have planned irrigation works for Mesopotamia before the outbreak of the war.

² It must be remembered that the Arabic and Turkish languages have nothing in common save their written characters. They do not even belong to the same linguistic family.

danism, the real cherisher of its traditions and the possessor of its holy places, is thus lost to the Turk, to whom it has never owned willing allegiance. As these lines are written, all this is no longer prospect, but essentially accomplished fact, a fact which no tribunal can or should reverse. Mesopotamia will become another and a greater Egypt under the same patiently creative and considerate administration as that which, in a single generation lifted Egypt from her lowest abasement to a prosperity such as the Pharaohs never knew.

The coast strip on the eastern Mediterranean offers us essentially a problem of sentiment. It is mountainous throughout, but with the usual broad valleys and fertile slopes which this implies. Toward the south it becomes arid and merges into desert. The southern half of the strip is Palestine, whose interest to the western world requires no comment. It is the only region in the world which is sacred to three great religions, Jewish, Christian, and Mohammedan, for it must not be forgotten that the Mohammedan finds a place in his system for the worthies of Jew and Christian precisely as the Christian does for those of the Jew. The supposed tomb of Abraham is guarded by the Moslem with a zeal almost as fanatical as that which he displays at the tomb of Mohammed. But both Moslem and Christian recognize in a sense the prior claim of the Jew. For him Palestine is not merely a shrine but a fatherland. It is therefore with something like general consent that the liberated land becomes again the home of a Jewish nation.

But those who know the modern Jew will not fail to note the utterly artificial character of the nation thus established. The Jews as a whole have immense wealth and power, but no one expects that wealth and power to be transferred to Palestine. That country, trifling in extent, meager in its agricultural possibilities, and devoid of minerals, can never have

army, navy, industries, or extensive population. In itself, therefore, it must be utterly helpless, nor can any amount of Jewish wealth in foreign lands lend it effective support in an emergency. Yet it remains much as of old, immensely strategic as an approach to Egypt and as sharing with that country the control of the Suez Canal. What, then, are to be its political affiliations? Who is to be its sponsor? The answer can hardly be doubtful, in view of the interests above suggested. No doubt the new Palestine will be nominally independent, and the fact that the modern Jew can provide administrative talent of the highest competency should make that independence a reality, if, as may be expected, the Jews of the world and not those of Palestine alone, are charged with the administration of the little state. This too will insure the broadest tolerance toward the multifarious devotees who swarm to this shrine of the nations, for the great Jew who rules in Wall Street and in the council halls of modern empires is no narrow fanatic. So far all should go well. But for protection against great states, a great state is necessary. That state must be Britain. Britain would tolerate no other. The Jew would accept no other. No doubt all outward appearance of such protection will be avoided. Absolute independence will be the fiction, or if avowed protection be deemed necessary, then perhaps a form of internationalism, but in that Britain must needs be the animating spirit, the really operating agent.

Let us not imagine for a moment that Britain covets these responsibilities. She is already seriously burdened. But this is the fatality of empire. To safeguard lands held in trust, approaches which control these lands must be controlled, and then other approaches, and so on indefinitely. Britain would welcome partners and sharers in the task, if partners of assured trustworthiness could be found. But imagine her sentiments if a Jewish Palestine should throw

itself into the arms of a Germany like the Germany of today. Fortunately that is little to be feared. The Anglo-Saxon, alone among great peoples, has given the Jew a fair chance, and the Jew knows his friends.

The northern part of the coast strip is Syria, richer and more beautiful than Palestine, but lacking its unique historic attractions. It is broader and more productive than Palestine, and in particular it has numerous and excellent harbors, especially Beyrout in the south and Alexandretta in the extreme north at the corner of the sea, an advantage which Palestine lacks. The prosperity of Tyre and Sidon in ancient times and the incomparable ruins of Roman Baalbek attest the larger possibilities of this region, which is in process of occupation by the Allies as this is written. It has long been recognized that Syria was to become a French protectorate in the event of the partition of Turkey. This was prefigured by the building of French railways, this being recognized as a French sphere of influence and investment. It is suggested by the French capture of Beyrout in recent days, though the conquest of the country is being effected by a British force. All considerations of propriety and prudence speak for it in the present juncture. Not only is France the traditional protector of all Christians in the Levant by an ancient agreement whose value consists in its long standing recognition,—a fact of importance in this strongly Christian district,—but the present complete understanding between France and Britain makes the presence of these two nations on this causeway of the nations a double guaranty against its use by a marauder. It can not be too strongly insisted that no part of this Arab world is able to protect itself, and the only alternative to occupation by the powers we now fear, is its occupation by powers we can trust. The ever ready suggestion of internationalization can be in practice nothing but *this same occupation in disguise.*

Turkey south of the Taurus Mountains, the whole domain of the Arab tongue and the Arab culture, is thus disposed of, not prospectively but actually. We have but to record, as the peace conference will have but to ratify, the inevitable and only reasonable decision. There remains for consideration the broad zone stretching from the Ægean to the Caspian, the true home of the Turkish language and the Turkish culture. This has not been occupied by the Allies, nor are their intentions clear regarding it. Omitting for the time being Constantinople and such territory as may be necessary to control the straits, we have first to consider whether this territory can be advantageously divided, and second, what disposition can be made of it, whole or in parts.

The outrages committed upon the Armenians have not unnaturally elicited the sympathy of the civilized world and led to the conviction that the Armenians must be rescued from Turkish rule. Quite naturally we have jumped to the conclusion that the way to do this is to sever Armenia from Anatolia and put it under the government of its own people. The Allied peoples seem to have settled down rather contentedly to the idea of an independent Armenia. But inquiry reveals the amazing fact that there is no such thing as a modern Armenia. There is a district in which Armenians once predominated and in which existed some two thousand years ago a somewhat fluctuating Armenian kingdom. But today there is neither kingdom nor predominant Armenian population. Reliable statistics, of course, do not exist, but careful estimates have been repeatedly made and there is sufficient agreement among independent estimates to give them a fair reliability. Taking the best accredited of these estimates, we reach the amazing conclusion that Armenia as usually defined has but fifteen per cent. of Armenians in its population, while Turks, that is, Moslems who speak the Turkish language, number seventy-four per cent. There are,

therefore, even in Armenia itself, five Turks to one Armenian. Nor is there any appreciable part of the country in which these figures are reversed. Only in nine out of the hundred and fifty-nine subdistricts into which the country is divided, are the Armenians in the majority, and then the majority nowhere exceeds sixty-five per cent. These nine subdistricts are trivial in area and are not all contiguous. All told, the Armenians living in Armenia have been estimated at slightly less than a million. And all these figures, it must be remembered, were for the period before the war. According to the most conservative estimates of the deportations and massacres, these numbers and percentages must now be reduced to a half or a third. Such a population becomes almost negligible in deciding the political destiny of a people. Conceding that Armenia may be separated from Turkey without compunction, what are we going to do with it? If we merely make it independent and leave it to the management of its inhabitants, the Armenians would still be at the mercy of a Turkish population five or ten times their number. It is true that the outrages from which they have suffered so much have not originated with this local Turkish population, and complete separation from the baneful control of Constantinople with its big schemes of world politics and its strategic requirements would promise decided amelioration of their lot. But it would still leave the root evil, the rule of non-Moslems by Moslems, with their denial of all rights to the subject population. *This must cease.* If the victorious civilized powers do not realize this, then nothing like final results are to be expected from their present victory.

But recognizing this necessity, it may well be asked whether anything is to be gained by separating Armenia from Anatolia. There are Armenians in both and in both they are a small minority, totally unable to control or even to furnish valuable initiative. They have no such outside backing as

the Jews. They are a subject people of two thousand years' standing, timid and non-political in their instincts. Until recent political exigencies made them the target for Turkish outrage, they were docile and passively loyal. Aside from the feeble and obsolete fact of historic tradition, Armenia does not differ appreciably from Anatolia in its Armenian or governmental problem.

The Greeks form a numerous and influential element on the extreme western coast and noticeably in Smyrna, the commercial metropolis of Anatolia, where they are in the majority. The existence of an independent Hellenic kingdom west of the *Ægean* naturally suggests annexation of these districts to Greece. This has been made the more plausible by the recent annexation of Chios and Samos to Greece. These large islands lie on the Asiatic side of the *Ægean* and are essentially a part of the mainland from which they are separated by only the narrowest expanse of water. To step from these annexations to the mainland is the easiest of steps.

But nothing could be less suited to annexation than these Greek settlements. The Greeks do not form a normal territorial population performing the various functions of community life, but are like the Jews in our American cities, a specialized commercial class. To annex Smyrna to Greece because of the Greek commercial element there, would be a little like annexing New York to the new Palestine because of its Jewish merchants and financiers,— an extreme comparison, no doubt, but one not the less illustrative. There is no evidence that these Greeks desire such annexation,— indeed they almost certainly do not. They have seldom been molested by the Turks and have assumed a political status in the Empire similar to that held by the Jews in the great western nations. Their ambitions are not political. If there is any demand for such annexation, it comes from Greece, whose people have acquired imperial aspirations. Even this de-

mand is doubtful. Under her present wise leadership, Greece is notably sane, and will hesitate to assume the impossible responsibilities of isolated littoral possessions in Asia without the possibility of an effective hinterland. The suggestion is rather the impracticable dream of western enthusiasts.

The Anatolian-Armenian zone therefore remains a unity, or if not a unity, its division contributes little to the solution of our problem. That problem is simply the problem of Turkish government. The problem is embarrassing. The population is overwhelmingly Turkish, and by our much heralded right of self-determination it should govern itself. The small minority of alien elements should take their chances or seek a better condition elsewhere. But we can not but be appalled by the consequences of our own reasoning. Turkish misgovernment is so abysmal that only ignorance can make it seem tolerable. To one who has seen the squalor of these lands that nature has made rich and that earlier civilization has made glorious, talk about self-determination becomes sacrilege. Even the reading of such a book as Brailsford's Macedonia, so compelling in its dispassionateness and in the calm statement of the facts that the writer knew so well, simply leaves no alternative to the conclusion that Turkish rule must cease or must be made amenable to the higher requirements of that civilization for which we stand. It is not true that we believe in the unqualified right of self-determination. High above mundane realities and in the pure ether of abstraction in which some spirits so exasperatingly love to soar while practical decisions wait, we may formulate our generalizations about self-determination and government by consent, but with our feet on the earth and in the midst of annoying realities we have never hesitated to apply the needed corrective. There is a certain minimum of decency and order that the civilized world will not forego. If a people can supply that minimum, it is the fixed principle of free peo-

ples to let them do it. If they can not or do not do it, it is equally our principle to help them or make them do it. Doubtless we must be patient and give a people time to learn the difficult art. We have done so with Turkey and the time is up.

The writer sees little to hope in the division of this zone unless for purposes of administrative convenience. There is no reason for intervention in Armenia which does not hold in nearly equal degree of Anatolia. Both have a Turkish majority and an oppressed non-Turkish minority. Both have crying need of capital, organization, and development along lines which presuppose such a government as the Turk can not give. In fact, this latter need is greater in Anatolia than in Armenia. Both must be made to supply or helped to supply that minimum requirement of decency and order which the world can not and will not forego.

Yet the Turks are neither so few nor so weak that they can be taken in hand like savages and made wards of a civilized state. The Turk must be made the instrument of his own regeneration. An administration actually in Turkish hands but under the supervision and control of civilized powers, able and disposed to exact compliance with modern standards, is perhaps the feasible compromise. It is extremely doubtful whether any single state could assume this responsibility, considering the size and strategic location of the country and the military training and capacity of its inhabitants. It is also much to be feared that no international combination formed for this or similar purposes could withstand the disintegrating influences of intrigue and conflicting interests which would be used so assiduously for their undoing. But in some way the required supervision must be forthcoming. If the Allies are unable to provide this essential in their moment of victory, then indeed is our boasted internationalism a fiction. The international commission which for a time con-

trolled the finances of Egypt and again of Greece may perhaps furnish the precedent and the model, perhaps also it will suggest to some the ultimate failure and the inevitable next step. If a single nation can be found willing to undertake so heavy a responsibility under the mandate and guaranty of a group of friendly powers, the writer for one would look more hopefully upon the experiment. Britain, France, Italy, or America would do honest work there and make a garden where the Turk has made a desert,— yes, and make the Turk the gardener at that,— but the first three ought not to increase their responsibilities and the last would certainly be reluctant to do so. It is not without a shudder that the writer makes the suggestion.

In this connection reference should be made to Italy's ambitions, already mentioned in an earlier chapter. Italy aspires to retain the Dodecanese, the twelve islands off the southwest corner of Asia Minor, and to acquire a foothold on the mainland on the southern coast. Doubt has already been expressed as to the wisdom of expensive colonial ventures for Italy under present conditions. We have here to consider the wisdom of such a move from the standpoint of the country itself. It will be noted that the proposed district is in Anatolia, not in the Arabian district. Such an annexation would therefore impair the unity of the Turkish domain. If the whole region is to be parceled out among the western powers, this is a legitimate beginning. If not, it is an annoying enclave thrust into a unit territory. The writer has a strong aversion against needless dismemberment of unit territories. All such divisions hinder the common object of our civilization. The unity of Anatolia-Armenia is based broadly on unity of geography, language, and religion. The proposed division would sin against all three of these unities. It is argued that such an arrangement would give Italy a stake *in the Levant* and insure her coöperation in maintaining the

status quo. It might just as easily work the other way. If it left Italy with no other thought than to protect what she had, such might be the result. But suppose it incited her to extend her holdings. Might she not conspire with an aggressor,—say with Germany,—to attain her ends, and with what advantage to the marauder who would thus find his base of operations prepared for him. Doubtless it will be hard to refuse Italy's request. It were much to be desired that she should avoid the necessity of a refusal.

NOTE. Since these lines were written it is reported that a definite movement is on foot, sponsored by no less influential a personality than Viscount Bryce, to place America in charge of the rehabilitation of Turkey. Conversely, the plea comes from Turkish sources that the great powers should furnish Turkey with trained administrators. Neither of these proposals follows the lines above suggested. Both presuppose the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey and her restoration to independence. The writer believes that the present Turkish Empire is unnatural and doomed to failure. The Arabs and the Turks differ utterly in their race, character, their language, their civilization and their habitat. There is no likelihood of their forming a helpful union. Meanwhile nothing but the most trustworthy of states can safely be trusted with the guardianship of these crossroads of the nations. With the divisions above suggested, divisions largely dictated by nature, an American receivership for Anatolia is perhaps a reasonable suggestion,—the more reasonable because unsought and unwelcome.


CHAPTER XVI

CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS

THE well known assertion of Napoleon that "Constantinople means the rule of the world" hardly exaggerates its importance.¹ It is not only the most important strategic site in the world, but in certain respects it is quite unlike any other. Constantinople, or more exactly the waterway which it is convenient to call by that name, serves a larger territory than any other port. It is also more defensible, being perhaps the only impregnable passage in the world. In these respects it merely surpasses others in its class. But in other respects it is altogether unique, having no similar. It is completely inaccessible to attack from without, being situated between two inland seas, yet is the most accessible of all harbors, being untrammelled by reef or bar. No other harbor is so situated. It is unique above all in that it has no substitute. All other great harbors have competitors which could assume their task, were they closed or disabled. Constantinople has none.

The value of Constantinople of course is very different to different powers, even to those in its vicinity. To Turkey it is merely a secure capital and a possession coveted by greater powers. It does not guarantee the Empire from attack, however secure in itself. Especially as the Empire has now shrunken, it loses all large functional importance, having no considerable tributary in Turkish territory in Europe, while Asiatic Turkey necessarily makes use for the most part of other ports. The city itself has long ceased to be of any

¹ For a more complete statement of the significance of Constantinople see "*The Things Men Fight For*," by the author.



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importance, now that there is no occasion for transshipment en route and customs barriers and backsheesh have made the passers of the straits shun its quays. Its value to the Turk is primarily one of sentiment and prestige.

But to a great power occupying the vast Black Sea basin it is not only a necessary ingress and egress, an indispensable condition of economic and commercial existence, but it is a weapon of tremendous power. Such a power, perfectly secure in the possession of the straits, could develop its vast resources quite at its ease and forge its thunderbolts undisturbed, only to launch them from its secure retreat when they were ready. It is almost certain that Russia, such as she was and seems certain again to be, if once in secure possession of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, could ultimately dictate her will to other nations. In a very real sense, therefore, Napoleon's assertion, addressed as it was to the Czar and with reference to Russian aspirations, represents the literal truth. The world has ever been unwilling to see the Dardanelles in Russian possession, for that would make the Black Sea a Russian lake and would extend her control to all its borders. If the Allies consented to this, as seems to have been the case, it was under duress and with misgivings. It is no small compensation for the disaster which the defection of Russia entailed, that this unfortunate pledge was thereby abrogated.

To Germany in her Mitteleuropa extension Constantinople would be hardly less valuable, though chiefly in a negative sense as enabling her to put Russia under lock and key and to menace British communications in the Mediterranean. It is difficult to see what the outcome of this war would have been if Germany had been solidly established in Constantinople with the resources of the tributary territories thoroughly developed. The Mediterranean would have been sealed to the Allies with consequences that it is difficult to imagine. Con-

versely, if the Allies had early acquired possession of Constantinople and been free to operate from that center in all ways, it can hardly be doubted that the war would long ago have been terminated in their favor. In short, though Constantinople is of less significance to other powers than to Russia, it is hardly too much to say that any power that could retain it would thereby become the foremost if not the master of all. More definitely, if Constantinople falls into the hands of Germany or Russia,—the only two great powers that are seriously trying to get it,—that possession will assure the ascendancy of that power.

This ascendancy is not to be admitted for a moment. Therefore neither of these nations must control Constantinople. No other power can reasonably aspire to such control. *Some other disposition than that of ordinary national annexation must therefore be made of this unique territory.*

Before suggesting what this disposition shall be, it is well to consider what we wish to accomplish by it. First, the passage should be kept open. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus must be public rather than private property. The Crimean War was fought to establish the principle that they were the private property of Turkey. It is now commonly asserted that the Crimean War was a mistake. That is not so clear. Situations change, and the necessities of the nations change with them. It is not clear that it would have been better for the world to have made the Dardanelles public property at that time. But be that as it may, that is the need now. It is customary to recognize the jurisdiction of a country over three miles of sea off from its coast. This principle would give Turkey jurisdiction over the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. But this is no ordinary case. Such jurisdiction would give her in effect a very considerable jurisdiction over the entire Black Sea to which these straits are the only access. *But Turkey should have no such jurisdiction, and if posses-*

sion of the coast gives jurisdiction over the straits, then she must not have possession of the coasts. This indeed, as we shall see, is the inevitable conclusion. So much of the shores as command the straits must share the fate of the straits.

It follows from the foregoing that Constantinople should be a free port. There should be no customs barriers, but ships should unload and reload freely, making it once more the busiest mart in Mediterranean Europe. Trifling dues of some sort would of course be necessary to defray the expenses of administration of the district, but the writer ventures to suggest that the charge should be for the use of the straits rather than for the use of the port as such, thus facilitating to the utmost the performance of its great function as the gathering and distributing point for the traffic that branches illimitably on either side.

Finally, it is chiefly important to prevent the possibility of seizure and monopoly by any power. This is the most delicate matter of all. It implies on the one hand perfect competency and impartiality of administration, and on the other, the possession and exercise of a considerable force. It is needless to say that Constantinople itself, even with the limited territories that may be assigned to it, can not maintain itself against the attack of a modern empire. That maintenance must be guaranteed by larger resources. But those larger resources can never be more than potential. They can not be ever mobilized and on the ground ready for action. If the district is entirely unprotected save by these unmobilized reserves, an unscrupulous power, even a little one, could seize the city and the straits by a surprise attack. It can not be too strongly urged that a serious power strongly intrenched in Constantinople and the Dardanelles could not easily be ousted. Does anyone doubt that if the Dardanelles had been no man's land and undefended at the beginning of this war, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* would have rushed the

city and that with the aid of Bulgaria or some other venal ally, it could have been closed as it has been. Public property does not mean unguarded property, especially when it is property that all passers covet. Whatever the disposition of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, they must be powerfully fortified and strongly held so long as men use force and craft to accomplish their ends.

There are several possible ways of attempting this settlement. It is conceivable that a great power might possess Constantinople in its own right, and yet voluntarily accept the limitations here proposed. This seems a hazardous guaranty of so distinctive a world interest, yet it is one with which the world is well and favorably familiar. It is thus that Gibraltar is held, open for all to pass, yet completely under the control of a single power. Hong Kong in like manner, is a free port to all the world, a perfect treasure trove to the tariff harassed commerce of the east. It is not contended that such a custodianship is without its potential evils, but if we ask what in the actuality we would have different, it is difficult to suggest a change. In other words, Britain manages these vast trusts in exactly the way that we would wish some other custodian to manage them. It is difficult to believe that the peaceably disposed nations of the world are very restive under her management. Probably France would manage such a trust in much the same way if its character were definitely recognized. Some will claim as much for America. Any of these nations would have the great advantage that they could supply the large potential backing of force which the situation requires as well as the police force constantly needed. Any of them would make of this neglected and bedraggled relic of a great past the very queen among the cities of the world. But such a custodianship would be in a sense irresponsible, however impartial and pub-

lic spirited. These powers would have only this advantage over Germany and Russia that they are not directly interested in Constantinople, a very great advantage, but hardly enough to silence the objections of those powers.

Another way would be to give the trust to an insignificant power. Several such could be named who would administer the trust with ability, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, perhaps Greece. The advantage of such an arrangement would be that the world would have little to fear from so small a power and one whose situation did not tempt her to turn the trust to her own advantage. Possibly, too, the police force could be provided. But such a nation could not furnish the larger backing of force required and must therefore have a sponsor. That sponsor would inevitably be a great power, and perhaps a changing and even a clandestine one. The possibilities are disquieting. Better a known great power than an unknown one. Thus, Greece was before the war supposed to be a cat's-paw of Russia, Sweden of Germany, etc. It would be the most slippery of all guaranties. Incidentally, it may be noted that it is the arrangement that we have had for some centuries with the ascendancy of Germany as the result.

Internationalization in some form would seem to be the only alternative. But internationalization, it must not be forgotten, is a concrete thing, not a mere talismanic ban. It implies agents, laws, force, and all that we know in the ordinary exercise of power. From whence is to come this force, this agent, these regulations? We will not embarrass our argument with questions of detail. But in principle these questions require an answer before the proposal can claim validity. It may be assumed that some concert of the nations, some form of international organization, perhaps the peace conference itself, will appoint some reliable person to act as

its agent.¹ Some measure of citizen government could doubtless be instituted, though it is clear that pure democracy and local self interest could not be relied upon to secure international interests. Then a police force amounting to a large garrison would have to be provided. The suggestion of an international force,—equal numbers, let us say, from Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, America, and other parties to the compact,—would be logical. But a cautious inquirer will by this time begin to have misgivings. What about the harmony of such a force? Suppose the parties to the compact went to war with one another, would their several contingents be at peace in Constantinople? Would they not manœuvre to control it and deliver it to their nation? What a time their commander would have! And even he would not be a man without a country. Where would his sympathies be? And who would be the governor? Would he hold for life or for a term of years? And if the latter,—or even the former,—would not something like rotation be inevitable? And when it came Germany's turn to take the lead, what of the possibilities with a German governor, a German consul, a German merchant community, and a body of German troops subject to his orders? What would guarantee us against German intrigue and the recrudescence of the Mitteleuropa dream under conditions so tempting? All this is imagined, it is true. Other arrangements might be made and unknown safeguards might develop. But mere possibilities are not enough. And then too it is equally possible that unforeseen dangers might develop. We can not escape the conclusion that, in any such form as this, *internationalism would not be a safeguard against intrigue and aggression, but an opportunity and an occasion for it.*

¹ King Albert of Belgium has been suggested. He would at least have the advantage of experience in the management of internationalized territories.

But that the solution of the problem rests with the associated nations and not with any single nation is a foregone conclusion. No single nation as yet commands sufficiently the confidence of its fellow nations to be allowed to own Constantinople. Conceding that its administration would be perfect and in the interest of all alike, the mere possession of such a site by one of the great powers of Europe would give that power an influence which, in wholly different connections, might be overwhelming. The power that possessed Constantinople unchallenged, would speak with authority no matter upon what subject.

Yet so far as efficiency and even impartiality of management is concerned, the chances are immeasurably in favor of administration by a single experienced and trustworthy power. Administration by an international committee or by any arrangement involving the actual coöperation of persons representing different systems and different national habits would be a guaranty of weakness and confusion. Let us take the most favorable supposition, that of the coöperation of English and Americans. Here no language barrier hinders coöperation. National systems have evolved largely in common, and national sympathies are for the present at least wholly favorable. Yet the writer prophesies for such a coöperation, certain confusion, friction, and inefficiency if not failure. A certain acquaintance with American administration in the Philippines and with British administration in India and Egypt leaves him at a loss to know which to admire most. Yet the two are utterly diverse in method and even in their fundamental conception of the race problem. Either would be successful in Constantinople, but certainly not both at once, nor yet any composite or compromise of the two. They would simply emasculate and destroy each other. There would be clash in the methods as such, but there would be still more clash between the personnels of the two differ-

ently evolved systems. Only the very biggest men at the top would be able to bridge the chasm with their broader sympathies.

All this would be still more true as between other races where the barrier of language and a still greater divergence of methods would add to the complications. *The net result of any scheme of internationalism which involved actual co-operation of dissimilar peoples and methods, would be to sacrifice efficiency to a purely fanciful equity.*

There is another and perhaps graver objection. We have been considering international interests. We are not wholly at liberty to ignore the interests of the local population. That population would be considerable. It has approached the million mark in Constantinople and in the district which would necessarily be included, it would be much more. There can be no doubt that making Constantinople a free port would largely increase this population. The interests of such a population, necessarily largely withdrawn from their own control, must be a matter of grave concern to the international body. There can be no possible question that the influence of a single culture, consistent in itself and positive in character, would be far more salutary than that of a confused discord in which each national element tacitly challenged the most cherished principles or habits of the rest. The cosmopolitan tendencies in such a place would be dangerously strong at best. They could have no better corrective than the presence of a positive, resolute race culture which would command respect as illustrating the value of consistent race ideals.

We conclude that such an administration should be international in its authority and ultimate sanctions but national in its actual exercise, a difficult combination, but not impossible,— perhaps, too, the least difficult of the permissible alternatives. This is not the place to suggest by exactly what

means this may be accomplished. It is for practical statesmen and experienced administrators to devise the necessary machinery. The essence of the suggestion is that a single trustworthy nation should administer Constantinople under the mandate of the associated powers. The chosen nation must needs be one of the great powers, one experienced in administration, and one not tempted by contiguity to make the trust a stepping stone to annexation and monopoly. These conditions would exclude Russia, Germany, and Austria, even were they not excluded by other considerations. There should be no hesitation whatever at such a juncture as this in declaring these nations disqualified. We have learned nothing from the war if we have not learned this. The list thus reduces to Britain, America, France, and Italy. The last could not wisely accept the trust. There is no serious reason to doubt the trustworthiness or the competency of the other three.

The question naturally arises whether such an administration should be combined with the administration of Anatolia-Armenia suggested in the preceding chapter. The balance of advantage would seem to be very much the other way. To combine them would come dangerously close to continuing the Turkish Empire under foreign administration. It would pretty effectually prevent the isolation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles and their administration purely as an international trust, a facility of world commerce. The fiscal demands of impoverished Anatolia-Armenia would continually covet the possible revenues of the great waterway and impede its traffic with toll exactions. Political and religious interests and prejudices, easily managed in cosmopolitan Constantinople, would acquire irresistible and dictatorial power with the backing of Turkish Anatolia. The two problems are not only diverse but wholly incompatible, if the plan of a truly open waterway and free port is to be adopted.

Such a plan naturally raises the question how much is to be included in the internationalized area. Only military and administrative experts can answer this question. It is clear, however, that the inclusion should be based on minimum requirements for defense and administrative convenience. We do not wish to create another empire here. The Gallipoli Peninsula, marvellously set off by nature for its purpose, must obviously be included. Also the territory back of Constantinople at least as far as the Chatalja lines. Whether more than this is required,—possibly even territory linking Constantinople with Gallipoli,—the novice can not judge. It is even possible that the present slight territory of European Turkey may prove to be the workable unit, though it is to be hoped that a much more limited defensive program may prove practicable. Probably a certain inclusion on the Asiatic side will also prove to be necessary, though here again it would seem to simplify the problem if the European shore proved sufficient.

Little remains to be said regarding the Balkan Peninsula. The case of Serbia has been considered in connection with the problem of Austria, save possibly the problem of its southern and southeastern boundary as fixed by the treaty of 1912. There seems little doubt that this treaty gave to Serbia a certain amount of territory in which the population is predominantly Bulgarian. This, however, must be understood in the light of the well known definition of nationality in this region. Language has little to do with it, and kinship still less. Church allegiance is the determining fact, and this allegiance, throughout all this Macedonian region, is a matter of comparatively recent propaganda. Under such circumstances national boundaries need not take too careful note of present pseudo race alignments. Moreover these race elements are relatively mobile and migrations following changes of frontier easily effect the necessary adjustments. The

writer was a witness of these swarming migrations from region to region following the second Balkan war. It may safely be assumed, therefore, that population has largely adjusted itself to the lines as drawn in 1912, whether they were then drawn rightly or not. To correct a mistake made at that time, if such there were, would therefore necessitate renewed migrations and further readjustments. Under these circumstances the thing to note is rather the topographical, commercial, and strategic factors than the elusive and artificial factor of race. Whether these factors require rectification of the frontier is a question for the expert. It must be remembered that the Serbian and Bulgarian languages differ but slightly.

The question of Bulgaria has been touched upon in speaking of Rumania. Considerations of race require the restoration of the earlier frontier between Bulgaria and Rumania in the region of the Dobrudja. The writer is unaware of any counter considerations. In case Constantinople is internationalized and the present Thracian territories in the rear are regarded as unnecessary, their relinquishment to Bulgaria is seemingly inevitable. The aggrandizement of Bulgaria is about the last thing that the Allies are just now in a mood for, but it is to be hoped that present moods will not be allowed to stand in the way of plainly reasonable arrangements. The odium which Bulgaria has incurred in the second Balkan war and in the present struggle is largely to be charged to her unworthy monarch, and while her standards are not high, her shame and her disabilities may be allowed to disappear with him. Greece, of course, desires these territories, but to extend the little kingdom to the gates of Constantinople would do her no good unless she is to have the city itself, while it would be both an affront and an injury to Bulgaria and a new source of trouble in this troubled region.

CHAPTER XVII

RUSSIA AND POLAND

It is significant of the change that the war has already wrought that Russia and Poland must now be mentioned separately. The greater no longer includes the less. Whether this prefigures a separate historical destiny from this time forth is not so clear, but it is the possibility and the prospect of the moment. The problem is distinctly the most complex with which we are confronted. The problems already discussed present grave difficulties, but for the most part we can see what we would like to accomplish. In the great Slavic East, it is difficult even to meet this preliminary requirement.

The problem must be approached from two standpoints, the needs of these peoples themselves and the safety of the family of nations. These two interests may ultimately coincide, but it would be hazardous to assume an immediate and complete coincidence. If all energies are devoted to the upbuilding of the Slavic peoples, the world should be the richer for their prosperity, but the world may be the sufferer from their aggression. Their ultimate power is almost limitless. On the other hand, the German policy of holding back the development of these peoples and keeping them divided and weak in the interest of outside nations is one so monstrous, when we consider the magnitude of the interests thus sacrificed, that we must regard it as both futile and perilous. It is questionable whether a repressive policy toward any people is legitimate or safe, but certainly toward the largest and most virile of all peoples it is perilous in the extreme. Nothing could better assure the ultimate deluge than to keep the largest

of the energetic races in perpetual barbarism. Underneath all policies that we consider must run this steady current of purpose, to promote the civilization of the Slavic peoples and to develop in them as rapidly as possible those inhibiting instincts which alone can protect civilization from their overwhelming power.

The Slavs are by no means a homogeneous race, yet they are all obviously related and are conscious of and influenced by that kinship. Panslavism is the only one of the pan-isms which has a very substantial foundation. It seems to portend the ultimate union of all the Slavs whose habitats are territorially united into a natural unity. This means all of the former Russian Empire with the approximate addition of Austrian Galicia and Prussian Posen, a combination not quite equivalent to former Russia and historic Poland. The Czecho-Slovak area, though conterminous with the great Slavic domain, is not a natural part of that domain, and both history and nature interpose seemingly insuperable obstacles in the way of its inclusion. If it is ever to become a part of a larger whole, that whole must be the Teutonic rather than the Slavic unit, a result which is suggested by the steady German encroachment, industrial and cultural, upon this too far advanced outpost of the Slavic race. Present tendencies, to be sure, are checking this encroachment, and until the German learns better manners and better morals, we can but welcome the divisive influences. But it is perhaps legitimate to look forward to a very far future when the needs of commerce, industry, and defense, the chief things for which government legitimately stands, may be provided for a unit area rather than for fragments based on linguistic and historic accident. If the German people ever get over feeling that the other peoples are destined to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water for a dominant nation," they will have a very large field of opportunity open to them.

Returning now to the normal Slavic domain, we have to note that it is both racially and naturally ill defined. In the extreme southwest it is separated from the plain of Hungary by the Carpathian Mountains, a very good natural boundary, but on most of the western frontier no such natural barrier exists. Vast marshes and lake systems make population sparse and intermittent, but tend rather to confuse than to delimit the racial frontiers. Such frontiers are seldom sharp but are rather of the nature of gradual transitions. Here they are even worse. In the early days of race mobility, the rivalry between Teuton and Slav took the form of establishing colonies or centers of population of each race against the other. These colonies slipped past each other far into each other's domain. Commercial organizations further complicated the situation, and the location of the Teutonic Knights as a patrician caste far to the east of the Teutonic domain, as the result of vicissitudes in the Mediterranean area, added another troublesome factor. There are Slavic settlements,— strong and self conscious,— within forty miles of Berlin. There are similar German communities not so very far from Petrograd. For many hundreds of miles the country is one,— not of mingled population,— but of mingled settlements, a far more tenacious and difficult problem. Nor must we forget that there are other peoples like the Letts, mere racial fragments left in this great lateral moraine of the westward migrations, which own neither Slavic nor Teutonic allegiance and which yet can have no profitable future as distinct nationalities. We are therefore compelled to recognize at the outset of our inquiry that any line drawn between these two great areas will be arbitrary,— very arbitrary,— as compared with other race frontiers. A region of interlacing settlements can not be divided so as to throw all settlements of one race to one side and all those of the other race to the other.

It must be plain, also, that such an area is peculiarly un-

suited to the principle of self determination. If race lines are followed, the result must necessarily be inconclusive. It is equally impossible for the people of such a district, unless they are exceptionally developed, which these people certainly are not, to forecast the result of the greater transformations which such a situation invites. Self determination is a delusion and a snare where fair coherence and finality of national character has not been attained.

In the absence of fairly clear racial or natural boundaries, the tendency is strong to follow historic boundaries. It is noteworthy that here as in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, there is an instinctive groping after historic boundaries which it is assumed have some presumptive justification. When the appeal to history is made to correct the wrongs of history, we are again in confusion. Thus, the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is demanded on historic grounds, in oversight of the fact that history can be cited just as legitimately in favor of Germany's claim. Why is the history of the last fifty years less valid than the history of the preceding period? On general principles it should be rather more valid as representing present adjustments. In fact, history alone can not validate either claim. The indisputable claim of France rests on other grounds.

Similarly, in our effort to escape from the confusion of the eastern situation, there is a noticeable groping after historic boundaries, a cry for the restoration of Poland. There is no apparent consciousness of what that historic Poland was, whether it was a constant or a variable, a fit or a misfit, a success or a failure. The assumption is that it better expressed the equities of the situation than the present (or recent) arrangement. The yoke galls now,—that is clear. It must be that the old one fitted better. So reasons the present victim, so reasons the sympathetic onlooker, each comparatively ignorant of that past which he invokes.

It is to be noted, first of all, that the historic past which is thus invoked is a much more remote past than that of Alsace-Lorraine. It more nearly corresponds to that remoter German past for the Rhine region which we have rejected as having been invalidated by later history. And to a large extent it has been thus invalidated by the happenings of the relatively long period since the partition of Poland. The tendency of political arrangements to validate themselves by effecting the necessary adjustments, has been quite as marked in this case as in any others. Unity of language and race has not been effected but it had not been effected in the historic Poland of pre-partition days which was largely Russian and quite as unnatural a combination as any which has followed it. But adjustments of a very vital character have none the less been effected which the proposed reunion would disturb. Galicia, which is two thirds Russian, is probably the most contented of all the subject races in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Though racially Slavic and outside the natural boundary of the Carpathians, it is united with Austria in religion which,—we find it hard to remember,—is the most important of political determinants in this part of the world. German Poland has been forcibly and harshly assimilated by Prussia, but not without effect. The German assertion that there is no German Poland is false, but it is not without a basis of truth. Germany is not Catholic like Austria, but its large Catholic population has successfully established its claim to complete liberty. The Poles have been an irreconcilable element in German government circles, but it is more than doubtful whether any considerable Polish territory in the German Empire would vote to enter a reconstituted Poland.


Russian Poland alone has remained distinctively Polish. Despite the official Russification which has been so brutally enforced, the Poles have remained stubbornly unreconciled,


though it is noteworthy that no such wholesale betrayal of allegiance took place in Russian Poland as that which Austria suffered at the hands of the Czecho-Slovaks, and the efforts of Germany to rally to her cause an army of Poles after her conquest of Russian Poland seems to have met with failure. But while a century of Russian rule with its unmistakable harshness and tyranny, has not won the sympathy of the Poles, it has developed bonds that are none the less vital to Polish prosperity. A very large part of the industrial development within the Russian Empire is in Poland. Safeguarded by the tariff barriers of the Empire, the immense Russian market has been theirs. But without this advantage these Polish industries could not compete for a moment with the much more developed industries of Germany and England. An independent Poland would not have this advantage but would be outside the Russian tariff barrier, compelled to find entrance on the same terms as these more efficient nations. This she could not do. An independent Poland would be a ruined Poland, as far as manufacturing industries go. This Germany perfectly understands. The suggestion has been made that the independent Poland be included within a Russian customs union, but this, if it did not wholly imply Russian control, would almost inevitably lead to a reunion of the two countries, as Germany again is fully aware. By every means in her power,—not direct appeal, but clandestine propaganda, appeals to the theoretical democracy of the Poles and their sponsors, Germany will endeavor to keep the Poles theoretically independent, trusting to the prejudices of the rural population and to the misdirected economics of modern nationalism to isolate Poland by tariff barriers which she will help to build and then in turn to make her, as a helpless purveyor of raw materials, dependent upon herself. There are more than military reasons for Germany's desire to erect Poland into an inder-

pendent buffer state,— of course with a trustworthy German sovereign. With her industries ruined she would become a great producer of food for industrial Germany, who in turn would monopolize the privilege of providing her with the necessary manufactured articles. If this relation of dependent independence could be properly assured and stabilized, it is not clear that Germany would object to the reunion of Posen and perhaps of other parts of Prussian Poland. It would rid the Reichstag of a pestiferous and intractable element and would better delimit the hewers of wood and drawers of water from the dominant nation. This economic dependence of which our western theoretic democracy is utterly unconscious, is in fact the supreme factor in the problem of the Slavo-Teuton border.

There are other embarrassments. Poland must have access to the sea if she is to have anything approaching real independence. This can come only through the historic harbor of Danzig. Unfortunately this harbor does not lie, as it properly should, between German and Russian territories, but between two definitely German areas. To give Danzig to Poland with the neck of Polish territory which connects it with the Polish hinterland would cut Prussia in two. Such an arrangement is not inconceivable or without historic precedent, but it is pretty thoroughly discredited by history. Nor could East Prussia, thus severed from the main German body, be practicably given to Poland or any other power, containing, as it does, Königsberg, the earlier Prussian capital and the center of Prussian tradition.

Finally, we can not overlook the fact that the historic Poland to which we appeal was a signal failure. No government in Europe during the last thousand years, has a record for more marked incompetency. Under the leadership of truly great sovereigns, the provincialism and local *selfishness* of the people proved obdurate to every appeal,





even in the face of the most unmistakable national dangers. If ever a nation perished because it was unfit to live, that nation was Poland. This is not saying that the same would be true today, though the experiences of the last century or two have not been of a nature, seemingly, to develop the needed characteristics. Still less is this meant as an aspersion upon individual Polish character, which has often enough given evidence of capacity and public spirit. But it means that Polish history offers an inadequate basis for faith in Polish future.

The writer is predisposed, as he has already confessed, to the maintenance of unions among men, even when those unions are unideal and but imperfectly established. Such examination as he has been able to make of the irksome unions among peoples convinces him that the irksomeness usually inheres in something else than the formal union and remains after the union is dissolved. This predisposition should be discounted by the reader in the measure that he deems necessary. With this confession, he ventures to express his strong feeling that the ends sought by Poland can be better secured by autonomy and federation with Russia than by a nominal and unreal independence. Nor is he able to convince himself that any form of international guaranty for a Polish state would be able to give that state real independence. Conceding that it might save the state from invasion and military subjugation (a very doubtful concession) this is not the danger that is most to be feared. With the present distribution of mineral resources, Germany is predestined to become an industrial state, densely peopled and wealthy, while Poland is as certain to become an agricultural state, with the moderate population and the moderate wealth which such occupation implies. With the geographical situation as it is, that means vassalage for Poland. To a large degree the same fate threatens all Slavdom, but the danger is infinitely

greater to isolated fragments and most of all to fragments that lie next to Germany herself. Only the most strenuous effort, not alone on the part of the Slavs, but on the part of their friends as well, can avert this vassalage of the Slav to the Teuton, a vassalage which was distinctly prefigured by the commercial treaty of 1905 which was one of the prominent reasons for the war and which the treaty of Brest-Litovsk re-imposes. Such a vassalage easily leads to military co-operation if not to political merger, as witness Bulgaria's statement on entering the war. It behooves the powers that are interested in restraining the military aggressions of Germany to resist by every means in their power that policy of disintegration by which Germany, invoking our cherished principle of self-determination, is pursuing her ends of Slav subjugation.

It need hardly be said that the objections here urged against an independent Poland hold in even greater degree against the other fragments of Russia which it pleases Germany to erect into puppet kingdoms and decorate with her surplus princelings. They are smaller, weaker, and less historic than Poland. They have shown no evidence of national spirit or capacity. Their dependence upon Germany is not remote and potential but immediate and avowed. Their detachment and alleged independence would be tantamount to annexation.

This brings us to the all important conclusion. Russia must be reconstituted, reunited, and constructively developed. Long dreaded by the western powers as the moving glacier whose irresistible advance threatened to overwhelm them, she now reveals herself as a necessary counterweight to a nearer and a deadlier enemy. If Russia could remain out of the game, perhaps all would draw a sigh of relief, but this is impossible. United and powerful, she is the inevitable check upon Germany whose leadership she resents

as much as we do. Divided and weak, she inevitably becomes a vast arsenal of resource for Germany's use. Germany entered this war to get Belgium and the Channel ports from which she could overpower Britain at her convenience, to overpower France and take her money and her navy, to get Constantinople and open the way from Berlin to Bagdad. The day after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk she would have yielded Belgium and her hope of the Channel ports, she would have withdrawn from France, she would have retired from the Balkans and Constantinople, she would have restored Alsace-Lorraine, and would have renounced her dreams of Berlin to Bagdad,— all, if she could be left free in her new and undreamed-of prospect of Berlin to Vladivostok. That is what she is saying through her new prince-chancellor as these lines are written. Autonomy, justice, self-determination, leagues to enforce peace, with all these she is agreed. She will not let paper principles stand in the way of an agreement which says nothing about iron and coal and interposes nothing but verbal barriers between her and the richest prize that ever fell to the lot of a conqueror.

The reconstitution of Russia will encounter almost insuperable obstacles. The underlying unity of race is obscured by provincialism and negated,— especially as regards Poland,— by the intensest religious prejudice. The country is inconceivably poor and wretched, and too ignorant to know the occasion of its misery. The wildest economic and political theories here find acceptance and work their terrible havoc. Schooled in the democracy of petty, local interests, no people is so utterly without knowledge of national interests or so unskilled in international problems. It is the land of the chimera and the will-o'-the-wisp. Yet if we are to escape the menace of a Germany that would extend from the Rhine to the Pacific, we must make a nation out of Russia.

It will be the supreme test of our power to survive. No paper guarantees and permessos will do the work. Close knit alliances, huge capital investments, constructive statesmanship, and above all tolerance for political necessities unlike our own and for methods and mechanisms which would not serve our ends, will be needed in a measure surpassing our utmost imagination. If we don't do this, Germany will,— in her different way and for her different ends,— and will reap the benefit, all to Russia's hurt and ours.

One exception to this general conclusion should perhaps be noted. Finland is not Russian, nor is there any reason for her becoming so except as a stepping stone to the absorption of the Scandinavian countries by the great Slav power. This is obviously no longer contemplated, and is farthest from that ideal which now animates the Allied cause. Finland is essentially Scandinavian in her culture and in all her affinities. She may well indulge in the novel pleasure of independence until the Scandinavian powers see the futility of their unnatural separation and find a way to reconcile their individuality with the necessities of modern larger organization. A customs union of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland with some form of federal union for the handling of their common interests, would seem a desirable thing to one who knows nothing of the petty jealousies, the arbitrary differences of custom and dialect which have motived their recent centrifugal policy. Whether the war which has written its great lessons so large before their eyes, has prepared them for the desirable, the seemingly inevitable, step, remains to be seen. The issue is theirs, not ours, and should in no way influence the deliberations of the peace table except to dictate the expulsion of the German kinglet and leave Finland free to effect the desirable combination.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE REMOTER POWERS

THE war has gradually drawn into its vortex a number of powers that are remote from the conflict both geographically and in their interests. With a single exception these are minor powers as measured by wealth, population, or military establishment. Their interests are unfamiliar and are easily forgotten. It may be assumed, however, that they are keenly alive to these interests and that they look forward to the peace conference as an opportunity for securing national advantage. The world is familiar with the case of Italy in the Crimean War. The struggling little kingdom was but half formed as yet, and the issue of the war concerned her but remotely. Above all she was unprepared for war. But the far-seeing Cavour perceived that participation in the war meant participation in the peace conference and so recognition by the powers. It meant farther an opportunity to bring the cause of Italy before the powers of Europe in council assembled, an opportunity which he used with telling effect. It is safe to say that these remoter countries have been much influenced by similar ulterior considerations, and that one of the most delicate tasks of the conference will be to determine what matters are relevant to the discussion. There will be the strongest pressure to make the peace conference a general committee *pro bono publico*, with the result that an impossible program will develop and a multitude of smouldering animosities will break into flame. Whether the world will find in Venizelos or some unknown Brazilian or Mongolian its new Cavour, we can only speculate. The situation has possibilities.

The scope of the present work does not admit a study of these remoter national problems which may find in the great war an occasion for demanding our attention. Small though they may seem compared with the great issues that we have considered, they are numerous and involved, and require for their intelligent settlement a vast amount of patient research. To lay this burden upon the peace conference, to postpone its decisions and jeopardize its agreements by the animosities and heart burnings which these minor issues involve, would be fatal to its main purpose. It must not be forgotten that after five years of literal world war one of the imperative demands upon such a conference will be that it reach its decisions *promptly* and relieve the nations at the earliest possible moment of their intolerable burdens. To reach a settlement that is just in its main lines but leave all details for more leisurely consideration under conditions of peace is the plain duty of the conference. Many a minor issue might better wait for justice than to have a suffering world wait for peace.

The conclusion is that the irrelevant or feebly relevant issues affecting remoter nations,—and even the main contestants,—should be rigorously excluded from the conference. At the same time the war furnishes an occasion not to be missed for the settlement of these matters. The Hague Tribunal, less ambitious than the league of nations, and therefore more hopeful, has machinery ready and admirably suited for the work. The peace conference may, without undue delay, find time to refer such issues, properly defined, to the Hague Tribunal. The advantage of the occasion consists in this that the presentation of these issues to the council of the nations gives them an opportunity to recommend, and virtually to compel, the submission of issues to rational adjudication, which otherwise would wait indefinitely for a suitable initiative. Nor will it be easy for one of these

claimants to refuse the reference of its claim to such a tribunal when it has acquiesced in the reference of similar claims for some other nation. The peace conference may, therefore, become the occasion for an extensive world house-cleaning without itself delaying for the completion of the work. The question of the enforcement of these judgments may seem to offer difficulties, but it is doubtful if enforcement will be necessary. The mere reference of the matter to the tribunal by the council of the powers is in itself a powerful enforcement, and a quiet assumption of this fact without allusion to possible coercion would facilitate the reference without seriously impairing the sanction.

One of these remoter nations, however, stands in a class quite by itself. Japan is one of the great powers and this fact, together with her early entry into the war, quite precludes the possibility of referring her claims to after settlement. Possibly some will demur that Japan has played but a secondary part in the war and that she is entitled to correspondingly less consideration. This criticism is without just foundation. Japan's part in the present war was determined in advance by treaty and by nature. That part was very considerable and has been admirably performed. It was primarily the policing of the Pacific and Indian Oceans against sea raiders, the protection of allied commerce in this vast area, and the expulsion of Germany from all her colonies and posts in the east. This last was done at the very outset and with the utmost thoroughness. The police duty has been performed throughout the war with perfect success. When we consider the extent of Allied commerce, let us say between Hong Kong and Aden and the heavy demand upon Britain's navy in the west, it is no small service to have made this largest commercial area in the world as safe in these four years of storm as in time of peace. But Japan has exceeded her pledge in this respect. When the

submarine menace was at its height and the Mediterranean became almost impassable, Japan joined the Allies in the protection of this area, contributing materially to the practical reclamation of this vital line of communications from which the submarine menace long ago disappeared. This service has been both costly and valuable, but it has not been dramatic. It easily permits the conclusion that no effort is being made. The writer has repeatedly been asked the impatient question during the last four years: "Why doesn't the British navy do something?" The questioner seemed wholly unconscious of the fact that that navy was performing incessantly and with complete success the most titanic and exhausting task ever performed by any fighting force. The task of Japan, though less strenuous, is of the same exacting but unobtrusive character.

It has been widely urged that Japan should have contributed to the struggle on land. This was physically impossible. The eastern front was barred both by the long distance and poor communications, and by the feeling of the Russian people who would not have tolerated the presence of their recent enemy in strength in their midst. The western front was twelve thousand miles away, accessible only by sea. At a time when no ships could be spared to bring wheat from Australia and too few were available to transport our own troops three thousand miles, the transportation of Japanese troops four times as far was obviously not to be considered. Japan has done what she could, and so far as can be seen, has done it cheerfully and wholeheartedly. The question has continually been raised whether Japan might not betray her allies and suddenly cast in her lot with Germany. There is nothing in the way of kinship or accumulated obligation to prevent it. Yet Japan has given no sign of defection. The writer is of the opinion that no government is more constrained by its plighted word than

this government, so recently the inheritor of the incomparable Samurai tradition. In any case the promise has been kept, and Japan presents herself before the world in council as an extremely strong claimant for whatever she sees fit to claim.

What will she claim? Formally she will perhaps ask nothing,—preferably so if she can avoid it. She will be happy if her claims are not mentioned in the conference, for to mention them will be to challenge them. Japan is the one great power that has realized substantial gains during the war and has succeeded in confirming herself in possession during the struggle. These gains are not primarily territorial, though the expulsion of Germany from her holdings in the east has left certain territories in her possession. Certain of these whose situation made their ownership a matter of concern to Australia and New Zealand, have been relinquished to their control. Others, and notably the famous Tsingtao, Germany's Gibraltar on the Shantung Peninsula, remain in Japanese possession. But these territorial problems, even so strategic a one as the last mentioned, are of small moment compared with other advantages which Japan has been able to secure while Europe was too occupied to interfere.

The capture of Tsingtao was the starting point for this very important advance of Japanese interests as also for a very significant and rapid evolution of policy on the part of the Japanese government and people. The announcement first made on the fall of Tsingtao was vaguely to the effect that Tsingtao had been recovered with a view to its restoration to the Chinese people, and lively expectations were at once aroused among the latter. These, however, were soon disappointed. A more explicit announcement soon followed to the effect that Tsingtao would be held by Japan during the continuance of the war after which the question of its

restitution would be taken up. This seemed to promise the consideration of the problem at the peace table, a recognition of the fact that questions of international relation between China and Japan were subject to its jurisdiction, or at least a proper subject for its advice.

But it could not fail to occur to the Japanese that this was a peculiarly favorable moment to escape from the tutelage of the western powers who had seldom shown themselves disinterested arbiters of Oriental interests. For once the long enforced deference to their opinion and wish might safely be laid aside. Hence China was informed that Japan thought it desirable to reach a settlement of all the questions at issue between the two nations. These questions,—some of them hardly living issues until this time,—amounted to a remarkable series of demands made by Japan upon China, embracing, among other things, the extension and prolongation of her hold upon Manchuria, the exclusion of foreign powers from specified parts of the Chinese coast, the transfer of control of the Chinese steel industry to Japanese hands, freedom of Japanese religious propaganda in China, and employment of Japanese experts in preference to those of other nations in all the constructive enterprises of the developing Chinese government. The purpose of these remarkable demands was to check the economic and above all the military power of the western nations in the Orient and to secure that of Japan in their stead. Despite the passionate opposition of the Chinese, the effort was almost completely successful. China was helpless, and her friends,—more exactly Japan's rivals,—were powerless to interfere. All of the demands except the last were finally conceded.¹

This diplomatic victory was not won without much commotion in the world. Germany of course protested but in

¹ For a fuller statement of these demands and the reasons partly justifying them, see "The Things Men Fight For," pp. 312-319.

vain. Russia can hardly have been reconciled, but it was not the moment to protest. Britain found her own strong position rather strengthened than menaced by the aggressive policy of Japan, though the unspoken animus of the movement, the Orient for the Orientals, had its disquieting suggestions. But Britain was plainly debarred from opposing an ally upon whose assistance she was so vitally dependent. Japan probably consulted her ally and acted with her approval, but that does not mean that the approval was willingly given. Decidedly Japan was in a strong position and she made the most of it.

But Japanese sagacity was never better shown than in her prompt adoption of a conservative and conciliatory policy following her victory. Political conditions at home fortunately enabled her to do this the more effectually. The retirement of the aged premier, Okuma, permitted the sagacious elder statesmen to dictate the appointment of a conciliatory successor. The ambassador to China whose strong handed action had made him hated by the Chinese was conveniently retired and Japan for three years has practiced to the full her incomparable art of ingratiation. The Chinese have short memories in matters that are remote from their daily thought, and there is little reason to doubt that the nation has learned to accommodate itself to the virtual suzerainty of Japan.

Most astonishing of all is the triumph of Japan in securing the recognition of outside powers and notably of ourselves.¹ In the fullest sense, Japan has fortified herself for the later action of the powers.

This, then, is Japan's stake in the settlement, the maintenance of her position of paramountcy in the Far East and particularly in China. During the war she has converted that position from a theory into a fact and has confirmed

¹ See page 123.

it by her arts. The peace conference will be the first and presumably the last ordeal which that paramountcy will be called upon to pass. Best of all for her purpose would it be to have the matter unmentioned, thus tacitly accepting it as an accomplished fact like the other historic facts upon which the governments represented depend. This is the probable attitude which the conference will take. There will be living issues enough without resurrecting any dead ones. Japan is an ally and has done her part. China is not yet a going concern and rights wrested from Japan on her behalf are a doubtful service to the cause of civilization and peace. And after all there are excellent reasons for each of the concessions obtained, reasons which would have seemed compelling had we been in the place of Japan. Above all it is to be noted that the paramount position which China has been compelled and we have been persuaded to recognize, has long been a concrete fact. A highly organized military and industrial nation situated at the very door of China, inert, mediaeval, and effete, necessarily occupies a position to which neither her helpless neighbor nor her efficient rivals ten thousand miles away can lay any claim. There is not much use in blinking facts like that or legislating against them.

But while there can be,— and probably should be,— no review of these transactions by the peace conference, despite the cherished hope of China to the contrary, there are interests that are menaced by the arrangement between the two powers which may well be made the subject of consideration. The policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for all nations in the trade of China and the development of her enormous resources, is a policy nominally in force since 1900. To this policy Japan, along with other powers, has given her assent, and this assent is said to have been renewed on the occasion of our recent approval of her policy. In the interest of China, in the interest of their own commerce, and

in the interest of the peace of the world, that policy should receive affirmation and, if possible, definition by the community of nations at this time. It is not nearly so self-explanatory a policy as it might seem. It implies, of course, equal tariffs, equal privileges, etc., for all nations. But the easiest thing in the world is to evade the spirit of such an agreement. Thus, at a time when Russia had guaranteed to Japan equal commercial privileges in Manchuria, she is said to have evaded her agreement by making it impossible for Japanese consuls to find office or domicile. As there could be no consuls without domicile and no commerce without consuls, the guaranteed equality was thus effectually withheld, but in a way difficult to make the ground of diplomatic protest. There is little likelihood that Japan will resort to such contemptible devices as this, but there are others. Particularly in the matter of concessions for railways, mining operations and the like, matters dependent upon special negotiations in each case, impartiality is not easy, nor is it guaranteed by a formula. The duty of the peace conference, either directly or through some delegated procedure, is to set definite limits to Japanese suzerainty in China. Properly limited, that suzerainty is a safeguard, not a menace. It assures first of all the integrity of China against the rivalries and the possible domination of the powers whose peace might find there its menace. It insures also the development of China as a Japanese asset. On the other hand the permanent domination of China by Japan in a sense which might make China a military menace to the western nations is most improbable. The Chinese are neither few nor weak. Japan will be cautious about putting the sword into their hands. With the development of modern intelligence and modern methods in China, a certain sense of opposition is likely to be felt between the two powers sufficient to protect the world from them and to give Japan very good reason.

for checking militarism on China's part. In other words, the much heralded yellow peril is one against which Japan must be on her guard, for if she ever armed China to fight her battles, China would inevitably get out of hand. The world has reason to be complacent over the Japanese hegemony of the Orient.

On the other hand, we have little to fear from the hostility of Japan. Japan is and must be a naval power. No resources in her possession or within her natural sphere of influence can ever give her world mastery of the seas. Her present allies hold that mastery and have every opportunity to retain it. If we can conceive of our own country ever having the folly to part company with its allied kin, a combination of Japan and Germany would be possible and perhaps fatal to either half and ultimately to both. But Japan will "cast in her lot with the English speaking peoples" if these peoples make common cause. If not, she will not and can not.

CHAPTER XIX

BRITAIN

In the summer of 1915 the writer had opportunity for prolonged conversations with an Englishman who was officially in touch with inner British circles. The relation became intimate and confidential. There could be no doubt of the sincerity of the views thus expressed. In the course of one of the conversations on the war, after a discussion of the aims and prospects of the various powers, the question finally came up: "And what do you want?" "Not a thing. We are not going to annex a single square mile." "But you will have to. You simply can't let Mesopotamia and Palestine with their strategic situation go back to Turkey or to anybody else who is in line for them. You must link up India and Egypt." "Well,—yes, I see your point, but (after hesitation), no, we must avoid it. We didn't go into this war to get territory, and our moral position as fighting a purely defensive war will be so much stronger if we stick to that program, that I think we shall find some way to avoid it."

Though speaking for himself, this man certainly reflected the opinion of high British circles at that time. There is no reason to assume that the preferences or judgments of these circles or of the British people have changed since that time. Yet we may take it as certain that this war will largely increase the responsibilities of the British Empire. The cynic will scoff and will find in this new discrepancy between British profession and British deeds one more occasion for the oft alleged British hypocrisy. We can anticipate the new diatribes of German critics about "perfidious Albion" and her conspiracy for the ruin of Germany and the

filching of her possessions. The Englishman was not insensible to the opportunity thus afforded.

A people in the stage of development in which the German people now find themselves simply can not understand or credit the attitude of reluctance to assume the responsibilities of empire. With a crude acquisitiveness untempered by scruple or experience, and conceiving of subject peoples not as weaklings claiming their toilsome guidance and protection, but as lower beings created for their service, empire for them means not burden but privilege. They do not appreciate that with the full acceptance of the principle of trusteeship the possibility of direct profit vanishes. Colonies to them mean prestige and profits, not burden and obligation. How can the people that conceives of the French and British as destined to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for themselves and that makes war upon a peaceable neighbor with the express purpose of appropriating the accumulated fruits of its industry and toil,— how can such a people regard the rule of negroes or Mongolians as entailing burdensome obligations? Colonies to them are assets and subject peoples are loot. Their colonies may be models of administration and their peoples cared for like stock on a dairy farm (neither of which has thus far been true) but it will be from motives of sagacious exploitation, not of human obligation. They can not conceive of true reluctance to accept such perquisites.

Yet nothing is more certain than that this reluctance characterizes those who have truly mastered the secret of empire as a great human trust. There may be no hesitation, no lack of resoluteness in undertaking the necessary task, but the attitude in which new obligations are accepted by a people that has given hostages to humanity is as different from the crass selfishness of the eager novice as white is from black. Empire for such a people loses its glamour and presents itself

in the sober gray of duty and poorly requited toil, a guise not without its attractions, but attractions incomprehensible to the uninitiated.

There are still all kinds of people in the British Empire and all kinds of attitudes toward imperial obligations. There are those who feel the primitive impulse to acquire with little care for anything beyond. There are those who are complacent with present gratifying achievements, too indolent to think beyond. There are those who shudder at the responsibilities that impend, and still others that would throw all over in disgust. But the British people have lost their crude eagerness to acquire. Their care is now to develop, to make self-sufficient, to lessen responsibilities, to emancipate, to complete rather than to extend the task of empire.

Meanwhile this task remains an ever enlarging fact. The work of empire, the correlation of separated but kindred peoples, the guidance of backward peoples, the protection of the weak, this work remains to be done and calls aloud for those who can do it. This is no fiction. Not long since certain petty states in the Malay Peninsula petitioned King George that they might be allowed to become a part of the Federated Malay States whose prosperity and superb administration they envied. The unanimous preference of the Syrian Moslems for English administration in the event of a change in Turkey, has already been noted (page 257). Nothing succeeds like success, and British administration is a success, its enemies themselves being witnesses.

But the immediate choice of the people is not the only nor the most compelling reason for the extension of these no longer alluring responsibilities. Little by little in all empires the fact reveals itself that the world refuses to divide satisfactorily. Wherever the lines are drawn, there are weak points that can only be strengthened by extension of control. No responsible empire makes these extensions wantonly, but all

tack or menace compels the unwelcome step. The imperial power is thus ever goaded on to further expansion. Such is the history of every healthy empire. Its growth is unwilling, reluctant, and at last coerced. The imperialism that is deliberate and avid is a disease.

The present is one of those epochs of coerced advance of which the British Empire has recorded so many. This necessity rests on several facts. First, upon the clear necessity of liquidating the imperial operations of Germany. As an imperial trust she must go out of business. We have learned nothing from the war if we have not learned that. Meanwhile her trust transactions call for a new trustee. Their location, if nothing else, prescribes Britain as the successor. The Caroline Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, and other scattered holdings in Oceanica are in the great British area. To assign them to any other power would be a forced and artificial arrangement which could have nothing but jealousies or irrelevant interests to recommend it. These will not go to England, be it noted, but to Australia, the nearby civilized commonwealth that is vitally interested in their occupancy by a possible enemy. There is abundant guaranty, however, that Australian administration will be guided by the invaluable British tradition.

The great question, however, is the disposal of the extensive German colonies of Togo, Cameroon, Southwest Africa, and German East Africa. The first two are tropical colonies and so situated that they link up with French possessions more naturally than with those of any other nation. While Britain has not surrendered her colonies of earlier foundation in this part of Africa, there is an obvious assumption underlying all Anglo-French relations since 1904 that this part of Africa is preëminently a French field of development. Moreover a large part of the German colony of Cameroon was French until recently, having been ceded to Germany in



1911 under compulsion in lieu of the much coveted Morocco. It is fitting and probable, therefore, that these colonies should be assigned to France and united with the adjacent French territories in a unit development.

German East Africa, also a tropical colony, adjoins British, Belgian, and Portuguese territories. Of these three there can be no thought of its union with any but the British. Belgium already has in the Belgian Congo a territory visibly in excess of her ability to manage. It owes its existence to a misguided attempt at internationalization which resulted in bankruptcy, fearful exploitation of the natives, and finally in assumption by Belgium by the logic of accident. No national exploitation of Africa can begin to show the incompetency and abuse which has characterized this great experiment in internationalism. The Portuguese colonies, on the other hand, have been conspicuous failures and their partition among other European powers was openly discussed and practically agreed upon before the war without protest from Portugal herself. She has long ago been weighed in the balances and found wanting.

Turning to the remaining colony of Southwest Africa we have a wholly different problem, and one which is strangely misunderstood. Southwest Africa was for Germany a dependency, a possession, a source of materials for her industries and of men for the armies which, as she boasted, were to keep British South Africa from aiding their associate dominions. It was, in short, the estate of an absentee landlord. But Southwest Africa is by nature a part of the great South African Commonwealth, the white man's Africa, a white man's nation, free to determine its own destinies as is Australia or Canada or England herself. The question therefore is not one of passing over a chattel from one power to another, but of emancipating white man's land and uniting it to its own. It is a question of Africa irredenta, of freedom.

and independence as contrasted with perpetual subjection, for Germany never contemplated the freeing of her colonies.

But there is a larger question than this and one that has been surprisingly ignored. Despite all our striving and all our protestations we still continue to consider these questions rather from the standpoint of suzerain privilege than from that of colonial welfare. The plea is continually in our ears or in our thoughts as to whether Germany should not have "her share" of colonies and the like, the good things of earth. Maddened by her inhuman acts we nerve ourselves to outlaw the great offender and to confiscate her colonies, but we are still conscious of having deprived her of something normally hers, something which if decent she might rightfully claim. We divide up Africa as Jacob and Esau divided the herds.

As regards tropical races and peoples destined to permanent or prolonged incapacity for self management, the right of the civilized world to impose the conditions of order can not reasonably be doubted, though it is a question whether even upon such races the civilized world has the right to impose its barriers and its feuds. But in a country like South Africa which is certain to be the home of white men and the seat of a great civilized independent state, this question becomes far more important. Europe is hopelessly divided in language and from this difference derive others which taken in the aggregate make political union impossible and even peace precarious. The present awful calamity which is said already to have cost the lives of eight million men is wholly due to diversities of race which in last analysis are matters of speech and custom.

But awful as is this situation, in Europe it has its explanation, its reason. Europe itself is divided into sharply differentiated areas fit to engender race peculiarities but offering advantages which compensate for them. The seas and

straits and gulfs that divide Europe are the most facile of highways, the channels through which move the stimulating and vivifying currents of life. Europe is the most quarrelsome but also the most dynamic, the most civilized, part of the world. Nature is responsible for both.

But South Africa is not made that way. To transfer to that unit area the diversities and antipathies of Europe would give it perfectly gratuitous disadvantages with no possible compensation. These colonies are young yet. The German colony has virtually no German population and the schism is not yet born. But let it be German for a hundred years, and we would have there a German area permanently incapable of union with the neighboring English speaking district which is, and forever must be, the dominant white element in South Africa. We should have gratuitously created a barrier for future generations to balk at, perhaps to drench with their blood. It requires a profound belief in the merits of German culture (a culture which the writer by no means despises) to make such a course as that seem worth while.

It will of course be said in reply that a similar divergence exists between French and English. Yes, and regrettably so, but the cases are not even approximately parallel. The French and British colonies are sandwiched in together in some parts of Africa in a way that seems at this distance unfortunate, a thing perhaps to be remedied by exchanges. But these are *tropical colonies*, and tropical colonies will never become white man's land. The population will always be native and will for an indefinite period retain its native language. Whether these natives in addition acquire a smattering of French or English is irrelevant as regards their political or cultural future. But a land that is destined to fill up with white men should avoid the white men's dissensions, especially when the country itself speaks unreservedly for union. The problem of Southwest Africa is not a prob-

lem of the rights of Germany or of Britain. It is a problem of developing a united people in a united land. If German had the same dominating position in South Africa that English now holds, the writer for one would unhesitatingly vote for a German unity.

It is perhaps worth while to note that the dissensions thus forecast are by no means speculative. They have long existed and Southwest Africa has long been a thorn in the flesh of the neighboring Commonwealth. It was no doubt in part due to this that the Commonwealth espoused the cause of Britain so wholeheartedly and devoted a hundred million dollars and a considerable army to the expulsion of "neighbor Hans" from his objectionable point of vantage. This hostility was not merely racial, but in this case had the artificial virulence which William Hohenzollern has everywhere known how to give it. But artificial or not, its effect was not the less real. In German Southwest Africa had been planted the seeds of one of the world's great antagonisms which it is the good fortune of the present generation to pluck up ere it was grown.

The case of the Portuguese colonies is not relevant to our discussion, yet intimately associated with our problem. Their fate has long been determined. Portugal does nothing, can do nothing, to develop them. It is due to them and to the world that some arrangement should be made to bring them under more favorable conditions. Britain's control of Portugal should make that possible. Indeed an arrangement was announced before the war dividing them between Britain and Germany. The eastern colony holds the same relation to the South African Commonwealth on the east that the German colony holds on the west, only the contact is much closer and more vital. It should be united to that great state now, before alien institutions and alien culture

make the union unnecessarily slow and difficult. The great western colony requires different treatment.

The cases of Arabia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia have been sufficiently considered in the chapter on Turkey. These districts for many reasons will doubtless pose as independent states, but in varying degrees they must inevitably be British dependencies. Arabia will be an isolated shrine in which Britain will have no other function than to protect its isolation,— and insure its sanitation. Palestine will be a competently administered up-to-date artificial state, which will require nothing of Britain save protection from foreign aggression, and will repay that protection with perfect loyalty. Mesopotamia will require British capital and British administration and can hardly escape becoming an avowed British protectorate. As such it will again become the Garden of Eden. Perhaps Anatolia and Constantinople will claim the healing touch, but the claim may well be denied.

The problem of problems in connection with the coming settlement is the control of the sea. That control Britain has maintained against all comers for two reasons that are peculiar to herself. The first is the insular position and dense industrial population of England. That population normally raises but thirty per cent. of its food. The rest is imported by sea. If the sea routes are closed, England starves. No other country is so situated. If any other country loses the use of the sea, it suffers but it does not starve. England alone must have the freedom of the sea or her present population can not continue to live there, but must migrate and ruin her industries, her everything.

To this unique necessity is added another, equally imperative and equally unique. England is but the European headquarters of a vast aggregate a hundred times her area and

with ten times her population. This group of nations, falsely called an empire, constitutes the greatest power in the world, solely by virtue of its voluntary coöperation. But this co-operation is rendered possible only by the use of the sea. If this use were denied them, no amount of sympathy or desire to help one another would be of any avail. The great power would automatically crumble into a lot of scattered little powers helpless to achieve any worthy work for the world, helpless even to maintain their own existence.

No more pertinent demand can therefore be made of a defeated Germany than the surrender of her navy. That navy was built solely to destroy the navy of Britain, that is, to destroy the British Empire. Even when Germany had colonies, her navy stood in no relation to their number or needs. With the loss of her colonies, she loses even the pretext for the maintenance of a vast navy. That navy necessitated the expansion of every other naval program in the world. No other form of German militarism was so odious, so burdensome upon the entire world, so utterly gratuitous. No other form is so capable of suppression by international action. To propose the destruction of German militarism and yet leave Germany in possession of a monster navy which exists, not as the condition of her national union, nor yet for the protection of her commerce, but purely for the purpose of challenging the safety and the existence of other powers, is a proposal which would invalidate every argument by which the Allies have justified their action.

A logical corollary of the surrender of the German navy would be the surrender of the Kiel Canal. It is true that this Canal serves commercial as well as naval purposes, though the latter were the real cause of its construction. Commercial purposes it would of course continue to serve in any case. But the Canal must in any case continue to exist, and so long as it exists it must potentially serve Germany's purpose. The

idea of withholding it from her by internationalization involves the usual fallacy of assuming that such arrangements are self-enforcing. If the Canal would serve Germany's purpose in any future war, she would take it, and no international precautions would prevent it.

Britain controls the sea that she may use the sea, for she must use the sea or perish. Her need and her right are such as no other nation knows. And now she is asked to surrender that control and to trust the freedom of the seas and with it her own existence and the lives of her people to an international league, a league having as yet only a theoretical existence, a league of whose competence, of whose justice, of whose sympathy, even of whose existence, she has as yet had no experience. *SHE WILL NOT DO IT.* *The world can not afford to have her do it.* The experiment must be tried with some lesser stake than the existence of the "great and sacred international trust" which, more than any other power, holds the safety of the world in its keeping. British statesmen and the British people have too much feeling for reality to trifle thus with the heritage of a thousand years.

And all for what? What do we wish to accomplish by this new international agency that we summon from the limbo of the imagination to take over the task of this veteran of the seas? To open the waterways to all honest folk? To light the beacon on the savage's inhospitable shores? To rid the sea of the marauder? To remove the barriers and the toll-gates? To rescue the shipwrecked? To maintain by pitiless discipline the law of "women and children first"? In which of these has Britain failed? What sea has she closed? What waterway has she barred? What harbor does she monopolize? Is there a reef that she has not charted, a coast that she has left unlighted, a pirate that she has not hunted? Is there a harbor under the control of her Parliament that she does not open to the ships of her rivals on the

same terms as to her own? Is there an abuse that she willingly tolerates, a possible forbearance that she does not show? What is the world's grievance that impels it to dismiss this most competent of unpaid servitors?

But Britain smites her enemies upon the sea, drives them to cover and shuts them in, all to the sore discomfort of those who were trafficking profitably with them. Precisely, just as land powers pursue their enemies upon the land with vastly greater disturbance and devastation. But what is there in recent British history to warrant the fear that her power will be used wantonly or tyrannously? It is fatuous to expect peace by the disarmament of the conservative and forbearing. The weapon in such hands is rather a guaranty of peace than its menace. We have read the story of the wars that the British navy has fought, but who knows the story of the wars it has prevented?

There has been just one intelligible protest against Britain's control of the sea, that of the power that wishes to destroy her. That control is the condition of the existence of that fellowship of free nations which Germany abhors, and the very substance of its power. Withdraw the British navy from the seas and nothing will effectually hinder Germany's ruthless purpose. Eliminate that purpose, and Britain will withdraw her navy without a mandate.

This protest against Britain's control of the sea is made in the name of internationalism, but in the interest (consciously or unconsciously) of the crudest and most illiberal nationalism. The seer of visions as usual plays into the hands of the seeker of gains. Meanwhile if the fondest of visions were realized, we should at the utmost be where we are now as regards the permanent interests of the safety and freedom of the seas. The thing we crave is as like the thing we have as tweedledum like tweedledee. And yet it is not the same, for the thing we have embodies the instincts and the

traditions which the greatest of seafaring peoples has slowly developed during fifteen centuries.

NOTE. For a more complete study of the problem of sea control see the author's earlier work, "The Things Men Fight For," Chapters VI and XIII.

One of Germany's fiercest protagonists, Count Reventlow, has stated that as regards the use of the seas in time of peace Germany has no grievance. Only schemes of conquest are interfered with.

It is perhaps a mistake to take seriously the newspaper speculation which runs riot at a time like this, but it is not always easy to ignore it. Our Secretary of the Navy recommends an enormous increase in our navy. So be it. We are a naval power with extensive coasts to protect and interests exposed to the covetousness of all nations. But now comes the report that we are to go to the peace conference armed with the greatest navy in the world,—larger than that of Britain,—*to demand the freedom of the seas*. What does that mean? From whom are we to demand it? From defeated Germany? From allied France? There can be but one answer. *From Britain*. It is difficult to say whether such a demand would be characterized most by foolhardiness or by criminality. Were it not that certain official pronouncements, including the famous fourteen points, have been disquietingly suggestive of an effort to coerce Britain to adopt measures which she regards as incompatible with her safety and her duty to the world, the suggestion might be dismissed as too preposterous for consideration.

CHAPTER XX

AMERICA

AMONG the great powers that are actively engaged in the world struggle, the position of America seems to be unique. The interests involved did not at first seem to be our interests. In the territorial sense we were not attacked, nor was any attack contemplated, at least during the present conflict. In her tactless way, too, Germany made the most earnest efforts to win our friendship, sacrificing what seemed to her substantial interests in order to do so. We accordingly essayed to be neutral, even in our inmost thoughts. When we finally entered the contest, it was still with no sense of serious danger. Even the submarine warfare which amply justified our course, did not seem to threaten our existence. There can be no doubt that so far as the popular consciousness is concerned, we entered the war for other than the compelling reasons of national safety which actuated our Allies. We quite naturally conclude that our action was on a higher plane and our motives more disinterested than those of other nations. Quite possibly this was the case. Our motives were naturally determined by our appreciation of the situation, and the danger that we did not perceive did not influence our action.

It is perhaps due to this fact that we have shown so marked a disposition to emphasize the theoretical and abstract aims of the war. The recognition of general principles merely as such, of forms of political organization and doctrines of popular rights, have seemed the appropriate ends for a nation seeking no tangible interests to demand as the fruits of victory. It has not always occurred to us that the recognition thus demanded might be a mere lip service, and that a nation so

skilled in dissembling as is our antagonist might purchase a dangerous immunity by conformity to these shibboleths. In short there has been an element of serious danger in this confident assumption that we were free from danger and at liberty to espouse ideals while others were compelled to think of groveling material interests. It has made us quixotic and unsympathetic toward the material interests of our Allies, careless even of our own.

For the danger was there, quite as real and quite as serious for us as for the others. The perception of this fact has become clearer as the war has progressed. The present war was not aimed at America, it is true. Its objectives were prudently limited to the defeat of Russia, the appropriation of the colonies and capital of France, the incorporation of Belgium, and the dismemberment and plunder of the British Empire. But with Britain destroyed, France plundered and forced into alliance, and Russia crippled and subject to German exploitation, the Kaiser's purpose to "stand no nonsense from America" was ready to reveal its true significance. Just what was to happen to us is not clear, nor is it certain that war was contemplated. It was probably assumed that our nonsense could be dealt with by less expensive means, not an unreasonable assumption. It matters little. The important thing is that the Kaiser was to be in a position to say what he would stand and what he would not stand. We were to recognize his authority. If the lesson of this war were not sufficient, there would be other lessons as needed.

There is still a tendency in certain quarters to refer to these designs with a certain levity. Such an attitude is not warranted either by the seriousness of German designs or by the American capacity for defense. If the Allies had been defeated,—if even now they could be persuaded to accept an inconclusive peace,—these German designs would be realized with terrible literalness. When we see by how narrow a mar-

gin that disaster has been averted, we can but shudder at the danger that we have escaped.

Whatever our purposes, therefore, in entering the war, our purposes in closing it should be shaped by this fuller revelation. We know now why we ought to have entered the war, and that must determine our terms of peace. Not merely as a knight errant generously espousing the cause of weaker nations, but as one that stands as our kinsmen stood "with our backs to the wall," fighting for the right to live, must we make peace with our enemy.

First of all we must insist upon the exclusion from the Western Hemisphere of any power which might endanger our peace and our independence. More specifically, we must bar Germany from these shores. It has been suggested that this take the form of the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of international law. It would perhaps be better to avoid associating such a declaration with this historic doctrine which is too intimately associated with our own country and too much motived by our national interests to command the sympathy of the Latin American republics. It is these republics that are sure to be the first sufferers from German aggression. Brazil was hopelessly in the toils of German finance and marked for German appropriation before this war began. From such a country,— better still, from a group of such countries,— the plea for protection may appropriately come. It is for diplomacy to arrange these important matters of detail, but for American vigilance to see that the necessary purpose is accomplished.¹

Not that we are to imagine for a moment that such an international guaranty will make us safe against aggression. It can not be too strongly insisted that no international

¹ For the author's fuller discussion of the Latin American problem as related to the United States, and, particularly, to the problem of the Caribbean and the Canal, see "America Among the Nations," Chapters V-XII.

power exists or is likely to exist which can of itself and without national aid secure such ends. A coherent internationalism will be a partial internationalism with powerful enemies outside that do not own its law. An inclusive and all embracing internationalism would include the dissensions and the dangers against which it exists to defend the world. Our right arm must be our defense for a long, long time to come. But recognition is not without its value. It puts a quietus upon minor protests and at least insures local acquiescence. And if the worst comes, it is easier to fight for a recognized right than for an unsupported claim.

But more material interests may well claim our attention. There are disturbing ownerships in the Caribbean which menace our control of the Canal, the most vital of all our possessions. Holland owns her Dutch Guiana on the Caribbean coast. We could have no more innocent or well disposed neighbor if Holland were independent. But Holland is not independent. During this war she has done all in her power to remain neutral, but Germany has compelled her to grant concessions which were a breach of neutrality. This relation is always potentially present, a relation of dependence. The relation may slowly become one of virtual incorporation into the Germanic unity of which Holland is so natural a part. Had the Germans succeeded in retaining Belgium as they intended, the incorporation of Holland would virtually be an accomplished fact. With this incorporation would go the power to use Holland's colonies, including Guiana. It was precisely this danger which induced us to acquire the Virgin Isles from Denmark lest later forcible annexation of the little kingdom to Germany might give the latter control of a territory dangerous to our safety. The danger is hardly less in the case of Holland.

France is similarly situated, her islands at the eastern end of the Caribbean being a close counterpart for the Virgin Isles

and her Guiana similar to that of Holland. But France is stronger and seems to be little in danger of incorporation into a German Empire. The loss of such colonies as the result of an unsuccessful war, however, is not impossible. It would have resulted, as we have seen, from a French defeat in the present war. To this we may add the fact that these trifling possessions are isolated from the great French colonial territories and are doubtless unprofitable, the maintenance of communications being expensive. France is at present heavily indebted to the United States for money loaned. In another sense the United States is more deeply indebted to France. Only with a blush could we accept payment of her debt to us, while unable to pay our debt to her. If the cancellation of our claim or some very generous portion of it against the cession of these scattered fragments of earlier empire could simplify the relation involved and lessen the burdens of France without a hurt to her sensibilities, it would perhaps be of general advantage. But France is not a menace, and if she prefers to continue to share with us the responsibilities of the Caribbean, we need not regret it. In this sense the case is not parallel to that of Denmark and Holland.

More important than any adjustment of territory is the question of the control of the sea. Like Britain, we are a naval power. Economically we are less dependent upon sea communications than Britain. Isolation would not mean starvation, nor would it sever us from any vital part of ourselves. No nation is so well situated as we are for self-sufficient existence. Yet the blockade of our coasts would cause us almost inconceivable distress. We should be astonished to find how long is the list of the necessities for which we depend upon foreign lands. Many an industry would be brought to a standstill and widespread depression would result.

But the more vital fact is our problem of national defense.

No great power can ever attack us otherwise than by sea, and if we fail to defend ourselves by sea, we shall not defend ourselves. Not that land defense is impossible, but it is certain to be the one for which we are least prepared, and if the stronger arm fails us, the weaker will not prevail. We are therefore interested hardly less than Britain in the problem of control of the sea.

It is hardly necessary to repeat here what was said in the last chapter on this subject. Far from the noise of battle we have been free to indulge in idealistic speculations as our Allies have not. Remote realities become unrealities and are easily exchanged for the unrealities of speculation on even terms. Let us develop internationalism into a reality as rapidly as we may, but let there be no interregnum while nationalism is relaxed and internationalism is not yet effective. We must still keep the seas.

In framing the treaty of peace there are ends to be kept in view which are more vital than those nominated in the bond. Of these, none is so important to us or to the world as the unity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and this for two reasons. In the first place, they have essentially identical interests, material and ideal. All are industrial and commercial nations, dependent for their coöperation and for their contact with the world upon the freedom of the sea. That freedom is in their keeping, and with it the peace and prosperity of the world. United they can easily meet the requirements of their responsible position. Divided, they will exhaust themselves with the superhuman task and eventually fail. The lessons of these days which have seen the two navies merged into a single force and the Union Jack, proudest of national emblems, floating from an American flagship, while the Stars and Stripes floated from the Parliament House in Westminster above the flag of Britain, should not be forgotten. It is the symbol of what must henceforth be if we are not to squander our force and risk our existence.

But far more vital is the union of our ideal interests. We are all free nations, and intent that the world shall be free. The power we hold is held subject to this, our common purpose. In no selfish particularism of race but as the beginning of human unity, we strengthen the bonds of common ideals and common purpose which make us one. The world will not be united as a motley assemblage of discordant wills, divergent cultures, and differing developments, all by the magic of an agreement and a mechanized procedure. The union will come by gradual crystallization around a congenial center. Ours is the privilege and ours the responsibility as a race, of furnishing that nucleus of crystallization. At the center is England, mother of free peoples and free institutions. Around this center is the larger circle born from her or drawn to her, the circle that we call Britain. All Britain is British in some very real sense, though only the center is English.

Farther reaching is the larger circle in which we find our place. It is not English; it is not British. It is Anglo-Saxon. Nearer by far to England than much that is British, this outer circle after all owns a different allegiance, uses a different symbol, and enjoys a more obvious independence. Less clear is the bond of unity, but not less vital.

Again the circle enlarges and peoples feel the mystic bond who are neither English nor British nor Anglo-Saxon. France speaks another language, owns a different origin, and boasts a different culture. But France is free, and this is our talisman. With her accession the widening circle becomes the circle of the free peoples.

Build about this center the league of the nations. Enlarge the circle of the free peoples. Strengthen their hand for the defense of the world's liberties. Exchange not the substance of things realized for the shadow of things imagined. Welcome the humblest accession of the free in spirit, but bar the

proudest of the unregenerate. Compel no lip service. Trust no deathbed repentances. For neither by clever contrivance nor by outward profession of faith, but by unobtrusive growth and transformation of spirit will mankind attain the goal of unity and peace without the sacrifice of liberty.



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